FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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America's New Course . . . . . *William G. Hyland* 1
The Soviet Union and the Rule of Law
Richard Thornburgh 13
Gorbachev the Economist . . . . . *Marshall I. Goldman* 28
The German Question . . . . . *Christoph Bertram* 45
A United Germany . . . . . *Ronald D. Asmus* 63
Czechoslovakia: Road to Revolution . . *William H. Luers* 77
Cambodia and the International Community
Stephen J. Solarz 99
Technology and Competitiveness: The New Policy Frontier
B. R. Inman and *Daniel F. Burton, Jr.* 116
Thomas Jefferson and American Foreign Policy
Robert W. Tucker and *David C. Hendrickson* 135
America and the Russian Future (1951)
George F. Kennan 157
Recent Books on International Relations 167
Source Material 190

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William G. Hyland

AMERICA'S NEW COURSE

For the past fifty years American foreign policy has been formed in response to the threat posed by this country's opponents and enemies. In virtually every year since Pearl Harbor, the United States has been engaged either in war or in confrontation. Now, for the first time in half a century, the United States has the opportunity to reconstruct its foreign policy free of most of the constraints and pressures of the Cold War.

Upon reaching such a turning point, it is natural to fall back on certain basic principles as a guide to charting a new course. This is a difficult undertaking for the United States. The basic foreign policy principle of the Founding Fathers—nonentanglement—was prescribed for a weak republic surrounded by the territories of stronger European powers, who were determined to carry their ancient struggles to the New World. Nonentanglement in these endless conflicts was clearly in the national interest of the fledgling United States, and for well over 150 years the United States was secure behind the protection of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans (and the British fleet). But Pearl Harbor destroyed the illusion that America could somehow remain safe while ignoring distant threats to the peace in Europe and Asia.

Since 1941 the United States has been fully entangled. Now as we move into a new era, a yearning for American nonentanglement may be returning in various guises. If the Cold War is over—and there seems to be a growing consensus that it is—how far should the United States go in disengaging from the positions it created during the past fifty years? Can America at long last come home?

The answer is not at all clear. The United States does in fact enjoy the luxury of some genuine choices for the first time since 1945. America and its allies have won the Cold War, and some disengagement is quite possible. No demands are heard from responsible quarters for a return to isolation, but there are proposals from both right and left for a substantial

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reduction in the American presence abroad. Even the centrists who advise maintaining a significant American involvement allow for some retrenchment.

II

The Great Debate has started once again; much as it did in 1914–20 and in the early years of the Cold War. The main question is this: For what purpose and to what end should America commit its awesome power and resources? What will be the new priorities of a post-containment foreign policy, and which instruments will be most effective?[1]

It is worth recalling that there have always been legitimate reservations about the extensive commitments that the United States undertook in the Cold War. Even as President Truman moved the United States toward a new internationalism, there were strong voices, especially from the moderate right (e.g., Ohio's Republican Senator Robert A. Taft), arguing against such commitments, or insisting that the new obligations be strictly limited. This was particularly true in 1950–51, after the Korean War broke out and the first American troops were returned to Europe, but that debate was easily resolved because the danger from the communist bloc was clear and present.

Now danger emanating from Moscow is no longer the driving force of debate. This country has to decide what role it wishes to play in the world when there is no overwhelming danger to national security and no clearly identifiable enemy. That is the central change, but there are other dimensions that will shape this new debate.

The most important structural change is that the clear bipolar division of international politics has broken down in two respects. First, the two superpowers are no longer clearly predominant, compared with the relative power of a number of other countries in Europe and Asia; this has been true for some time. The second change is more surprising: the once fundamental East-West division is now virtually eliminated by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the weakening of the Soviet state.[2]

[1] For an analysis of post-Cold War choices, see Charles William Maynes, "America Without the Cold War," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1990; see also Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, "Bipartisan Objectives for American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1988; Stanley Hoffmann, "What Should We Do in the World," *The Atlantic Monthly*, October 1989; and Burton Yale Pines, "Waiting for Mr. X," *Policy Review*, Summer 1989.

[2] See Hoffmann, *op. cit.*

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The revolution of 1989 has yet to run its course, especially in Europe, but the character of American policy has already begun to change in response to the events in Eastern Europe. The Cold War was a broadly conceived struggle that gave primacy to geopolitics and military preparedness. At the outset, the United States was the most powerful nation in the world. Few questioned that it could afford the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the rearmament of NATO, the strategic arms race, the interventions in Korea and Vietnam or, more recently, the buildup of armaments in the early 1980s. For the next decade, however, ideological and military issues are likely to recede, economic factors will predominate and other issues (e.g., the environment, terrorism, drug trafficking) will grow in importance.

The United States remains the strongest world power, indeed the only truly global power, but its resources are no longer commensurate with the maintenance of the exalted position it held in the postwar period. In the 1990s few would claim that Washington has anything approaching the kind of freedom of action it enjoyed in the Cold War decades. In this regard, the world of the 1990s and beyond will resemble nothing in America's previous experience. This country will be required to conduct a "normal" foreign policy for which there is almost no precedent, with limited resources, in an increasingly competitive world in which the threat that held together the various anticommunist alliances will have vanished.

Because American resources are limited, the United States also has to weigh more carefully its international goals against increasingly urgent demands at home. In 1988 two former presidents, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, formed a group of experts to examine the "American Agenda" and issue a report to the incoming president. They commented on the situation that the nation faced at home:

> We see two Americas, one increasingly wealthy, one tragically poor, a land of opportunity for most and of idle hopelessness for too many, a nation never so prosperous or so profligate. And in between are middle Americans, many of whom are struggling to hold their own.[3]

The current arguments over a "peace dividend" are symptomatic of this conflict between domestic and foreign policies.

[3] *American Agenda: Report to the Forty-First President of the United States of America*. Camp Hill, Pa.: Book-of-the-Month Club, n.d., p. 22.

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That conflict has always been present, but in the Cold War national security concerns had to prevail. Now the arguments are likely to be more evenly balanced, and the choices will be more complex.

Since 1945 the United States has had to bear the bulk of the burden of the Cold War, as well as the risks. In some periods, American leaders have welcomed the freedom to go it alone. Unilateral globalism was a charge frequently heard in the early days of the Reagan administration. But the United States is no longer alone. More recently there has been a revival of the idea of burden-sharing, given the obvious fact that America is allied to most of the wealthiest and strongest powers on the planet. In the next decade, going it alone will become an increasingly less justifiable course, and working out a redistribution of burdens will become a crucial challenge to American foreign policy.

III

In the name of what principle, therefore, will the American people be asked to continue bearing their international commitments and responsibilities abroad: the balance of power, economic security, human rights, democratic freedoms?

Throughout American history there has been a conflict between the dictates of geopolitics and the values the United States has championed—human rights and democracy.[4] The Cold War saw constant tension between, on the one hand, a preoccupation with strategic requirements and, on the other, a concern that the unpalatable compromises and alliances the United States was forced to make, or chose to accept in the name of anticommunism, were corrupting America's traditional support of democratic values. It was periodically charged that the United States subordinated human rights and democratic institutions to realpolitik.

As the Cold War winds down, this tension over goals and practices will become more acute. It is reflected in two current debates: which policies won the Cold War, and what is the proper balance between concern for human rights and the requirements of realpolitik.

As to the first question, in the wake of the communist collapse in Eastern Europe two lines of argument are taking shape. One is that communism surrendered to the irresistible

[4] See Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, "Thomas Jefferson and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1990.

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demands for human rights and that freedom triumphed because its time had come. This view has been eloquently expressed by Czechoslovakia's new president, Václav Havel:

> The tide turned and the concept that turned it was the old European (and American) concept of human rights . . . with the moral rather than the tangible support of other Europeans (and Americans and Canadians) this concept of human rights paved the way for the enormous changes in Eastern Europe that we have recently witnessed.[5]

The opposing interpretation takes the following line:

> What is clear is that in the fourth decade of the East's imprisonment, the U.S. and its allies determined to stand up more firmly than ever to the 'other force' and that the Soviet Union decided to stand down.[6]

This debate is not only about history; it is also about the next phase of Western (and American) policy and the path which that policy ought to follow. Those who are convinced that the anticommunist revolution of Eastern Europe was encouraged mainly by American power argue that it is too soon to give up positions of strength. They add that a reversion of the U.S.S.R. to its past expansionism is possible, though not probable because Soviet foreign policymaking is tied too closely to Gorbachev, whose problems at home are only growing. Others claim that a new era is opening, that matters have gone too far for Soviet policy to be reversed, and therefore it is high time to address a new agenda and leave behind much of the Cold War mentality and its policies.

New fuel to this debate has been provided by the elections in Nicaragua: one side is already arguing that it was the pressures from the contras and the United States that forced Sandinista President Daniel Ortega to hold elections, which then led to his downfall. The other side argues that the credit should go to the Latin American presidents who promoted the peace process and the elections, and thereby gave the Sandinistas a face-saving way out.[7]

[5] Václav Havel, "The Chance Will Not Return," *U.S. News and World Report*, Feb. 26, 1990, p. 30.

[6] "Who Won Eastern Europe?," editorial in *The Wall Street Journal*, Feb. 23, 1990, p. 10. For a recent critique of Cold War policies see Strobe Talbott, "Rethinking the Red Menace," *Time*, Jan. 1, 1990; an opposing view is provided by Richard Pipes, "Gorbachev's Russia: Breakdown or Crackdown?" *Commentary*, March 1990. See also Paul Taylor, "Cheney Finds That CIA Chief is No Comrade in Arms," *The Washington Post*, March 6, 1990, p. 21.

[7] Al Kamen, "U.S. Strategy: Pressure for Vote," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 28, 1990, p. 1.

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The second debate is similar, but it is over China. It has erupted with considerable vehemence:

> Once again China offers a choice especially difficult for Americans: between a foreign policy based on moral concerns and one that gives priority to geostrategic factors. Again, the U.S. relationship with China poses a head-on conflict between realpolitik and human rights.[8]

The Nixon-Kissinger opening to China in 1972 was justified in the name of creating a balance of power against the Soviet Union, and was welcomed in the United States even though the regime in Beijing had just emerged from the long bloody repressions of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In 1989, however, the Cold War was virtually over and the "China Card" was worth far less. Although the post-Tienanmen Square debate has been cast in terms of China policy, it is at bottom a debate over the new purposes of America's post-Cold War policy.

The case for geopolitics was expressed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger:

> A crackdown was . . . inevitable. But its brutality was shocking, and even more so the trials and Stalinist-style propaganda that followed. Nevertheless, China remains too important for America's national security to risk the relationship on the emotions of the moment. The United States needs China as a possible counterweight to Soviet aspirations in Asia and needs China also to remain relevant in Japanese eyes as a key shaper of Asian events.[9]

The contrary position was summed up in congressional debate by New York Democratic Representative Stephen Solarz:

> It is the view of the House and the American people that our relationship with China will be influenced by the extent to which the Chinese authorities respect the fundamental human rights of their own people.[10]

Which side is right in these two debates is not the only issue; the broader question is whether the United States should now

[8] Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Realism and Chinese Repression," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 13, 1989.

[9] "The Caricature of Deng as a Tyrant Is Unfair," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 1, 1989. For a defense of the Bush administration's policy see Michel Oksenberg, "Bush is Right on China," *The New York Times*, Dec. 13, 1989, p. 31 and A. Doak Barnett, "Increasingly Bush Seems Right on China," *The New York Times*, Jan. 21, 1990, p. 21.

[10] Quoted in Martin Tolchin, "House, Breaking with Bush, Votes China Sanctions," *The New York Times*, June 30, 1989, p. 1. Also see Winston Lord, "Misguided Mission," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 19, 1989, p. 23; and Anthony Lewis, "Kissinger and China," *The New York Times*, Aug. 20, 1989, p. 23.

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realign its foreign policy, leavening the older concerns over national security and geopolitics with greater concern for moral values, namely democracy and human rights.

In fact this clash may not be as sharp as it seems in the abstract. As the Cold War recedes, the interests of geopolitics and human rights may actually come to coincide in American policy more than at any time in the past. Consider, for example, two recent unrelated but instructive incidents—the intervention of the U.S. Air Force in Philippine politics in support of the Aquino government, and the invasion of Panama. Neither action was taken to suppress a communist threat, but both actions received strong American popular support. Both were justified as a defense of democracy, but at the same time these two areas, Panama and the Philippines, would fall clearly within any definition of U.S. security interests.

The promotion of democracy is a laudable American ambition, but could become a perilous guide to policy. If applied indiscriminately, such a policy could invite interventionism in the 1990s much as anticommunism did during the Cold War. It is one thing to support the new democracies of Eastern Europe that have liberated themselves, but it would be another matter to intervene to institute democracy in, say, South Africa or Iran.

There will also be instances where democratic alternatives are simply lacking (e.g., currently in Cambodia), and the United States will still be forced to accommodate itself to some unpalatable partners. Americans must decide to what extent the United States should intervene to support rebellion in the name of democracy. It is ironic that the regions where progress has been minimal in human rights are areas where direct U.S. involvement either would be ineffective (in most of Africa) or dangerous (China, Indochina and the Middle East).

Nevertheless, present evidence suggests that the realism of geopolitics is giving way to the idealism of human rights. If, after all, this turns out to be the new thrust of American policy it should not be too surprising; at the base of its motivation, containment was always intended as a means to this end.

IV

During the Cold War every administration was concerned with the high cost of a global strategy of containment. But in almost every instance where there was a clash in priorities

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between economic policy and national security, the latter prevailed. As a result, after almost fifty years of containment policy the United States has emerged from the Cold War in a precarious economic position. Just how precarious is open to debate, but there seems to be a consensus that, "the new force in the world is neither arms nor political ideology; it is economic power."[11] There also seems to be a consensus that the United States has lost its economic hegemony, and to correct new imbalances it must put its fiscal house in order. Unfortunately there is no agreement on how to do this.

Reducing the budget deficit seems to be the starting point of every plan. This always leads to the question of reductions in defense spending, for it is in the Pentagon's budget that large sums of money can be saved by making even modest spending reductions; some experts envisage a fifty-percent reduction over the next several years.[12] But budget reductions ought to reflect a military strategy, and there has not yet been enough time to work out a new military strategy that supports post-Cold War foreign policy goals and priorities. Hence the budget debate and the strategic debate feed on each other—and end in stalemate. The way out of this dilemma is through a new policy that reflects a realistic appraisal of the near- and long-term threats of the post-Cold War era, and a new consensus on the balance between commitments and resources.

The trade deficit, on the other hand, is linked to the issue of the increasing economic power of Japan. Efforts to correct the American trade imbalance have badly eroded Washington's political relationship with Tokyo. Each new technical issue is escalated into a political challenge. One observer, former Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Alan Wolff, has said that "for the first time in at least two decades, you have open hostility between those on either side of the trade debate." The danger is that what began as a squabble over trade is degenerating into a more fundamental conflict with important geopolitical consequences. Thus, prominent Japanese accuse the United States of outright racism, and important elements of American opinion increasingly view Japan as a hostile

[11] *American Agenda, op. cit.*, p. 19.

[12] See William T. Kaufmann, "A Plan to Cut Military Spending in Half," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1990. See also "$150 Billion a Year, Where to Find It," editorial in *The New York Times*, March 8, 1990, p. 24.

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force.[13] Public opinion polls taken among Americans show a souring of attitude consisting of two factors: resentment over Japanese investment in high-profile areas (e.g., Rockefeller Center in New York), and a fear that too great a dependence on foreign sources will make the United States vulnerable to political and financial blackmail.

The strategic issue is whether the United States intends to continue anchoring its policy to the alliance with Japan. If not, what are the alternatives? If so, a reappraisal of trade and other aspects of the relationship is urgently necessary on both sides to avoid a collision.

The economic component of national security shows up in other areas as well. The strain on resources affects policy for the western hemisphere because of the huge debts incurred by key Latin American countries. One of the immediate aims of the Treasury Department's current "Brady Plan" is to reduce these debts rather than defer or restructure them. Thus far the results have been mixed at best. Important Latin American countries have not even joined the process. A failure of this plan risks a backlash among U.S. investors against making any new foreign investments or loans, i.e., a creeping tendency toward American economic autarky at the very moment that Latin America has made its greatest progress toward democracy, and at the moment when new demands on public and private resources for Panama, and probably Nicaragua, are required.[14]

There is also the prospect of increasing energy costs over the next decade; rising oil prices and increasing American dependence on foreign oil sources could add billions to the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. Such an increased dependency on oil from the Persian Gulf could have a renewed impact on U.S. policy in the Middle East, on attitudes toward Israel and on questions of arms sales to friendly Arab countries.

Finally, the United States finds that its resources are almost certainly too limited to allow it to play the major role expected

[13] See "The Japan That Can Say No," by Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara, as quoted in *The Congressional Record*, Nov. 13, 1989, remarks by Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.).

[14] The total foreign aid request for FY 1990 is $20.9 billion, an increase of 8.9 percent. The Bush administration, after the Nicaraguan elections, announced plans for a "significant and meaningful" aid package for Nicaragua; others questioned the U.S. ability to supply large funds. The administration estimated the costs of economic recovery in Panama at $1 billion; thus far in FY 1990, it has requested $500 million in supplemental economic support funds for Panama. See the symposia on "New Institutions for Developing Country Debt" appearing in the Winter 1990 issue of *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, pp. 3–56.

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of it in other areas, especially in Eastern Europe. That region's nations are likely to turn to Germany and the European Community for support, thus magnifying the loss of American influence.

In fashioning a response to these various economic difficulties the United States will be reconstructing, whether deliberately or not, its foreign and defense policies. To what extent will the United States be willing to make economic sacrifices and concessions to further its political goals? Alternatively, how willing will we be to allow such responsibilities to devolve onto others, with a corresponding reduction in American influence in broad areas of the world?

V

Not all of the Cold War's issues have been solved by any means. There is a residue of important issues that will remain at the center of American policy for the next several years.

In the postwar era the United States and its allies constructed a political, military and economic system based on the strategic assumption that the confrontation with the Soviet Union would continue indefinitely. Active policy planning for a post-Cold War era ceased long ago—if, indeed, it ever got started.[15] The stationing of large American forces in Europe, as well as in South Korea, Japan and the Philippines, assumed a protracted conflict. The same rationale applied, in varying degrees, to American commitments to Iran and the Persian Gulf, to Pakistan and to friends in the Middle East. Even the commitment to Israel, which has had a strong moral dimension, was sharply enhanced by the Soviet intervention in support of Nasser in 1955–56. Although the American presence in many areas was originally conceived as a riposte to Soviet thrusts and as a deterrent, these commitments seem to have gradually taken on an added significance as an element of regional stability and reassurance. Indeed, the American military presence in Europe was recently justified by President Bush in the name of "stability" and "predictability."

As the Cold War ends, the United States confronts an obvious question: Can or should America's commitments and presence abroad be reduced, in response to the decline in the

[15] For a prescient analysis of the possibilities for postrevolutionary Russia, see George F. Kennan, "America and the Russian Future," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1951, excerpts reprinted in *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1990. Also see James H. Billington, "Looking to the Past," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 22, 1990, p. 11.

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threat to U.S. interests and the limitations on American resources, without risking a destabilization of the very areas in which the United States wishes to remain involved?

No abstract principle can be applied. Few believe that a Soviet attack is likely in Europe, but many observers fear the irrationality of, say, North Korea. Weakening military support for Israel could threaten that nation's very existence, whereas disengaging from Southeast Asia or the Indian or South Asian subcontinent could be justified as a reorientation of American policy.

The situation in Europe is still the most critical in the near term. The collapse of communism has ended the Cold War, and as a consequence Soviet power is receding, Germany is unifying and a new balance of power is emerging. The United States still plays the dominant role in reconstructing the new security order in Europe. But America faces two conflicting pressures. On the one hand, the United States wants to facilitate the unification of Germany together with the construction of security guarantees that Germany will not disrupt the European balance, now or ten years from now. This implies that limitations and restrictions be placed on Germany as well as the provision of American guarantees for Germany's neighbors, including perhaps the U.S.S.R.

On the other hand, American policy cannot ignore the possibility, if not the probability, that Soviet power will revive some years hence and again pose a threat to Eastern and central Europe. This suggests a policy of reinsurance, including a strong Western alliance and a strong, united Germany. It also suggests a military posture that can be rebuilt in fairly rapid order. Such a posture, in turn, influences how far the United States can go in reductions negotiated in arms control agreements, which seem less critical now than five years ago; indeed, their value may lie more in their intricate inspection and verification systems than in the actual reductions of nuclear weapons.

Executing the subtleties of a reinsurance policy, however, may prove quite difficult in the atmosphere of conciliation and euphoria that is taking shape in Europe and the United States. What the United States needs is a new policy plan similar to the one that was approved by Truman shortly after the communist invasion of South Korea. That document, NSC-68, had the virtue of bringing together the various strands of policy, under the broad theme of containment.

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Thus any review of American policy eventually returns to the point where the Cold War started. Because the changes in the Soviet Union are so far-reaching, for perhaps the first time since 1917 Washington has a chance to work out a genuinely new relationship with Moscow. Americans have given little thought to what could be expected of a postcommunist Russia. That is no longer a subject for idle fantasizing. The Bolshevik Revolution has finally run its course, and we may be witnessing the breakup of the Soviet empire; that is, of the Soviet Union itself. But we cannot know what will replace it—a relatively benign confederation or a belligerent, nationalistic Russia.

What can, or should, the United States do about it? Where do America's interests lie?

VI

It is often argued that the United States needs a new "vision" of its role in the world. Such arguments take on added weight if one also agrees with the conventional wisdom that the United States will have less and less influence in world affairs and therefore will be forced to navigate more skillfully. But as events of the past year show, there is good reason to question conventional wisdom. Who would have thought one year ago that any Soviet leader would propose the dismantling of the leading role of the Communist Party, that the Berlin Wall would be torn down and Germany be united, that a dissident playwright would become president of Czechoslovakia? It has not been a vintage year for punditry, and as America begins to reconsider its world role, it might do well to prepare for more surprises that will defy any carefully crafted vision.

A final note of warning is also in order. One of the most astute observers of American foreign policy, the late Hans Morgenthau, warned against the tendency of American policy to swing between the extremes of an "indiscriminate isolationism and an equally indiscriminate internationalism or globalism." Both extremes, he concluded, are "equally hostile to that middle ground of subtle distinctions, complex choices and precarious manipulation which is the proper sphere of foreign policy."

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Richard Thornburgh

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RULE OF LAW

Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership have recognized the need for fundamental legal reform in the U.S.S.R., and their emphasis is well placed. Law is the lifeblood of any democratically organized polity. It shapes social and economic structures and relationships, and provides normative rules for private and public conduct. Moreover, given the tradition of Russian absolutism and some seventy years of Soviet totalitarianism, a requisite component of democratization in the U.S.S.R. must be the development of some form of limitation on government power. This suggests, among other things, a legal system independent of government control.

Last fall I participated in a historic meeting between representatives of the U.S. Department of Justice and Soviet government, party and law enforcement officials.[1] The unprecedented candor with which Soviet officials were willing to discuss the ills plaguing their society was certainly refreshing. It reflected the leadership's apparent readiness to put aside ideological clichés and rigid, doctrinaire solutions. I was also impressed by the obvious excitement about change displayed by these officials. My Soviet interlocutors seemed genuinely interested in the American legal and democratic experience, and our discussions, while reflective, were by no means ab-

[1] The October 1989 visit was at the invitation of Justice Minister Venyamin F. Yakovlev, and was the first by a sitting United States attorney general. Its purpose was to discuss the meaning and importance of the rule of law. During my stay in Moscow, I had the opportunity to explore significant legal, political and even philosophical issues with several officials, including Nikolai I. Ryzhkov, prime minister of the U.S.S.R.; Anatoly I. Lukyanov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet; Vladimir Kryuchkov, chairman of the KGB; Vadim V. Bakatin, minister of internal affairs; Aleksandr Y. Sukharev, chief prosecutor of the U.S.S.R.; and Chief Justice Yevgeny A. Smolentsev. As governor of Pennsylvania in 1979, I also had an opportunity to visit the Soviet Union and participate in discussions with leading government, legal and party officials.

Richard Thornburgh is Attorney General of the United States. For their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article, the author wishes to thank David B. Rivkin, Jr., Legal Adviser to the Counsel to the President, and Lawrence J. Block, Senior Attorney-Adviser in the Office of Policy Development, U.S. Department of Justice.

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stract. Clearly the Soviets were searching for ideas that might take root in their own country.

In my view the Soviet leadership should reestablish the legitimacy of the state by basing it upon genuine popular sovereignty—the only acceptable basis of any government in the final decade of this twentieth century. For that, however, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) must relinquish its monopoly on power, in fact as well as theory, and compete alongside other political organizations in the electoral arena.

Furthermore the Soviet Union must create a constitutional structure that includes a legal system that is not subordinate to the state but rather offers equal justice under law to everyone, thus fulfilling the law's traditional role as a mediator among conflicting societal interests. As a predicate to accomplishing these objectives, a "rule of law" must be established in the Soviet Union. By rule of law I mean not just normative rules but a systemic process that inculcates the principles of limited government, due process and a "legal culture." The leadership's initial goal, therefore, should be nothing less than turning the Soviet Union into a law-abiding state.

II

The task is formidable since there is a legacy of lawlessness and arbitrary rule that must be overcome. The Soviet system today is primarily an amalgam of distinctive legal traditions that, over the course of a thousand years, have stubbornly resisted the inroads of Western liberal thought. In the Russian tradition law has always been the instrument of ruling elites. For the tsar the law was a tool through which to control his empire. Legal power was exercised through what was commonly known as the *ukase*—a proclamation or decree having the force of law.

This legacy has been worsened by the supervening years of Soviet rule. For the tsar's Soviet successors the law has been a device for the arbitrary exercise of total power as well as for social engineering, essentially for turning a particular social and economic theory into reality. In sum, whether tsar or commissar, Russia's rulers have historically stood above the law, changing or ignoring it at will to meet their own immediate political or ideological needs; law as a replacement for arbitrary political power or a check on despotism has never existed.

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Significantly, orthodox Marxism postulated that the law, like the state itself, must ultimately "wither away," a position eagerly embraced by a number of Bolshevik enthusiasts. At the time of the revolution, however, the new rulers of the Russian state had to be more practical. Thus, while the tsarist legal forms were abolished, a revolutionary Marxist structure, designed to oversee the transition toward a stateless society, was adopted. Under the constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, proclaimed on July 10, 1918, private property was abolished, universal (i.e., forced) labor was decreed and revolutionary tribunals, free of all procedural limitations and operated by the secret police, were erected to deal with all "enemies of the revolution." In fact members of the "exploiting classes" were formally declared to be second-class citizens and deprived of their right to vote. As in the past, although with a newly enhanced brutality, the law was made to serve the interests of Russia's rulers, now the Communist Party.

In 1921 Lenin changed tack and, in a desperate attempt to shore up the Soviet economy and state, which were battered by the bloody civil war and on the verge of complete collapse, adopted the New Economic Policy. Instead of continuing the failed radical policy of War Communism, the regime now pursued "transitional" capitalism. As part of this program, Western models for civil and criminal law were embraced, at least in theory. This limited Westernization of the Soviet legal system, prompted by the needs of the rapidly growing private sector, was viewed by most Bolshevik leaders as a necessary but temporary evil. Lenin, for one, declared that "we must apply to private law relations, not the *corpus juris romani*, but our revolutionary concept of law."[2] Not surprisingly the rule of law never took hold and, for the most part, the Communist Party continued to exercise authority arbitrarily and secretively.

In any case, by 1929 Stalin had consolidated his power, and what remained of the freer atmosphere of the NEP was crushed. Collectivization was enforced and totalitarianism was finally cemented. To the new leadership of the CPSU, "bourgeois" forms of law were no longer relevant. Codes of law that represented Western values, such as the right to hold private property and punishment calculated according to the seriousness of an offense, were rejected. An effort to move away

[2] I. V. Gsovski, *Soviet Civil Law*, 28 (1948).

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entirely from all legal precepts, in line with traditional Marxist teachings, was also made. In the 1930s a debate emerged between the so-called legal nihilists, who advocated a swift and complete abandonment of all formal laws and resolution of all disputes by people's courts according to the precepts of proletarian justice, and legal realists, who wanted to retain laws and a judiciary system.

Stalin, in a befittingly cruel irony, recognized the value of retaining the language and forms of a Western legal system and sided with the legal realists. Western-style legal structures (based on the German and French models) were considered efficient methods of furthering the dominance of the state and the CPSU, as well as a means of impressing Western intellectuals with ersatz liberality. Accordingly the new constitution of 1936 had a more formal structure than its two predecessors. It—like Western-style constitutions—combined regularized legal forms and a long list of (mostly fictional) political rights. Stalin preferred to deal with the enemies of his regime through separate legislation and, whenever expedient, bypassed the law codes with "extralegal" procedures.

After Stalin's death the Soviet constitution was amended, yet his legacy of masking totalitarianism with false constitutionality remained. In 1957 the Soviet constitution was again changed, and in 1961 a new law code, the U.S.S.R. Fundamentals of Civil Legislation, appeared, defining and regulating legal relationships such as tortious conduct, contractual obligations, insurance, credit, foreign transactions and treaties, and based generally on Western legal principles.[3] Contracts were generally permitted, legal capacity and civil rights were no longer based upon class definition, corporate-type entities gained legal rights and obligations similar to those of natural persons, and even testamentary freedom was guaranteed. The document, however, continued to provide the traditional escape clause: "Civil rights shall be protected by law, except as they are exercised in contradiction to their purpose in socialist society in the period of communist construction."[4]

Soviet criminal law and procedure in form also resembled Western models (including the right to be represented by counsel), although they contained abusive and arbitrary as-

[3] "Fundamentals of Civil Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics," in *Fundamentals of Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics*, at 150. See also Osakwe, "An Examination of the Modern Soviet Law of Torts," 54, *Tul. L. Rev.* 3 (1979).

[4] *Ibid.*

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pects. For example, "socially dangerous" acts were still punishable as crimes, although such acts remained undefined in law, and agencies such as the KGB continued to routinely harass and persecute dissidents with absolute disregard for legal strictures.

The apogee of the formal "legalization" process was the constitution of 1977 promulgated under Leonid Brezhnev. Twice as long as Stalin's constitution, the 1977 version is far more explicit in delineating the political and legal structure of the Soviet state. Unlike its predecessors, it details the leading role of the party in all aspects of governance. Like earlier Soviet charters, the 1977 constitution contains a long litany of essentially fictional individual rights—leading a generation of courageous Soviet dissidents to declare that their goal was simply to force the Soviet government to comply with its own constitution.

In sum, since the revolution the Soviet leaders have expended considerable energy creating the facade of a legal system similar to that in the West. Throughout the entire period the individual rights and limitations on government power contained in these constitutional provisions were illusory. The law remained a tool of the state and, since any "crime" had political implications, the rule of law gave way to unbridled arbitrariness. Similarly, despite its Western structure the entire purpose of the civil law was to harness the energies of the Soviet citizen in service to the policies of the party.

III

Recognizing the dire state of the economy and the deep malaise in the country, the Soviet leadership has—under Gorbachev—turned to an increasingly radical program of reform. One part of that effort to restructure the Soviet Union and to modernize its economic and political structures is a new emphasis on the rule of law and encouragement of pluralism. The February 1990 Central Committee Plenum, seen by many in the Soviet political elite as a watershed, took the historic step of recommending the amendment of Article 6 of the 1977 constitution, which guarantees the party a monopoly of power over virtually all aspects of Soviet life. The plenum also advised allowing for some form of party pluralism and adopting a strong presidency.

These government and party changes were approved by the

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Congress of People's Deputies this spring, and concurrence by the 28th Party Congress is likely this summer. The net result is that Lenin's establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the Soviet mode of governance has been undermined. It should be underscored that Gorbachev's willingness to amend Article 6 and to subject the party to electoral competition amounts to nothing less than a repudiation of the major tenet of Leninism—namely, that the party, as vanguard of the proletariat, has the right to hold power irrespective of the actual wishes of the populace.

It is conceivable that Gorbachev expects that the party, once cleansed of corruption, might become a viable political force that can compete in electoral contests. If so, his hope is unlikely to be realized. Just as he has in the past underestimated the extent of ethnic animosity in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev may be failing to grasp the degree of unpopularity of the CPSU.

During my visit to the Soviet Union I was struck by the strident criticism of the party. Significantly, many of these criticisms came from high-ranking party functionaries. In urban areas the party is blamed for food shortages, and in many instances the Soviet populace has literally thrown out corrupt local politicians, either through direct public pressure or in the recent March local elections. Outside of the Russian Republic the party's position is even less tenable—it is viewed not only as responsible for corruption and incompetent economic administration, but also as an occupying colonial force. It is possible that the reforms recommended by the February plenum may indeed lead to the "withering away" of the party.

It should be stressed, however, that electoral difficulties faced by the party do not guarantee that a genuine multiparty system will coalesce in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party still has an organizational structure and financial resources that could tilt the playing field in any election—at least to the extent of preventing the emergence of any major new political organization at the national level. Indeed, in the immediate future, the most likely scenario is that the Communist Party itself may fracture. It appears that many disgruntled Soviet communists prefer this route—a sentiment well expressed in a statement attributed to one party leader, Sergei B. Stankevich: "We are not going to walk away from the party with empty

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hands and bare bottoms."[5]

The last time something akin to legal opposition existed within the Communist Party was during the period 1919–22, when this role was played by the Mensheviks. Thereafter, any factions within the party were outlawed and all party affairs were conducted pursuant to the rule of "democratic centralism and monolithic unity." It is quite likely that, spurred by the decisions of the February 1990 Central Committee Plenum, real "intraparty democracy" may emerge, and it is conceivable that Gorbachev will permit a much greater decentralization of the CPSU, whereby local and regional organizations would enjoy greater autonomy. This approach could help the party cast itself as the champion of local interests.

However, when all is said and done, the likely "withering away" of the party offers a number of advantages to Gorbachev. It weakens the ability of the entrenched party bureaucracy to obstruct Gorbachev's reforms. Even more significantly, Gorbachev is trying to decouple his own future from the political future of the party. If he is successful and if the party continues to fail in electoral contests and does, in fact, "wither away" and crumble, Gorbachev would remain at the center of power, through his control of the presidency and influence in the Soviet Union's new legislature. This strategy is not, however, without risks. Eastern Europe has seen many communist reformers swept from power in the rush to multiparty systems. As the father of perestroika, Gorbachev might be spared the fate of the others, but the future course of the Soviet Union's own revolution—and Gorbachev's role in it—is unclear.

The new 2,250-member Congress of People's Deputies met for its maiden session last spring. Its bicameral, 542-member, permanent working core, termed the Supreme Soviet, began last September to consider a number of new legislative proposals. This in itself is a marked reform. In the past, laws were drafted by experts from government ministries or other bodies, such as the Soviet Academy of Sciences. These laws were reworked by other government bureaucrats and were eventually rubber-stamped by the Supreme Soviet, which met for about three days twice a year.

The Supreme Soviet has now been reorganized to act much

[5] Quoted in Bill Keller, "Upheaval in the East: The Soviet Party is Not Over," *The New York Times*, Feb. 8, 1990, p. 1.

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more like a legitimate legislature, dividing itself into 14 parliamentary committees of about forty members each, which review various proposed bills and draft final versions for consideration by the entire body. There are also competing versions of a small number of proposals and bills, which marks a remarkable departure from past practice. In fact the volume of reform legislation is so great and the attendant confusion so widespread, I was informed during my discussions in Moscow, that many of these laws need to be continuously amended, superseded or repealed.

The Supreme Soviet is currently considering about twenty new laws that, taken together, will amount to a wholesale revision of the country's legal codes. In fact during my fall trip to the Soviet Union I had the privilege of observing extensive debate in the Supreme Soviet on reform measures. Most notable among these are laws concerning private property, leasing of land, "socialist enterprises" (public businesses), cooperatives (private businesses) and taxation. Also included would be laws that establish the right of Soviet citizens to seek redress against their government, party officials and even the secret police. The Supreme Soviet is also considering a Western-style "criminal procedure" bill, in addition to new laws permitting liberalized freedom of speech, the press and emigration. Astonishingly, an oversight committee to monitor such institutions as the military and the KGB has been formed, although it is heavily dominated by members of the Soviet defense-industrial complex.

The introduction of party pluralism in the Soviet Union could create challenges to the operation of the government if the Communist Party once again performs poorly in parliamentary elections. In theory, it would be possible for the Supreme Soviet to pass a law over the objections of both the government and the Communist Party. Further, the entire Congress of People's Deputies has the right to veto any legislation passed by the Supreme Soviet. Of course, given the absence of any organized national political parties in the Soviet Union other than the Communist Party, both the congress and the Supreme Soviet are unlikely to gain a working opposition majority. The future membership is more likely to be divided among a great number of diverse local and regional organizations as well as various factions of the Communist Party. This, combined with what is so far an absence of workable parlia-

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mentary procedures, is likely to perpetuate the current state of legislative gridlock.

Nevertheless the establishment of an apparently legitimate legislature raises an issue never before faced in Russia—the separation of powers. At present, the executive (including both the government Council of Ministers and the party Politburo) has no formal authority over the Supreme Soviet. When, cajoled by Gorbachev, the Congress of People's Deputies narrowly approved the creation of a strong unitary executive, the constitutional change far exceeded the American paradigm in that the Soviet president, in addition to having nearly unfettered executive authority, also possesses considerable legislative powers. The decision not to choose the first president through direct national elections, and instead to allow him to assume his new post by vote of the Congress of People's Deputies alone, is also disturbing.

All of this amounts to an unprecedented augmentation of Gorbachev's power—not necessarily a good precedent for Soviet democracy. To be sure, local, regional and republic-level Supreme Soviets are likely to function as real legislative bodies and acquire greater power. At the national level, however, it remains to be seen to what extent legislative power, housed in an unwieldy and fractious Supreme Soviet, would be able to balance the new executive. To make the system work, the Supreme Soviet, in addition to passing new legislation, would need to alleviate its legislative gridlock and develop workable oversight and budgeting processes.

During my trip to the Soviet Union, Justice Minister Venyamin F. Yakovlev also spoke approvingly of inculcating a system of separation of powers that, in addition to an independently elected executive and legislature, would include an independent court system. This is highly important. At present the Soviet Supreme Court, which was established in 1922 as a body to "assist revolutionary justice," and which at first also played a prosecutorial role, has no real judicial review authority. Its current modest function was described by Chief Justice Yevgeny A. Smolentsev as "giving guidance to lower courts to assure uniformity." Even under the proposed changes, the Soviet Supreme Court would not possess a power of judicial review. Instead a Council of Review, made up of leading lights of academia and law, would scrutinize legislation for constitutionality.

Whether judicial review is conducted by a court or by a

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Council of Review, a "Madisonian dilemma" arises, whereby a nonelected body would be empowered to nullify democratically promulgated legislation. After years of absolutism one temptation inexorably facing the new judiciary or Council of Review would be to advance reforms beyond those contained in legislation. However, it is democracy and the rule of consent by the governed that legitimizes any law. Any judicial review extending or rejecting legislation based on the vision, no matter how well-meaning, of one individual or group of individuals acting as Platonic guardians could weaken the rule of law, the democratic spirit, and even the legitimacy of the new Soviet regime.

IV

The most contentious proposal to be considered by the national legislature will probably be the response to the unrest among the non-Russian nationalities. One must remember that the Soviet constitution provides a right of secession for the union republics. As an inducement to forestall such a move a "law on republican and regional autonomy" has been drafted whereby local republics would exercise some control over their own land and resources and would be able to veto or nullify Supreme Soviet legislation that regulates their natural resources in ways they consider undesirable. Yet laws to that effect enacted by several republics have been declared unconstitutional by the central authorities in Moscow. With the ethnic turmoil in several republics and what can only be termed incipient civil war in Azerbaijan, reform of the Soviet republican federal structure has been shelved for fear of increasing tensions that might split the union asunder.

Significantly, tensions are not limited exclusively to the outlying republics. Even in the Russian Republic itself signs of fragmentation abound, with such key regions as Siberia complaining that Moscow extracts too many resources from them, providing too little in return. Meanwhile many cities throughout the U.S.S.R. have enacted ordinances that require locals to prove residency before they can purchase items in short supply.

A possible solution to the nationalities dilemma might be some sort of mechanism to defend the republics' prerogatives—"states' rights" if you will. There must be some limitations on the central government's authority to bind the local and regional governments. A judicially enforced federalism would be one safeguard against the national government

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or even against arbitrary republican governmental usurpation of the rights and privileges of resident minorities.

In another area, the most remarkable reforms being considered in the Soviet Union are in the category of property law. Currently, in accordance with tenets of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Soviet law does not recognize private ownership of the "means of production." The civil codes are designed primarily to protect the property of state enterprises against all infringement, and the property of cooperatives against all except the state's. While theft of private property is punishable under the criminal code, the punishments involved are significantly lighter than those for the theft of state property.

The recent party plenum, however, called for the recognition and legalization of at least some private property. A new proposed property law will legalize various forms of private property, including "joint-venture" and "share-holding" property. "Joint-venture" property would be corporate property, and "share-holding" property is a suitably socialist euphemism for private property owned by a number of people, emphasizing that ownership is shared by many. Both state property and cooperative property would still be recognized. Significantly, on March 6 the Supreme Soviet approved a property law that, for the first time since the NEP, gives private citizens the right to own small-scale factories and protects private property against confiscation by the state.

Indeed, what really matters is that real and equal protection is expected to be accorded to all types of property. A "law of leasing" is also being considered. This would allow lease contracts to be created, and both perpetual and hereditary leases are envisaged, although the long-suffering Russian peasants are still not likely to be able to own their land in *fee simple*. Since land in the Soviet Union comprises a much greater percentage of national wealth than in any Western country, the decision not to privatize land ownership effectively removes a large percentage of Soviet resources from the market. Meanwhile the decision to register all cooperatives and other forms of free enterprise before they can operate is certain to ensure delays and bureaucratic gridlock.

Protection, therefore, of what Locke called the "fruits of one's labor," the sine qua non of liberty, is still subject to state control. The basis of Gorbachev's new reformed communist state is still the utopian dream of a propertyless, classless

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society. Protection by law of nearly all forms of private property, including the ability to assign, sell and alienate, is still not simply regulated (as in the West) but *prohibited* unless the law allows exceptions. Perestroika still has not changed this.

V

Soviet reformers have proposed several significant criminal law reforms, including expanding access to legal counsel. This proposal stresses broadening the rights of suspects and accused persons and emphasizes the development of an adversarial process—in the pretrial, as well as trial, stage. Included in this reform is the opening up of at least the trial stage to greater public access, under the theory that public supervision would ameliorate mistakes and abuses by investigators in an inquisitorial system.

Another crucial reform is contained in legislative proposals that emphasize the admission of counsel at the time of detention, or at the pretrial stage. Thus, investigators will not be able to question suspects *ex parte* before the arrival of counsel.

Another significant legislative reform proposal would adopt the presumption of innocence as the standard for Soviet criminal law. This concept, however, is alien to Soviet doctrine, and some public officials have strenuously resisted this effort to reform Soviet criminal law. Indeed, during my visit to the Soviet Union our delegation asked Internal Affairs Minister Vadim V. Bakatin about the need for expanded protection for the rights of suspects and prisoners in particular, and basic human rights in general. His response was that because the crime rate increased last year by at least forty percent (he was not sure about the rate since not all crimes are reported, and opined that the increase was probably closer to seventy percent), it was not yet the "right season" for criminal justice reform. He also stated that one significant problem facing law enforcement was the prevalent "romantic view," persistent in Soviet history, that no crime exists in the socialist paradise.

In addition to the above measures, reform of the judicial structure itself is on the agenda. The leadership, intent on abolishing "telephone justice," has recommended to the Supreme Soviet that party officials should be prohibited from interfering with the work of the courts on pain of expulsion. Furthermore, Justice Minister Yakovlev said during our meetings that a law would be sought setting criminal penalties for obstruction of justice and interference with the judiciary.

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It is widely believed that the independence of the courts would be enhanced by giving judges life tenure. Indeed, during my visit Minister of Justice Yakovlev informed me that, in addition to being granted life tenure, judges will be given a 100-percent pay raise—an action presumably designed to remove at least some of the present incentives for judicial corruption and to raise the status and prestige of the judiciary. Other structural proposals include transforming the entire Bar and raising the status of the defense Bar. This is to be done by increasing pay and honoraria of lawyers and encouraging students to study law. It has been proposed that a national association of advocates, free from political control, be formed. Also advanced as a "structural" change is the proposal that political management of the Bar, or "colleges," be reduced, as well as granting the colleges the right to screen candidates without outside pressure.

VI

What is the significance of the widespread changes in the Soviet society and state? It is apparent that the magnitude and the thrust of Soviet reforms are of more than academic interest to the American people. Clearly there is a connection between the content of Soviet foreign and defense policy and the nature of the relationship between Soviet society and its government. So long as Soviet foreign policy decision-making remains the exclusive province of the Politburo, even with the heightened input of foreign policy professionals and a Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Committee playing a limited "oversight role," the possibility always exists that the moderation of today can be replaced with a new round of expansionism and aggression tomorrow. By contrast, were the Soviet Union to become a full-fledged participatory democracy, with decision-makers at all levels ultimately accountable to the electorate, the possibility of a reversion of Soviet foreign policy to its old expansionist ways becomes considerably less probable. While democracy does not obviate all foreign policy blunders, the historical experience accumulated during this century, and especially since the end of World War II, indicates that democratic governments are more inclined toward a cooperative and pacific foreign policy than totalitarian ones.

Moreover, only the development of democratic institutions, at both the national and local levels, can possibly ameliorate political and ethnic tensions and stabilize the situation in the

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Soviet Union. This, of course, is a prerequisite both to much-needed Soviet economic growth and to the Soviet ability to play a positive and legitimate role in the existing international system. Likewise, a principal reason for the Soviets' interest in the rule of law is that only a body of commercial law respecting the sanctity of contract and private property will provide the predictability and stability necessary to attract foreign investment, thus bolstering their ailing economy.

To be sure, only the Soviet Union can reform itself, and the process is in its early—and very uncertain—stage. America cannot, and should not, force its ideals and system on the Soviet peoples. History and culture are important regulators of what is and is not acceptable political behavior in a given society. I do believe, however, that a new Soviet revolution is necessary—one similar to the British Glorious Revolution of 1688 and our own revolutionary period of 1776 through 1787—that is, peaceful (in the sense of avoiding a reign of terror and other accoutrements of a police state) and constitutional in the broad sense of structural change producing a more perfect government and society.

The peoples of the Soviet Union are struggling for democracy and economic freedom against one of the most oppressive tyrannies the world has ever known, the Leninist Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The ethnic nationalities today are asserting political freedom and their cultural heritage against the last vestige of colonialism in the world, the Great-Russian-dominated U.S.S.R. The Soviet republics are confronted with political choices similar to those faced by the eighteenth-century American states, which also had a multitude of conflicting economic, commercial and political interests. Because the underlying problems of the Soviet Union are at least similar to those of eighteenth-century America, Justice Minister Yakovlev was perhaps prescient last fall, several months before the recent party plenum, when he told me that the American system of separation of powers and federalism is a "far better system for the Soviet Union to copy than the parliamentary system."

Accordingly, Americans have much to share with the Soviet reformers. For instance, federalism and federation are lessons from the American experience that may be instructive as the Soviet Union undertakes reforms. Here, however, the comparison between the American experience and the Soviet one must be made with particular care. The United States is a

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union of fifty separate states. Both the federal government and the state governments may be said to be "sovereign" in their own spheres, as defined by the Constitution. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is composed of distinct ethnic or national units, added over a period of centuries by conquest or forced annexation. With the decline of communism, there is no overriding uniform culture or belief that unites these "nations." Gorbachev can hold together the Soviet republics only by convincing them that it is in their interest to remain a part of the U.S.S.R. He must, in short, adopt a "new federalism" that will satisfy the national aspirations of the Soviet peoples, as well as give them co-equal status with the presently dominant Great Russians.

Furthermore, while democracy is indispensable, more than mere majoritarian rule is needed to safeguard liberty. In addition to the question of democratic license, the Soviets must address the fundamental matter of restrictions on majoritarian rule necessary to protect minority rights and safeguard personal liberty. This requires establishing some version of a separation of government powers. The purpose of divided government, whether based on the American model of separation of functional powers (executive from legislative from judicial), or on the traditional British model of "mixed government," is to limit the despotic tendencies common to any regime.

But, again, limiting government by separating government functions is not enough. An accompanying system of checks and balances is necessary to prevent one unit of government from encroaching upon the duties and responsibilities of another. I discerned from my meetings in Moscow that the Soviets simply do not comprehend how a political structure can exist with deliberate tensions built in among government branches and political factions, since in their tradition decisions are reached either through the unanimity of dictatorial fiat or by consensus motivated by utopian vision.

We should do all we can to encourage a system of checks and balances. The primary problem before the Soviet people and their leaders is to prevent the new Soviet Union from becoming a revived version of the autocratic monarchy, to foster instead true political pluralism and limited government reflected in the rule of law and respect for natural rights. It is in the interest of the United States, and indeed of the entire world, for Gorbachev to succeed in these endeavors.

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Marshall I. Goldman

GORBACHEV THE ECONOMIST

The Soviet Union today is a radically different place from what it was five years ago when Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Communist Party. Admittedly, Gorbachev promised then that his goal would be to reform Soviet economic and political life. But the Soviet people had heard similar promises before, almost all of which had ended up unfulfilled. No wonder few anticipated that in a few years the Soviet Union would in fact legalize the formation of such un-Soviet institutions as cooperative and private businesses, joint ventures with foreigners, and economic autonomy for several of the Soviet republics. It would have been even more farfetched to predict that there would also be glasnost, secret ballots, the disappearance of the secretariat of the Communist Party, the creation of a Supreme Soviet and a presidency that would usurp much power from the Central Committee and the Politburo, calls for regional secession and, finally, an end to the Communist Party's monopoly in political life.

Gorbachev deserves enormous credit, not only for what he has accomplished but also for the fact that he has managed to ride out these transformations—many of which have been rather tumultuous. But while his efforts at political liberalization have been extraordinarily fruitful, his attempts to revitalize the Soviet economy so far have failed. Economic reform was Gorbachev's number-one priority. He promised a radical transformation of the economy, which he eventually came to call perestroika. If it succeeded, the Soviet Union would be competitive not only in terms of conventional products such as machine tools, but also in the field of high technology. Equally important, soon after assuming power he promised to raise "the economic well-being of the Soviet peoples to a qualitatively new level."[1]

[1] *Economicheskaia gazeta*, Feb. 19, 1988, pp. 10–11.

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Unfortunately for the Soviet people, not only have they not enjoyed "a qualitatively new level" of economic well-being, their per capita real standard of living has actually fallen by what one respected Soviet economist estimates to be one percent per year.[2] In addition, the Soviet economy now finds itself beset for the first time since World War II with an overt form of inflation that may exceed 20 percent a year, as well as persistent shortages of such basic products as sausage, salt, soap, school notebooks and sugar. A Soviet survey in early 1988 found that only 23 out of 211 varieties of foodstuffs were readily available in Soviet shops.[3] Even bread, the one product that Soviet leaders have always tended to protect, has "sporadically" disappeared from the shelves of such normally well-provisioned cities as Moscow.[4] Out of necessity, rationing of basic products such as sugar has been instituted, in many cases for the first time since 1947.

What produced this crisis? Why is such an enthusiastic reformer having such a hard time? And how much responsibility does he bear for what has happened?

II

In fairness to Gorbachev, the economic situation he inherited in 1985 could hardly be described as robust. It is hard to judge just how serious conditions were. As part of the glasnost process, Soviet economists have begun to criticize not only their own but even CIA statistics. Some charge that the CIA's figures present too rosy a view of past Soviet economic growth. But even the so-called overestimated statistics still reflect a decline in the rate of growth. For example, in 1979 and the early 1980s there was a drop not only in the rate of growth but in the actual output of such important industrial commodities as steel, machine tools, coal and petroleum. In addition, beginning in 1978 the Soviet Union found itself with a succession of six bad harvests. Formal meat rationing was introduced in various provinces of the Soviet Union.

Although it is traditional for the incumbent leader of the Soviet Union to blame his predecessors for almost all the country's current shortcomings, Gorbachev can be forgiven for referring to the Brezhnev era as "the years of stagnation."

[2] *Sotsialisticheskaia industria*, Oct. 30, 1988, p. 2.
[3] *Sotsialisticheskaia industria*, April 6, 1989, p. 1.
[4] *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (hereafter *FBIS*), July 20, 1989, p. 85.

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Indeed, much that was being produced at the time was of poor quality or outmoded. Thus, even though the Soviet Union called itself the world's largest producer of steel and machine tools, hardly anyone in the outside world with convertible currency to spend was interested in buying Soviet materials. For that matter, even Soviet buyers without any alternative sometimes resisted the pressure placed on them to utilize Soviet goods.

In addition to Brezhnev's legacy, Gorbachev had to deal with a host of other problems unrelated to the state of the Soviet Union's economy. It almost seems as if there is a perverse "Gorbachev's law": If it ain't broke, it soon will be. He appears to be a magnet for catastrophe. Only a year after becoming general secretary, Gorbachev had to cope with the nuclear reactor explosion at Chernobyl, followed by massive earthquakes in Armenia and Central Asia. At the same time there was a series of droughts combined with excessive heat and premature cold, all of which had a serious impact on the Soviet harvest. On top of everything else, the world price of oil dropped. Since petroleum had accounted for over 60 percent of the Soviet Union's hard currency earnings, this reduced the country's ability to pay for its imports. Nor did it help when the Soviet Union was forced to import more grain to compensate for the poor harvests. To have sustained its previous volume of imports, the Soviet Union would have had to borrow significant sums from Western lenders. But Soviet leaders have traditionally been reluctant to borrow money to sustain or increase imports. They borrow but only after they have first tried to increase exports and cut imports.

Certainly these difficulties, which placed a severe strain on the Soviet budget, would have handicapped even the ablest administrator or economic manager. Yet it is necessary to remember that the problems facing Gorbachev are not unique. Maybe the magnitude of what his predecessors had to contend with was not quite as overwhelming, but all previous Soviet leaders have had to deal with extraordinary catastrophes.

An analysis of these last five years shows, rather, that faulty decisions by Gorbachev and his administration have been a major cause of the magnitude of the Soviet Union's economic crisis. This is partly because Gorbachev responded inadequately to some of the Soviet economic problems. More important, it is because until 1988 and 1989 most of his programs were inappropriate, untimely and, in a few in-

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stances, harmful. Consequently he and his advisers must bear a major share of the responsibility for the deterioration that has taken place. He promised the Soviet people a better life, but because of misjudgments about the economy, their circumstances are now more stringent then they need have been.

III

Where did Gorbachev go wrong? In the beginning he seemed to be doing well. Taking the lead from his mentor, Yuri Andropov, Gorbachev reinstituted a campaign for tighter discipline, along with a crackdown on corruption and alcoholism. He adopted much tougher restraints on the sale of vodka by raising the price and reducing the number of outlets and their hours of service. Production of most Soviet industrial products rebounded sharply from the low growth or negative rates of the Brezhnev and Chernenko eras.

Gorbachev's effectiveness was exemplified by his reinvigoration of the petroleum industry. Monthly production began to fall in October 1983. In 1984 the Soviet Union experienced its first annual drop in petroleum output since World War II. Production continued to decline throughout 1985. Since petroleum is so important to the Soviet Union both internally and externally, Gorbachev sought to prevent a further decline. Giving the venture his personal imprimatur, he made an on-site visit to the oil-rich Tyumen region in September 1985, a mere six months after coming to power. Although Tyumen is the Soviet Union's main producing center in western Siberia, many complaints had been heard over the years about its inept operations. After some unprecedentedly frank discussions, Gorbachev demanded remedial measures including a purge of local administrators and managers. The turnaround was almost immediate. Petroleum output increased markedly in January 1986 and continued to rise for about two and a half years. It was an excellent example of how discipline, anti-alcohol campaigns and administrative housecleaning can make a difference. A renewed drop in petroleum output in late 1988 indicates, however, that exhortation and managerial changes do not of themselves ensure structural change in the economy.

For several reasons Gorbachev devoted little attention to consumer goods. Instead he emphasized machine tool production; this was a serious mistake. It is hard to explain Gorbachev's obsession with machine tools. The best explanation seems to be that, like so many Soviet leaders before him,

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Gorbachev adhered to the view that the route to an advanced, affluent economy was through the machine tool industry. This was also the advice given him by a small circle of economic advisers led by Abel Aganbegian.[5] The emphasis on heavy industry had become doctrine in the Stalinist period. Development of "Sector A" industries, as the heavy industrial sector was called, was regarded as a necessary prerequisite for the growth of "Sector B" industries—consumer goods.

Not everyone in the Soviet Union supported this emphasis on heavy industry, particularly as it had evolved under Brezhnev. Critics were concerned by what they saw as the very wasteful utilization of resources. But Gorbachev thought he had a solution. In contrast to what he called Brezhnev's "extensive" approach to development, Gorbachev urged a switch to intensification and acceleration (*uskorenie*). Enterprise managers were to continue their emphasis on the machine tool industry but to utilize raw materials more effectively by working additional shifts and using more care.

To achieve true efficiency and higher quality, factory managers were given more decision-making powers. Some initial experiments were introduced as early as May 1985 at the Volga automotive plant in Togliatti and the Frunze Scientific Production Association in Sumy. The managers were allowed to fire some of their workers and redistribute wage savings to the continuing members of the work force. They were also promised that they could hold on to as much as 40 percent of whatever foreign exchange they earned from exports.

In tandem with his efforts to expand the authority of enterprise managers, Gorbachev realigned the powers of the ministries and committees in Moscow. On the one hand, he created *Gospriemka*, the State Quality Acceptance Committee, a new organization whose function was to ensure a radical improvement in the quality of production, a persistent shortcoming of Soviet economic life. In 1985 quality inspectors were assigned by Moscow authorities to 19 enterprises with the power to accept or reject output. By October 1, 1986, factories producing 20–30 percent of all Soviet output were assigned *Gospriemka* inspectors, and on January 1, 1987, representatives

[5] *Sotsialisticheskaia industria*, Jan. 5, 1988, pp. 2–3; Abel Aganbegian, *The Economic Challenge of Perestroika*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 105.

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from *Gospriemka* began to inspect the output of most other major Soviet industries.[6]

At the same time, Gorbachev altered the function of the industrial ministries. At the urging of Aganbegian, he consolidated several ministries into a small number of superministries that supposedly would be too preoccupied with major policy issues to interfere in the day-to-day affairs of operating enterprises. Instead, the superministries in such fields as machine tools and energy production would be able to focus on larger policy issues and technological development.

Perhaps the most publicized example of a superministry was *Gosagroprom*, the State Committee for Agricultural Industry, or as we might call it, the agrobusiness ministry. This ministry was put in charge of everything having to do with agriculture. It was the survivor of five former ministries and one state committee, all of which had previously been responsible for one aspect or another of the food-growing and food-processing cycle.

It may well be that nothing Gorbachev could have done at the time would have spared the Soviet Union economic and political problems. After all, the Chinese took a very different route to economic reform; after a decade of remarkable success, they too encountered serious problems. Given the enormity of the undertaking that both Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping were attempting, perhaps such problems were inevitable. Their goal was nothing short of a revolution—peaceful, but nonetheless as far-reaching as what happened in 1917 and 1949.

Yet in retrospect Gorbachev would probably have done better if, instead of emphasizing the machine tool industry and superministries, he had followed the Chinese example by focusing on the revitalization of a grass-roots agricultural and consumer goods sector. Deng's efforts began with the peasants taking over the land for themselves. Soon afterwards, he diverted resources from the heavy industrial and military sectors to the consumer goods industry. This helped to encourage the peasants to further efforts. The peasants saw that if they worked harder, they would be rewarded with heretofore unavailable consumer goods and farm building supplies.

As we have seen, Gorbachev had a very different set of

[6] *Pravda*, Nov. 16, 1986, p. 6. See also *FBIS*, Nov. 25, 1986, p. R4; Dec. 31, 1986, p. 51; Feb. 18, 1987, p. R11.

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priorities. Instead of emphasizing agriculture and consumer goods, the areas most in need of attention, Gorbachev focused on *Gosagroprom* and machine tools. Even though he, like Deng, talked about transferring decision-making to the localities, by his actions he increased the power at the center in Moscow. *Gospriemka*, for example, with its quality inspectors, increased Moscow's control over day-to-day operations to a level reminiscent of the Brezhnev and Khrushchev eras. Similarly, the superministries, particularly *Gosagroprom*, actually interfered more than their predecessors had done.

Gorbachev's contradictory policies toward private and cooperative trade produced similarly mixed signals. As a by-product of Gorbachev's drive against crime, the Soviet government in October 1985 prohibited the sale of farm produce in Moscow and the republic of Georgia by anyone other than the original producer. This experiment became the law of the land on July 1, 1986, when a ban was declared on receiving "unearned income" from the sale of products produced or grown by somebody else. However, in a complete about-face, another decree was instituted on May 1, 1987, which legalized the establishment of individual, family and cooperative businesses. Initially there were all kinds of restraints on what could be sold and who could sell it, but the important point is that the 1987 law sought to expand what the 1986 law sought to ban. Not surprisingly, this caused confusion and hesitation among would-be entrepreneurs. Nor has it helped that even Gorbachev himself has recently made some anti-cooperative-trade remarks. In response, price controls have been instituted and cooperatives that act only as middlemen have been banned.[7] Similar sentiments were echoed in July 1989 by striking coal miners. For instance, one of the demands of the Karaganda Strike Committee was that "trading and purchasing cooperatives" as well as cooperative restaurants "be closed down."[8] As they see it, the high prices, shortages and increased crime are largely the consequence of greedy cooperative practices.

IV

The negative impact of such misguided and contradictory policies has been profound. There is little doubt that they have

[7] *Moscow News* No. 11, 1989, p. 3; *FBIS*, Sept. 13, 1988, p. 40; Jan. 23, 1989, p. 49; June 8, 1989, p. 4.

[8] *FBIS*, Aug. 7, 1989, p. 73.

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exacerbated the already existing economic difficulties in the Soviet Union.

The renewed and accelerated emphasis on the machine tool industry is a good example of how such ill-advised policies have created unintended consequences. As the data in Table 1 show, by 1988 the Soviet Union had increased its annual importation of machinery over 1984 levels by approximately 2.5 billion rubles. This was done despite the fact that, due to the fall in the world price of oil, petroleum export sales to both hard and soft currency buyers fell from a high of 30.9 billion rubles in 1984 in the pre-Gorbachev period to about 20.7 billion rubles in 1988. This constituted a staggering drop of 10 billion rubles or one-third of the total.

Fortunately for the Soviet Union, two good harvests in 1986 and 1987 made it possible to reduce grain imports. This allowed a reduction of 2–3 billion rubles in import expenditures, which made up for some of the shrinkage in export earnings. When the harvest suffered again in 1988 and 1989, however, it was necessary to increase grain imports by 50 percent in 1988 and again in 1989, thereby increasing import expenditures. It would have been better to have reduced machinery imports by a substantial amount, especially when it became clear that oil export revenues had fallen off sharply.

TABLE 1

SOVIET EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(in millions of rubles)

Product	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
			Imports			
Machinery	22,747	23,944	25,683	25,455	25,155	26,584
Food (except grain) & consumer goods	11,079	12,411	13,205	12,926	11,964	11,738
Food and consumer goods plus grain	14,724	17,776	18,045	14,961	13,516	14,101
			Exports			
Petroleum, crude and refined	28,216	30,895	28,188	22,464	22,826	20,708
Natural gas	6,302	7,463	7,695	7,358	6,381	5,197

SOURCE: Vneshniaia Torgovlia, Statisticheskii Sbornik, annual editions, 1980 through 1988.

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This should have been done as early as 1985 and certainly before 1987. Gorbachev and his staff, however, did just the opposite; rather than cut back on machinery imports, the Soviets actually increased them.

What Soviet officials did instead was to cut imports of consumer goods. This began in 1986 and continued each year, so that by 1988 Soviet consumer goods imports were about one and a half billion rubles less than they had been in 1985. These imported consumer goods would have been marked up about six-fold by the time they were sold to Soviet consumers. This explains why Soviet authorities report that under Gorbachev, food and consumer goods imports fell by the equivalent of 8.5 billion rubles in retail prices.[9] As we shall see, this slashing of consumer goods imports had serious fiscal implications.

The fetish with industrial machinery was further reflected in the domestic budget. Budget expenditures on capital investment within the Soviet Union for both factory construction and machinery (particularly "Sector A"—heavy industry) continued to rise steadily throughout the Gorbachev years with a particularly notable surge in 1986. Further, because of the crackdown on the sale of alcohol and the reduction in consumer goods imports, domestic collections of the turnover tax, the Soviet Union's sales tax, also fell. From a high of 103 billion rubles in 1983 and 1984, turnover tax collections fell by nearly 13 percent to a low of 91.5 billion rubles in 1985.

The impact of higher budget expenditures on machine tools combined with lower revenues was dramatic. After years of insisting that the Soviet Union always operated with a balanced budget, Soviet authorities in 1988 finally acknowledged that their budget was, in fact, in deficit. But the deficit that totaled a rather modest 18 million rubles in Gorbachev's first year had tripled to 48 million rubles in 1986 as a result of his policies. The deficit continued to expand so that by 1989 it reached 100–120 billion rubles, about 14 percent of the Soviet Union's GNP.[10] This compares to a U.S. deficit of about 3–4 percent of its own GNP. The accumulated Soviet national debt totaled 312 billion rubles.[11] For the most part, these deficits and debts were financed the old-fashioned way—by turning on the printing presses. This in turn was the underlying cause of the

[9] *Economicheskaia gazeta*, January 1989, No. 1, p. 10.
[10] *Pravda*, June 9, 1989, p. 2; *The Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 7, 1989, p. A15; *FBIS*, Aug. 7, 1989, p. 60; *Pravitel'stvennii Vestnik*, No. 18, 1989, p. 6.
[11] *FBIS*, Aug. 7, 1989, p. 55.

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sudden inflation and goods shortages that struck the Soviet Union.

Inflation is not an entirely new phenomenon in the Soviet Union. As a result of the persistent emphasis on military expenditures and heavy industry, there has always been a tendency to pay out a wage bill that is larger than the value of the consumer goods and services available for purchase with those wages. And since prices were carefully controlled in state shops, the result was a steady form of suppressed inflation. However, the increasing budget deficit and the legalization of cooperative ventures with considerably more power to set their own prices made inflation overt. In 1988 for the first time since World War II, prices of almost all Soviet goods began to rise. The impact was dramatic. According to the Soviet economist Vasily Selyunin, the emphasis on heavy industry, combined with the outpouring of newly printed rubles, explained why "we have fewer goods than planned and twice as much additional money. What happens in this case? During the second half of last year [1988] trade began to fall to pieces before our eyes."[12] By 1989 many prices were increasing at a rate of 20 percent or more—that is, when one could find the goods to buy. Some Soviet economists have even begun to warn of hyperinflation.[13]

Compounding the problem was Gorbachev's decision to crack down on alcoholism. At first it seemed like a laudable decision, but after a few months of effective enforcement thousands of enterprising Russians realized that there was much money to be made in distilling home-produced vodka. Moonshine, or *samogon* as the Soviets call it, became big business. Moonshiners, however, found they needed large quantities of sugar for their work. In a short time, sugar simply disappeared from the country's shops, even in Moscow. In addition to exacerbating the fiscal crisis by reducing the national budget revenues, the crackdown on vodka sales provoked a sugar shortage—a shortage relatively rare in the pre-Gorbachev era and a trigger that set off all kinds of other shortages.

The unprecedented sugar shortage, combined with the decision to reduce consumer goods imports, plus the surge of more newly printed rubles and the resulting inflation, trig-

[12] *Sotsialisticheskaia industria*, April 6, 1989, p. 1.
[13] E. Gaidar, "Trudnyi vybor," *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1990, p. 25.

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gered a buyers' panic. People began to hoard. One Moscow friend acknowledged that although there was no more room to store the sugar that she had to buy with ration coupons, she would continue to buy—fearing that it would not be available when she needed it or, if it was, the price would be even higher. In this kind of environment it was difficult to keep much on Soviet store shelves. Most Soviet stores were empty of such products as jewelry, furniture, milk products, sausage, soap, laundry detergent, pasta, tea, matches and even salt.

v

Gorbachev is very much aware of his fiscal problems. His concern with the budget deficit, for example, is at least a partial explanation for his early determination to reduce military expenditures. This was one way to shrink the size of the deficit and reduce or eliminate inflation. It also made possible the belated transfer of resources to the consumer sector—as Deng had done earlier in China. Only now, after four to five years in office, is Gorbachev trying to do the same thing.

But as praiseworthy as Gorbachev's current efforts are, his initial actions are largely responsible for the present inflation and goods shortage. He should have moved immediately, not four years later, to provide more for Soviet consumers. Instead he sent out the opposite signals. For more than four years Gorbachev did little to stimulate increased consumer goods production. His advocacy of cooperatives and private businesses lacked enthusiasm. Unlike Deng, Gorbachev never said, "It is good to be rich." When he finally decided to allow private, family and cooperative farming in 1987, his signals were ambiguous. While exhorting the peasants to move off on their own, he continued to insist that nothing should be done to diminish the role of the traditional *sovkhoz* (state farm) and *kolkhoz* (collective farm). Moreover, many *sovkhoz* and *kolkhoz* members themselves tried to prevent others from leaving the larger units and opening their own farms. Furthermore, Gorbachev continued to support his agricultural superministry *Gosagroprom*. Although the ministry was finally abolished in 1989, many of its bureaucrats and their responsibilities did not really disappear. As happens with so many Soviet bureaucracies, *Gosagroprom* was replaced with another ministry-like apparatus, the State Commission for Food and Procurement of

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the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.[14] Bureaucratic meddling by Soviet officials more than anything else frustrated efforts to generate increased grain sales to the state.

In an ideological breakthrough it was announced in mid-1989 that the state would pay peasants in hard currency for any increase in deliveries over 1988. But despite a slightly higher 1989 harvest, deliveries to the state actually fell 27 million tons below plan. The reason is that the bureaucrats attached so many conditions to what the peasants must do to take advantage of their hard currency credits that the peasants came to the conclusion that it was all a bureaucratic deception. As a result they grew the grain but refused to deliver it to the state. Similar bureaucratic mishandling helps explain why peasants have been so reluctant to set out on their own. Moreover, in addition to the bureaucratic and economic uncertainties, peasants who show too much initiative risk being labeled *kulaks*, the epithet for middle-class peasants who were killed in the Stalinist terror. Already there are reports that some peasants who have set up their own farms have been stabbed and their farms set on fire. Nor was it reassuring when Gorbachev appointed Yegor Ligachev to the job of supervising agricultural reform, particularly since Ligachev, a conservative, has always made it very clear that he opposes any effort to abolish the *sovkhoz* or *kolkhoz* and continues to denounce capitalist practices.[15]

The signals have been equally mixed in industry. Gorbachev's key June 1987 reform, the Law of the Enterprise, turned out to be a big disappointment. Given the power to set wages, the enterprise managers found themselves under great pressure to raise salaries, which in turn helped to fuel inflation. The Enterprise law was undermined by most of the industrial ministries. Under the new law they were supposed to shrink the share of the *goszakazi*, state orders, to about 70 percent of enterprise output. Most ministries, however, continued to claim 90 percent and sometimes 100 percent of what the factories under them produced. And when the ministry did reduce its *goszakazi*, frequently the enterprise itself would seek to increase the share to 100 percent. With *goszakazi*, the enterprise would be spared the worry of finding a customer for its output and be assured of government guaranteed and

[14] *Moscow News*, No. 33, 1989, p. 5.
[15] *FBIS*, Jan. 17, 1987, p. 77; *Izvestia*, Jan. 9, 1990, p. 2.

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supplied components. Without *goszakazi*, the factory would have to take the risk of finding a customer and developing its own suppliers. That required a new set of skills that Soviet managers had seldom if ever used. If successful, setting off on their own could mean higher profits and bonuses for the managers, but it also might mean losses and the denial of wage premiums and bonuses. Most managers refused to take that chance.

This reluctance to sever the guaranteed umbilical cord to centralized control and decision-making characterized almost all efforts to transfer authority to the enterprise. In addition to reflecting the unwillingness of Soviet managers to set off on their own, it also confirmed the reluctance of the central government to let power slip from its hands. Like bureaucrats anywhere, the Moscow authorities enjoyed the power they had and saw no reason to let others have it. Since the Moscow bureaucratic apparatus also knew that they would ultimately be held responsible for any failure, even if power had been decentralized, they tried to protect themselves by ensuring that no mistakes would be made. This attitude helps explain the decision to introduce *Gospriemka*. It also explains why, when a decree was finally issued to allow any Soviet enterprise to export or import on its own, this decree was "clarified" immediately by noting that although in principle enterprises could indeed import or export on their own, they would nonetheless have to check with Moscow authorities for permission to buy and sell a large list of goods.[16]

This same bureaucratic unwillingness to let go reduced the effectiveness of joint ventures. In a radical break with ideology, Soviet authorities decided in 1987 to allow foreign businessmen to set up joint ventures on Soviet soil, as in the 1920s. Despite valiant efforts by Gorbachev to implement this decision, however, the intermediate bureaucrats encumbered this initiative with all kinds of obstacles. At first the foreign partners could own no more than 49 percent of the operation. This limitation was relaxed in the spring of 1989, but there remained other constraints such as the need for unanimous decisions in the joint venture, even when the foreign partner owned 90 percent of the equity.

The joint venture has no assurance that it will receive high-quality raw materials from the Soviet economy and, most

[16] *Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1989, p. 2.

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important of all, it still cannot take out or convert Soviet rubles. No wonder that out of the 1,300 or so joint ventures that were formally registered as of January 1, 1990, fewer than 200 were in actual operation and of those only 30 were involved in meaningful industrial operations. All the other joint ventures focus primarily on service activities and are designed to get in with minimum investment and, if need be, to get out fast with minimal loss. Consequently some Soviet critics are calling for the revoking of the law authorizing joint ventures.[17] As these critics see it, foreign investors are only interested in exploiting Soviet raw materials and making a quick ruble while the Soviets end up with outdated machinery and a polluted environment. Thus joint ventures are hampered by the same ambiguities that have hamstrung the cooperatives and private trade. What should have been a remedy for the Soviet Union's economic problems has become another part of the problem.

VI

Gorbachev is now trying to redress some of his earlier miscalculations. Very little or nothing is being said or heard about the long list of what were once his top priorities: the machine tool industry, intensification, three work shifts, *uskorenie*, *Gospriemka*, *Gosagroprom*, the alcohol crackdown, the ban on private trade and the maximum equity of 49 percent in joint ventures. Several of these miscalculations are not easily reversed. By beginning with *Gosagroprom* rather than with the breakup of the *sovkhoz* and the *kolkhoz*, most Soviet peasants have the impression that Gorbachev has no real commitment to the private or family farm. How can they trust Gorbachev to continue his support? Not only has it taken a long time to formulate the law guaranteeing long-term private use of the land; more important, Soviet history gives no assurance that such a law will be honored and not revoked.

Given the proper incentives, it may well be that the peasants will be willing to set up their own farms. Peasants in the Baltic and Caucasian republics in particular have hinted that they might be responsive, especially as their republics begin to assert economic autonomy or some independence from the rest of the Soviet Union and particularly Moscow.

Yet notwithstanding the fact that he is a superb politician,

[17] *Izvestiia*, June 3, 1989, p. 3; *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 5, 1989, p. 10.

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Gorbachev has lost much of the credibility that he once had when it comes to dealing with the economy. To pull himself out of this mess, it is not sufficient simply to prevent further mistakes. The momentum is in the direction of further inflation and inadequate supplies of consumer goods. That is why in December 1989 Gorbachev and his advisors decided to revert to central planning and price control. They promised that this would last no more than three years and that the main emphasis would be on the production of more consumer goods. By then, they insisted, the consumer goods shortages will have disappeared and it will be possible to introduce a market system. But central planning serves to create shortages, not eliminate them. The odds are that it will take years for the economy to correct itself, and it is unclear at this point if the population has enough confidence or trust in Gorbachev to sit idly by for the length of time he will need to remedy his past mistakes as well as restructure the economy. Already there are worrisome signs that conservative and worker's groups have linked up in a "Peronist" opposition to reform. The United Front of Workers is opposed to price reform, cooperatives and any retreat from central planning.

If Gorbachev is to succeed he must introduce, as the Polish government has now done, a new more consistent (although politically more risky) agenda for the economy. For the Soviet Union, it may now be too late. Just as in corporate life, Gorbachev might have done better if he had taken the hard decisions when he first assumed power. This would have focused the blame on his predecessors. Then he could have started with most of the problems behind him. For example, he should have immediately introduced a program of monetary reform, devaluation and convertibility of the ruble and moved to free up prices. That would have absorbed most of the money overhang and helped him establish market equilibrium that would have helped eliminate the shortages. All of these steps he will have to take sooner or later if he is to carry out economic reforms; now every time he hints at any such step, a new panic ensues and he backs away, further tarnishing his credibility.

Gorbachev also has to face up to his bureaucracy, which continually frustrates his initiatives. To his credit, he has sharply reduced the number of industrial ministries; like bureaucracies around the world, however, even if reorganized they somehow manage to hold on to or reestablish their cherished prerogatives. One solution would be to dismantle all

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industrial ministries and comparable bureaucracies. In the same way, if Gorbachev is ever to see the growth of family or private farming, he will have to abolish state and collective farms. If the members want to keep their cooperative or state farm, they can vote to reconstitute it. But until Gorbachev shows clearly that he wants to do away with the *sovkhoz* and *kolkhoz*, and as long as the *sovkhoz* and *kolkhoz* are there to discourage anyone who contemplates leaving, individual peasants will almost certainly find it difficult to break out and set off on their own.

The Soviet Union has lacked diversity of economic enterprises since Stalin established his rule. But if the peasants are willing to take the risk, let them run private farms, yet let them also opt for the *sovkhoz* and the *kolkhoz* if they so choose. Similarly, allow factory workers the chance to break out into smaller factory shops from the larger factories and reduce government regulation and control. This should also facilitate the growth of price competition. For that matter, let anyone who so chooses set up a cooperative or joint venture without having to seek permission from some state official. The ability to issue permits of one sort or another not only facilitates the retention of monopolies and bureaucratic strangulation, it also opens the door to extortion and corruption.

Admittedly, imposing a program that is as far-reaching as the one proposed here can be carried out only by a master politician. Of all the past and probable future Soviet leaders, Gorbachev has the best chance. Of course, such measures must also include a carefully thought-out safety net of increased pensions and welfare support. The poor and low-income workers must be provided for during any such transitional period.

Gorbachev, however, can no longer postpone taking such strong medicine. He seems to be waiting for a more propitious moment when supply and demand are more in balance and when there is a wholesale market for machinery and a money supply that is smaller and less volatile. But even he acknowledges that these shortages will not go away as long as the planning system and administrative allocation of goods keeps distorting the economic situation.[18]

Belatedly Gorbachev and his advisers have moved to reduce the budget deficit and increase the production and import of consumer goods. Reportedly he is also preparing a far-reaching reform program that will bring with it price reforms,

[18] *Pravda*, July 30, 1988, p. 2.

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stock markets, convertability and other market-type mechanisms. However, his task will not be easy. Just as often happens in other countries, his call for a tax increase was rejected last year by the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, given all the rubles circulating in the economy, it is unclear if such belated efforts are adequate to solve the problem. If anything, the situation seems likely to deteriorate even more, which only increases the opposition to more market reforms and leads instead to calls for additional doses of central control.

VII

The Communist Party Congress scheduled for this June or July will have to deal not only with the political makeup of the party and its role in society, as Gorbachev wants, but with the economy as well. Ironically, despite all the talk of a move toward a market-oriented structure, the decision to return to planning and price control, even if temporary, means that the Soviet economy today operates much as it did in 1985. The main difference is that the population perceives that its standard of living has deteriorated.

Yet despite the economic decline, Gorbachev's political position in the party appears to be strong. The big unknown is how long he can remain in control while all around him there is a growing sense of economic and social disintegration. Master politician or not, it is difficult to see how Gorbachev can survive without an improvement in the economy—and soon. But that depends on bold economic action, and not even Gorbachev seems willing to take that chance.

Gorbachev and his counterparts in Eastern Europe and China are now discovering that it may be easy, although bloody, to set up a Stalinist centrally planned economic system, but it is very difficult to dismantle it and replace it with one that is market oriented. The market system is complex, like a forest, a living organic thing. As the economists Kenneth Boulding and Joseph Berliner have noted, it is easy to chop down that forest, but it is very difficult and time consuming to grow it again. It is not enough merely to replant several trees and call it a forest.

Gorbachev seems damned if he does move for more decentralization and damned if he does not. But at least if he does, the odds are that the Soviet economy will become more responsive than would otherwise be the case, even though it may not be Gorbachev who then has the power.

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Christoph Bertram

THE GERMAN QUESTION

There are only two real certainties in European politics today: Eastern Europe has been effectively liberated from Soviet domination, and the reunification of Germany is approaching. For all their historic worth, these certainties, in turn, create new uncertainties—after all, the postwar system of European stability, of deterrence and détente, was based on the permanence of the Soviet threat and of the division of Europe and of Germany. Now that history has turned the tables, it is the hitherto unquestioned structures of European order that are entering a period of unpredictability: in the East, all structures—from the Warsaw Pact to Comecon—set up to camouflage Soviet centralized control; in the West, the NATO alliance and the European Community (EC); in Europe as a whole the familiar ways in which East-West relations are conducted. Germany is at the center of all these uncertainties, not only geographically but politically.

This article will examine the de-Sovietization of Eastern Europe and coming reunification of Germany, and the implications of a single Germany for the cooperative structures of the West—NATO and the EC. The final part will sketch stages and considerations that should facilitate the passage to a reunified German state in a changing Europe.

II

Europe's two new certainties are interdependent: had Eastern Europe not succeeded in slipping away from Soviet control, there would be no chance for the reunification of Germany.

The most significant geopolitical development of the late 1980s was a reformulation of Soviet security interests. Europe, and Germany, have been divided for the past four decades because of Soviet insistence that the security of the U.S.S.R. called not only for the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union

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but also for ideological integrity in a communist system of states. Thus the Soviet Union maintained massive military forces not just to deter and defeat a military aggressor but also to quash any ideological rebellion. The presence of communist regimes in Eastern Europe was a vital security interest for the Soviet Union. It was precisely this combination that constituted the European security problem over the past four decades.

For whatever reason—exhaustion through imperial overstretch, economic pressures, military reorientation or shifting domestic priorities—the Soviet Union cut the link between national security and ideological conformity in the late 1980s. Suddenly the communist regimes in Eastern Europe (and elsewhere) discovered that they were on their own—and their subjects discovered it, too. The anticommunist revolution that followed all over Eastern Europe would have happened eventually even without this shift in Soviet strategy. But it would not have happened so soon.

That it did happen released East European political systems from communist control and East European countries from Soviet control. It has thereby reduced considerably the traditional Soviet military threat to the rest of Europe. The Soviet Union will remain a military superpower, due to the sheer size of its military-industrial base, its resources and its manpower. But its security requirements have been narrowed so significantly as to allow what few would have believed possible only a short while ago: the massive reduction or even total removal of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

The release of East European countries from Soviet control has allowed them to gravitate toward the democratic and economically successful West. Today the trend all over Eastern Europe is westward. To claim, as some did in the past, that West Germany was "drifting eastward" was always to ignore the direction of the most powerful currents below the surface of European politics. Today those currents have come to the surface and they are clearly moving from East to West.

Might this trend be reversed? That is difficult to imagine, for two reasons. First, the shift in Soviet policy has been imposed by objective factors related to the failures of the Soviet system; it is not simply a policy reorientation that can be rescinded at will. If Mikhail Gorbachev and his inner circle should be replaced, his successors, whoever they might be, would have to respect these same objective factors.

Second, even if this or another Soviet leadership wanted to

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reverse policy, reinstall the link between security and ideology, and seek to invest ideologically conformist regimes in Eastern Europe, it would simply not work. If attempted by force, this would cause massive uprisings throughout the former Soviet security glacis that might escalate into major East-West conflict. If tried through other types of pressure and influence, a proposed return to communist regimes would have to gain the support of the people and their representatives—which it could not. The era of Soviet control over Eastern Europe has, for all practical purposes, ended, and Soviet influence over European politics in general is now much diminished.

Hence the process toward the reunification of the German states, too, is irreversible. The results of the first free elections in the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), held on March 18, are unlikely to lead to a consolidation of a separately functioning East German state; the new government's only unequivocal mandate is, on the contrary, to negotiate rapidly with the West German authorities the unification of Germany as a whole. There is no doubt about the outcome: German reunification will take place. The question today is not whether but when, and under what domestic and international circumstances.

III

For a brief period after the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, it seemed as if the East Germans were less keen on a German merger than on merely obtaining freedom of travel, free speech and free elections. Indeed, the early spokesmen of the newly formed opposition groups all initially emphasized the separateness of the East German state, which would remain, they hoped, devoted to some kind of "third way" between market capitalism and centralized socialism.

That phase has long passed. The call for unity has become ever louder in East German demonstrations. And as East Germany's new and old parties prepared for the March elections, they all adjusted their positions accordingly—even the old communist Socialist Unity Party, now renamed the Party of Democratic Socialism. The new, freely elected G.D.R. Chamber of Deputies, dominated by centrist and conservative groups which have been pressing hard for quick reunification, will call for the rapid merger with the Germany of the West.

The reason for this is both economic and political. For the foreseeable future, and even with the influx of massive West

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German (and, it is to be hoped, other Western) funds to modernize the East German economy, living standards in the German Democratic Republic will lag far behind those in the Federal Republic. Not only can the East Germans of today observe the life-style of their Western compatriots via West German television (which they have been receiving for many years), but they can freely experience it first-hand in frequent visits across the border. Even if economic reforms should be implemented rapidly in the G.D.R., they will take more time to produce results than people's patience may tolerate, particularly since reconstruction would have to be accompanied, initially at least, by austerity, price increases and growing unemployment. Thus the exodus from East Germany to the West will continue (it reached 350,000 last year and the rate is significantly higher in 1990). While it is true that this flow will not dry up even when a formal merger of the German states is concluded, such a merger is increasingly seen by many in both Germanys as the only move that can stem the tide, by providing a degree of much-needed confidence to the people who have not yet left the East.

The political reason for reunification is no less pressing. The G.D.R. has experienced—and even after the elections there has been no drastic change in this respect—a rapid crumbling of social and political authority. The revolution pulled the carpet of legitimacy from under the East German leadership, the economic apparatus, the army and police, and the whole juridical system. While it is true that the election provided some measure of democratic legitimacy to the new government, the void of credible authority will only gradually be filled. Merging with West Germany is the last lifeline for many in East Germany.

In November 1989, when West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced a ten-point plan to deal with events unfolding in the East, a confederation between East and West Germany—which would have created a special relationship between two legally separate states, reunited not de jure but de facto—still seemed not only the preferred but also the most realistic option. A few months later confederation no longer provides a model even for the medium term. At best it can serve as the formula for a progressively shortened transition phase toward the full merger of the two German states.

The political timetable is accelerating under the impact of events. De facto reunification, for example, the "contractual

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community" first mentioned by the G.D.R.'s transition prime minister, Hans Modrow, and taken up by Chancellor Kohl, can no longer be formulated in an open-ended manner; it will have to contain a near-term date for de jure reunification as well.

The reunification of what was divided for over forty years will not be a smooth operation. Domestically, it will cause resentment in the eastern half of the country, which for a long time to come will remain the poorhouse of Germany, fearful of exploitation by its enterprising, capitalist cousin to the west. The continuing influx of East Germans into the Federal Republic, together with the financial burden implied by any major aid program needed for the G.D.R., will also breed resentment in West Germany, where social disruption is already widely feared despite predictions of massive economic dividends to result from reunification in the longer run.

Societies that for forty years lived largely separate existences will not adjust easily to the new relationship; in contrast to those East Germans who projected their hopes for so long on a rescue by Bonn, West Germans, particularly the younger generations, increasingly found their identification at home, not in a larger Germany that they had little hope or aspiration of experiencing. Thus reunification will tax the political system of the Federal Republic and shake up the balance of political parties in Bonn, creating new majorities and coalitions. Just as with the alleviation of economic discrepancies, this political adjustment will take time and bring setbacks and frustrations.

The precise stages of reunification are still uncertain. It could be an outright merger as envisaged in Article 23 of West Germany's Basic Law; in this scenario the newly elected representatives of the G.D.R. or those of individual states within the G.D.R. would simply apply for membership in the Federal Republic. It could also be a more complicated arrangement, with both German states working out a largely new constitution. But expediency and the very nature of West Germany's Basic Law would suggest the former approach.

There is also the question of how soon constitutional procedures in each of the two states would cease to apply. For a while, when it seemed that the process was accelerating every day, West German politicians were speculating that the West German federal elections scheduled to take place in early December 1990 would become de facto elections for a new all-German parliament. In the meantime, the amount of

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legislation required to bring East Germany's social system and economy into line with those of West Germany has come to be recognized, and there is consensus now that the period of transition will be rather longer than once expected. Thus it seems likely that West Germans alone will vote in the December elections—and that the government that results will bear the prime responsibility for the accomplishment of reunification.

The outcome has to be a matter of speculation. There were those who believed that the major opposition party in the West German Bundestag, the Social Democrats, would receive a major boost if its fellow party in East Germany were to emerge as the most powerful political group in the G.D.R. elections. As it turned out the SPD in East Germany received a much lower percentage of the vote than it ever had in West Germany.

But for other reasons as well, an SPD victory in West German elections remains unlikely. The present Bonn coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats can point to an impressive economic record: West Germany has been experiencing an extraordinary period of economic growth and prosperity that shows no sign of abating. Moreover, the challenge from the new populist right-wing party, the Republicans, which for a time seemed capable of splitting the right-of-center vote, is fading under the emotional impact of national reunification. Most important, perhaps, the West German electorate is likely to prefer the experienced if often lackluster team of Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, rather than opt for the Social Democrats, who are still wobbly on both economic and foreign policy. In times of national urgency and a booming economy, the bonus for the sitting majority should be considerable.

What happens in Germany is inevitably more than just a national matter. To address the international consequences, a number of meetings are already scheduled to take place. These include, in the first stage, the "two plus four" procedure, in which representatives of the two German states and those of the four World War II allies (the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain) discuss the security status of Germany, the cancellation of the remnants of Germany's now obsolete postwar legal regime, the special rights of the Four Powers, the status of the city of Berlin, and the finalization of Germany's external borders, particularly with Poland.

In a second stage, the European Community will have to

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define the modalities of permitting one of its member states to be enlarged. In the final stage, the 35 nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will meet to register the changes in the center of Europe. In between these projected stages, numerous other consultations are certain to take place.

Yet this procedural schedule, however important, will not significantly interfere with the process of German reunification. The decisive question for the future will not be procedural but substantive: will the new Germany remain part of the Western system?

Clearly Germany will be more central than ever to European politics and, at the same time, more preoccupied with itself. It could also become less inclined to cooperate in the Western collective framework—NATO and the EC—that has been the chief innovation of postwar West European politics as well as the condition for West Germany's remarkable international acceptability. Yet how reunification will affect this framework will depend not only on the Germans themselves but on their friends and partners in the West.

IV

There is nothing inherently incompatible between a larger, united Germany and the cohesion of the collective structures of the West. Take the Atlantic alliance. If, at the height of the Cold War, by a sudden miracle, reunification had been offered to the Germans in return for neutrality, they might have been seriously tempted (although it is worth remembering that when Stalin suggested such a deal in 1952 the Bonn government rejected it). In the meantime, the Federal Republic has had almost forty years of Western experience; it has become a Western political society. Now that the Cold War is over, why separate from the West? Nor would East Germans demand such a price. As Eastern Europe seeks to strengthen its links with the West, there would be no majority demanding that Germany, in contrast, should loosen its own.

Significantly, the Soviet Union has abstained from seriously demanding German neutrality as the price for unity. The Kremlin is probably more aware of the degree of German "Westernism" than many in the West, and neutrality in the middle of Europe can scarcely serve Soviet interests, since it would encourage some or all the other members of the Warsaw Pact to seek a similar status. Rather than trying to

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weaken NATO through a futile attempt to lure West Germany away, Gorbachev has instead sought to strengthen the Warsaw Pact by supporting NATO, as the visit of his foreign minister last December to the Brussels headquarters of the alliance amply demonstrated.

Through its support for the two alliance systems, the Soviet Union also intended to underpin the border line between them—a boundary that will continue to run through Germany as long as two legally separate German states exist. But what now as they unite?

On the surface, the answer to that question seems more complicated than it may turn out to be. Whatever the legal structure of reunification, the alliance membership of the Federal Republic need not be in question. However, a way would have to be found to assure both the West Germans and their allies that German membership in NATO will continue. The Soviet Union would also need assurance that its security interests in the center of Europe would be respected sufficiently.

Soviet security interests are not what they used to be. The Soviet Union seems to have accepted that it no longer can hold, and no longer needs to hold, a security glacis in Eastern Europe, and that the time for Soviet military forces stationed in Eastern Europe is fast running out. Rather, Soviet interests seem to be dictated by a new combination of domestic and institutional considerations.

On the domestic front, the interest of the Soviet leadership is not to lose face over the German issue. Many in the Soviet Union still fear the emergence of a "militaristic Germany." President Gorbachev thus needs assurances, including the continued stationing of Soviet forces on East German territory and a major reduction in German armed forces. Here the prospects for European arms reductions offer an avenue of hope. All over Europe, Germany included, military forces are being scaled down through a combination of formal negotiations and unilateral reductions. This will be accompanied by a negotiated regime of verification and confidence-building measures that might be enhanced further by new East-West institutions for conflict control and crisis management. Such a network of arms reductions and control, in which the Soviet Union would be a permanent member, would not be a bad bargain for Moscow, given the rapid disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet strategic interest, after all, is to have the Soviet

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Union accepted as a partner of equal status in the international system. Hence it also seems probable that, in the talks involving the Four Powers, the Soviet Union will not want to make the issue of Germany a divisive subject. Thus a host of arrangements appear possible for maintaining West Germany's security links with the West without provocation to the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Genscher seems to have convinced his NATO colleagues to consider a proposal under which, for a lengthy transition period, the former G.D.R. territory would not be part of the NATO area, even though a united Germany would be a member of NATO. NATO forces, including the Bundeswehr, would not be stationed in the territory of the former G.D.R., and Soviet forces would retain a *droit de séjour* there for some period. And NATO forces would remain in western German territory.

The details of this or similar arrangements are, of course, still unsettled and complicated. Some security forces would be needed in East Germany, and they would have to be subordinated to a body distinct from the West German Federal Ministry of Defense. Conscription for the Bundeswehr would not apply on East German territory—and, for young Germans, moving to the former G.D.R. could thus become a widely practiced way of avoiding the draft (as moving to West Berlin has been in the past). Clearly the separation of former G.D.R. territory from the defense regime established in the West will pose a considerable number of practical problems. Yet none of these would seem to defy practical solutions.

Continued German membership in the Western alliance would not seem to be jeopardized by a merger of the two German states. Of course, the end of the Cold War will weaken even so successful an alliance as NATO. But this is not a prospect created by the likelihood of German reunification alone. Indeed, German developments could well provide the traditionally conservative NATO establishment a useful catalyst for the definition of new functions, and possibly new structures, for the inevitable task of responding to all the momentous changes occurring in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

V

What about the other collective structure of the West in Europe, the European Community? Here, too, reunification is not incompatible with either formal German membership in the EC or the organization's continuing political cohesion.

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For one thing, the G.D.R. has always been more a part of the EC than any other nonmember country. The German Protocol of the Treaty of Rome made the G.D.R. a sleeping partner in the EC from the start, with intra-German trade exempted from the EC's external tariffs. With the European internal market scheduled to open at the end of 1992, East German goods would in any case move freely all over EC territory. And the Soviet Union seems to have few objections to the incorporation of the East German economy into that of West Germany and Western Europe.

What reservations there are seem to come mostly from Germany's Western partners. While Jacques Delors, the president of the European Commission, is on record in favor of East Germany's membership in the EC—either as a separate entity or as part of a united Germany—some of the member governments are more reluctant to accept this. Much of this reluctance may come from the understandable instinct of politicians never to cross a bridge before they come to it. But there seems to be a deeper reason for West European apprehension: that the new Germany would simply be too big and powerful to make a reliable partner in West European integration.

This is, however, a strangely mechanistic argument. For one thing, West Germany alone is already the major economic and the dominant financial power in the EC. The inclusion of East Germany would add relatively little to this position. A reunited Germany would have a population of 76 million, as opposed to 60 million, and account for 31 percent of total European economic activity as opposed to 26 percent. Furthermore, East Germany will be a drain on West German resources for a long time before it becomes an asset.

Concerns over Germany's weight reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the EC system. The Brussels procedures, after all, limit the sovereignty of all member states, big and small. Even today Bonn cannot negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with East Berlin because the power to do so lies with the EC, not with the Federal Republic. The whole legal structure of the EC is based on a new quality of interstate relations that impose on its member countries, however powerful they may be, the need to compromise, to delegate a growing sector of national economic policies to a supranational body, and to be subject to the rulings of the European Court of Justice. However many votes a united Germany would have in

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the EC's decision-making bodies, the voting is weighted today and will be weighted tomorrow in such a manner that any member state, whatever the size of its economy and population, could be overruled by a majority. And, as 1992 approaches, these safeguards will undoubtedly be extended further.

Yet these are but formal reassurances. What Germany's West European partners may be worried about (and what should concern the Germans themselves) is not a united Germany's continued formal adherence to the rules and regulations of the EC, but its continued political and emotional commitment to the political union of Western Europe.

The EC is at a crossroads: it can either evolve into an all-European trade and monetary arrangement, or into a politically much more cohesive union of West European states.

The first road would mean an EC that, in addition to its current 12 members, would incorporate not only the few advanced industrial countries of Western Europe still outside the Brussels framework but also, after a lengthy transition period, all of the democratic countries of Eastern Europe now trying to adopt market-type economies. Democracy and market economy would be the only conditions for membership; the EC's ambition would be limited to facilitating economic intercourse within the organization, and protecting the economic interests of its combined members without.

The other road, to political union, would mean a primarily West European EC, whose members contribute to a common European stance toward matters on the continent and beyond; the EC would not be just an economic actor, but a political one as well, conscious of both its weight and the responsibility that comes with it. While nobody can say what the ultimate institutional structure of this European political union would be, it would include in some form most of the traditional responsibilities of a nation state, with responsibility for external security and stability being among the most important.

In the past, the EC has reconciled these objectives by refusing to accept the contradictions between them. The difference between members unwilling to support political unification and those actively seeking it was bridged by the argument that integration was required for economic reasons, and that more economic integration would somehow demand, and thus lead to, more political integration as well.

Yet this convenient device is becoming increasingly ques-

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tionable as a result of the events in central and Eastern Europe. Now alternatives are emerging and proving incompatible: if the EC wants to incorporate all of Europe, then its political cohesion will be in flux for a long time to come; if it wants to become a cohesive, political actor, then membership will have to be restricted and integration brought forward.

Germany would not be the only EC member state that would prefer to delay the choice. Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has been the most outspoken against political union; yet even the outwardly pro-European French administration under François Mitterrand has preferred to hold onto national sovereignty in all but the economic and monetary realm. West Germany, while originally strongly favoring Western Europe's political federation, has become more and more indifferent to the idea. Still, there has been no major European initiative that ultimately could not count on support and even funding from Bonn. And in the rest of Western Europe there has been enough acceptance of gradual, if unstructured, progress toward political integration—and enough willingness to tie West Germany firmly into the EC—to overrule the more principled opponents of political union.

The impending reunification of Germany could stop, even reverse, this trend for two reasons. The Germans themselves, preoccupied with their newly achieved unity and proud of their status, could be opposed to tightening existing EC ties further, while at the same time not wanting to opt out. And Germany's partners might wonder whether any EC ties would be strong enough to bind a new, assertive Germany; instead, the other members might prefer to retain their own traditional freedom of maneuver.

This would imply a choice against political union. And without a conscious decision for greater political integration, the state of economic integration achieved so far would be undermined; there could even be a renationalization of European politics within the EC. As the restrictions that have so far blocked a truly internal market throughout the EC are being removed, and as competition increases, so those losing out in the process will turn for help to their national governments, not to the distant European Commission in Brussels or the politically toothless parliament in Strasbourg.

To political distrust vis-à-vis Germany would be added resentment against the strongest economy within the EC. The French idea of compensating for this by pushing Europe's

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economic and monetary union is perhaps logical, but it is also impractical and it will take a very long time to come about. What is needed now is instead a clear political commitment, signaling that the EC still has the courage of its original convictions.

It is difficult to think of a more impressive signal than a show of readiness—at least by a European nucleus of which France and Germany would be a part—to merge, progressively, military planning and security policies. Experience suggests that the practical and political difficulties in such an undertaking must not be underestimated, but there will be a chance to make security policy the next "floor" in construction of the EC "house." Military integration need not alarm Soviet security planners since it would represent not a buildup but a concerted reduction of military strength. Military forces in the emerging conditions of European security would not be directed against any assumed enemy but would stand for a minimum of *touts azimuts* reinsurance—and in the longer run for a transformation of NATO into a pact between the United States of America and a cohesive European unit which could provide for a healthy transatlantic relationship.

A stable future for Europe and Germany surely requires a strong, cohesive EC. Thus the most important question that the prospect of German reunification has brought to the fore is this: Can Germany and the other chief members of the EC generate the will and the commitment for further political integration? It is a question that cannot be answered by the Germans alone. But it is likely that they will, for their part, reply in the negative if their partners should appear to want to use integration only to rein in the Germans, while seeking to retain flexibility for themselves.

VI

German reunification, as argued above, is no longer a question of whether, but of when and how. If there is an international consensus on the matter, it is that the merger of the two German states should occur in a controlled manner; it is "wild reunification" that Russians and Americans, East and West Europeans, and even many, if not most, in East and West Germany are worried about: a ground swell of East German popular demand so desperate and so powerful that it would sweep aside all the dams and breakwaters that

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governments had so carefully set up as part of the postwar status quo.

At the same time, while it is probable that reunification will occur soon, its timing is by no means certain. The practical and legal problems of East Germany's application for membership in the Federal Republic are becoming more obvious as the first emotional waves recede. There is a growing reluctance of West Germans to be pushed into a precipitous marriage by ardent East German popular demand. A tacit coalition is emerging to try to slow down the march of events.

Perhaps it will work; if so, so much the better: the gradual integration of both states into a new Germany is clearly preferable to frantic fusion. Yet even if it may still be possible to guide events in this way, the influence of outside powers is limited, calling for extremely tactful application in order not to backfire. Any delays will work only if they are clearly seen, by Germans East and West, as preludes to reunification.

The events of recent months have demonstrated just how limited has become the influence of outside powers on the evolution of German reunification. West Germany's NATO allies as well as the Soviet Union have made repeated attempts to chart a course for the unfolding events: at the Soviet-American Malta summit of December 1989, at repeated top meetings of the EC, in bilateral talks and—at the instigation of the Soviet Union—at a specially convened meeting in Berlin of the Four Powers' Allied Control Council and, more recently, at the Ottawa East-West Conference in February 1990. If none of this has had much effect, it is due not only to the force of popular upheaval in East Germany but also to the decline in the leverage of outside powers (which has also affected whatever legal rights they have reserved for themselves in postwar and pre-reunification Germany).

With the demilitarization of international politics following the fundamental change in Soviet security policy, the influence of major military powers has been reduced accordingly—that of the United States in the affairs of the West, that of the Soviet Union in the East—and types of national power other than military have come to the fore. With the de-Sovietization of Eastern Europe, Russian physical control over those lands has ceased. It was the West German need for military security and the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe that underpinned the legal prerogatives of the Four Powers in Germany. The security need has not yet disappeared but it has declined, and

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Soviet political control has been reduced to a military presence that is increasingly isolated by the pressure for removing Soviet forces in the rest of Eastern Europe. In short, the status of West Germany as the major economic power in Europe has been enhanced, while that of the Four Powers has become much more circumscribed. That is why, even if they wanted to have it otherwise, neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States, Britain or France could block reunification against German will. All they could hope to do, by acting together, would be to define the modalities of reunification.

Even that would be a highly sensitive operation. If it appeared to be a delaying tactic, reunification would happen against the will of the outside powers and, most important, against that of the West. German public opinion would simply demand it. It could thus produce what forty years of Soviet policy had failed to achieve: the distancing of West Germany (and with it a reunified Germany) from the Western club of nations; a failure of four generations of Western—and West German—policy.

There cannot, therefore, be a successful Western policy on reunification without German agreement. Such a policy must, first, genuinely share the objective of reunification and, second, build on the prevailing consensus (which includes Bonn) to assure that the passage to reunification is negotiated under conditions of stability.

While this is a considerable challenge, it is nevertheless important to recognize that it is less daunting than at any time in Europe's postwar history. Several conditions are required for a stable transition, and they are much more likely to be met today than in earlier periods.

—For reunification to be reconciled with the requirements of East and West, Soviet interests will be the most difficult to satisfy. But due to the fundamental change in the definition of the security of the U.S.S.R., the Soviets, as their reaction to East European developments in 1989 indicates, no longer regard Eastern Europe as a vital security glacis. While they continue to profess concern over a future "militaristic Germany," they no longer seek to prevent it by physical control of the Eastern part of the country, but instead by international cooperation.

—Reunification, in whatever form it takes place, coincides with an unprecedentedly harmonious period of East-West détente. Arms control negotiations are moving with a

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speed that would have seemed impossible only a few months ago, and even unilateral arms cuts have become respectable. As a result, Western concerns over Soviet military power, and Eastern concerns over German military potential, now have a real chance to be met, as the ceiling of military forces all over Europe is progressively being lowered. East-West détente is also unprecedented in the closeness of consultations over the German Question between those parties that, at the height of the Cold War, were uncompromising antagonists.

—A reunified Germany will find itself not an independent actor, a "loose cannon," but tied into the cooperative structures of the West. West German armed forces will remain assigned to, and the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe will continue to be legitimized by, NATO; West German economic power will remain integrated into the EC. When Germany was originally divided, none of these structures existed; now that it is reuniting, they assist in providing a stable environment for the process.

—As reunification occurs, there is no need to create an all-European framework for accommodating the interests of all those concerned, for one already exists: the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Since its beginning in 1975, that quasi-permanent forum has included as full members practically all European states, allied or nonaligned, as well as the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada. Originally set up to make the division of Europe (and Germany) more tolerable through more human contacts, more economic exchange, respect for human rights and confidence-building measures, it now faces the task of carrying the strains connected with the reunification of Europe (and Germany). The CSCE could serve as an ersatz peace conference and eventually become a permanent network for conflict management, consultation and negotiation on continental European issues. While few would have thought, back in 1975, that the Helsinki conference would succeed even in its more modest original ambition, none would have predicted that it now might serve a much more ambitious one.

So, in a remarkable way, institutions and structures designed in an earlier, very different phase of postwar European politics are available now as elements of stability for the new period of

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European normalization. NATO and the EC, the Vienna arms control negotiations and the CSCE process—if these were not in existence today to accompany German reunification, there would be real cause for anxiety.

This does not mean, of course, that the passage will be smooth and without risks. All the above-mentioned institutions are in a state of incompletion, of promise more than of certainty. NATO will have to move from the calculable conditions of a defined threat to much vaguer contingencies. The EC will have to move decisively toward stronger political unity at a time when both a desire for involving the new democracies of Eastern Europe and an uneasiness about a powerful Germany provide arguments to those who would prefer a looser EC. The Vienna arms control negotiations must now be conducted against the background of a collapsing Warsaw Pact and major pressures for unilateral arms cuts in East and West. The CSCE as a traditional international conference can function only if all its 35 member states agree; Malta has the same weight as the Soviet Union or the United States. Thus, structuring the peace of the post-Cold War era is no less a challenge than was "winning the peace" after World War II. But it does mean that there is no need to start from scratch.

The one major difference from winning the peace in 1945 (when Germany was defeated) or 1948 (when Europe was divided) and doing so in 1990 (when that division is being overcome) is, of course, the role of Germany itself. Germany had a pivotal role to play every time, but in the past it was as an object of policy that depended on the ideas, initiatives and commitments of others. Now Germany holds a pivotal role as a generator of policy. The ideas, initiatives and commitments to shape a stable European future will now largely have to come from the Germans themselves—not only because of their weight in Europe's politics and economy, but also because, with the notable and welcome exception of the United States, Germany's main partners in the West have largely retreated into attentive (France) or irritated (Britain) passivity. German politicians must thus display an immense degree of statesmanship, not only in order to manage the domestic process of reunification, but to pave the way for the international one as well.

This is a tall order for any country. Germany must accommodate the concern of those worried about the German past as well as that of those troubled by its new power; it must reassure

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Soviet security interests without arousing suspicions in the West; it must strengthen its Western ties through participation in the reform of NATO and through promotion of political union in Western Europe. In short, Germany has to use its weight and power wisely, considerately as well as confidently.

Whether Germany can shoulder this extraordinary responsibility is the central question raised by reunification. Its inability to do so in the past created the German Question in European history. It is by no means assured that, this time, the challenge will be met; after all, West Germany's political culture is still very young and, at times, immature. The process of reunification can give rise to all sorts of popular emotions in a country that has not always been successful in separating politics from emotions. That German overconfidence can still generate insensitivity for the concerns of Germany's neighbors was sadly demonstrated at the beginning of March, when Chancellor Kohl tried to withhold full recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's legitimate western border for the sake of extracting concessions from Warsaw—for example, a pledge that Poland would not seek World War II reparations payments from a united Germany.

That Germany might fail to meet the challenge of statesmanship is the most serious worry that the process of reunification should cause to Germans and their neighbors alike. And yet, the chances for German good sense and statesmanship are probably better today than ever before. Germany's western part, which will remain dominant in a united Germany, has successfully developed into a stable democracy. Its citizens have become, during the past forty years, members of the Western club. The international constellation is propitious. And, by and large, West German politicians, while often falling short of statesmanship, have managed to avoid major blunders since the Berlin Wall came down. Why should they not be able to continue to do so, particularly if Germany's partners in the West do not forsake them at this time of extraordinary challenge and opportunity?

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Ronald D. Asmus

A UNITED GERMANY

A revolution is taking place in Germany. It is a revolution that will have profound ramifications not only for the two German states, but for Europe as a whole. To be sure, the dramatic events of 1989 in the German Democratic Republic are part of the political avalanche that has swept across Eastern Europe, toppling communist regimes from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Yet nowhere are the ramifications more far-reaching than in the G.D.R., where the collapse of communist power has raised the issue of German unification and questions about the future security arrangements of the continent. Throughout the postwar period European security has rested on the partition of Germany and of Europe. Now the overcoming of those divisions obviously will have profound implications for the continent's future.

II

The political earthquake that has shaken the G.D.R. has simultaneously revolutionized thinking on the German Question. Less than a year ago statesmen in East and West seemed in firm agreement that the German Question was not on the East-West agenda and that movement toward overcoming the German partition could only take place in a historical context and as part of a gradual process of overcoming the division of Europe as a whole.

The reason why the rapid emergence of the unification issue has caught so many observers off guard lies in three assumptions that until recently constituted conventional wisdom on the German Question in both East and West. The first of these assumptions was that the G.D.R. was relatively stable, in many ways the last country in Eastern Europe likely to undergo radical political change. East Germans seemed to be the most unlikely initiators of a democratic revolution from below.

Second, in West Germany a firm consensus had emerged that there was no alternative to former Chancellor Willy

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Brandt's Ostpolitik, a policy of small steps in accommodating the G.D.R. Successive West German governments had accepted what seemed to be the reality of communist rule and increasingly adopted policies aimed foremost at ameliorating the costs of partition.

The third assumption was that the final guarantor of German partition was Moscow, where Soviet definitions of ideology, security and international prestige for most of the postwar period clearly had been intertwined with Germany's division.

Today each of those assumptions has been exploded. The apparent stability of East Germany that once seemed so formidable proved to be remarkably brittle when put to the test; the small steps of Ostpolitik have given way to headlong strides toward unification; and events have forced Moscow to redefine its postwar conception of security, or at least crimped the Soviets' will and ability to maintain what had been their position for the past forty years.

All revolutions have their own history and dynamic, and the German revolution of the fall of 1989 is no exception. There were two crucial turning points. The first was the toppling of Erich Honecker's regime in October after its open threats to use force to put down rising discontent—the "Chinese solution"—proved not to be a viable option. Not only had Moscow made it clear that Soviet forces were not to be relied upon to resolve internal East German problems, but the forces of discontent and political liberalization had spread so rapidly that East Berlin's own security forces were of questionable reliability.

In a broader sense, the fall of the Honecker regime marked a crucial shift in the entire political terrain of Eastern Europe. Previously there had been a sort of stalemate in the bloc. The two reformist regimes in Poland and Hungary were set against orthodox regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. While Poland and Hungary moved toward some sort of liberalization, the old guard in the other states continued to cling to their old ways, and hoped for some kind of reversal in the U.S.S.R. that might allow them to survive. The toppling of the Honecker regime—considered by many to be led by the toughest, most efficient and most durable communist party in Eastern Europe—set off a reaction that numbered the days of the ruling hard-line elites in Prague, Sofia and Bucharest.

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The next, and in many ways crucial, turning point was the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inter-German border in early November. This last-ditch attempt by East Berlin to defuse mounting domestic pressures in many ways wrote its political obituary by providing a powerful impetus for unification. The opening of the wall resulted in the rapid radicalization of the internal debate in the G.D.R. and the emergence of unification as a major political issue. Afterward, the initial hopes of many East German intellectuals for an independent reform model, which while borrowing heavily from the Federal Republic might still maintain a separate East German identity, were quickly overtaken by the disintegration of their government and their own inability to come up with a credible political program. German unification was seen increasingly as the only way out of the crisis and the fastest path to Western-style freedom and prosperity.

Although the primary motor driving such developments was the desire for Western standards of political freedom and economic prosperity, such demands increasingly were accompanied by a surge in German nationalism. Nationalism in West Germany had been largely defused in the course of the postwar period or channeled into the European and Atlantic communities. In East Germany, however, the Soviet-led institutions of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact provided an identity at best for only a narrow, elite stratum of society. The typical East German *Bürger*, denied the possibility of international travel and fixated on the F.R.G. as the symbol of the golden West, remained far more German and nationalistic than his West German counterpart. He would now take to the streets and impatiently demand that Bonn fulfill its commitment to German unity so that he could benefit from the freedom and affluence his West German brethren had long enjoyed.

III

There had been almost unanimous interest among Germany's neighbors that the unification process be slow, orderly and take place in conjunction with a deepening European integration process, further progress on arms control and the creation of more durable Pan-European security structures. History, however, has taken a different course. The political collapse of the G.D.R. has made rapid unification into an imperative in order to prevent chaos and instability in central

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Europe. Whatever misgivings Bonn may have had over the pace of the process have been cast aside in a hurried attempt to offer East Germans the type of guarantees that might stanch the flow of refugees and convince them to stay where they are and rebuild.

The almost torrential pressures for unification that have emerged in the G.D.R. have caught most of the neighbors and allies of the two German states off guard. Despite the West's long-standing commitment to German "self-determination" in principle, the prospect of rapid unification has evoked considerable concern for a number of reasons. At first, the emerging chaos and seeming inability of anyone to slow down the unification process raised fears that the East German government might simply collapse, and that the resulting turmoil perhaps could lead to the involvement of Soviet forces, and thus to one of the last remaining possibilities for East-West conflict in Europe.

Additional reservations stem from the prospect of the recreation of a powerful German state in the heart of Europe and revolve around two questions: the political and economic power of this new German state and the role it is likely to play in new European security structures. In the course of the last decade there has been an increasing sense that Germany has outgrown the framework, restrictions and low-profile role it eagerly accepted in the early postwar period. German self-confidence has grown hand in hand with its political and economic power. Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, Helmut Schmidt's attempts to preserve détente in the early 1980s in the wake of crises in Afghanistan and Poland, and the emotional debate over intermediate-range nuclear forces, the double-zero option and concerns that Germany would be singled out created a new awareness of unique German interests, interests increasingly seen as transcending the East-West divide. These factors have helped to set the stage for what will inevitably be one of the most important debates of the postwar period—Germany's proper role in an undivided Europe.

IV

Does the crumbling of the Berlin Wall also mean the disintegration of the two alliances? To be sure, the collapse of communist power in the G.D.R. removes the very linchpin of the Warsaw Pact, and the consequences for the future of the alliance are apparent. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the

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collapse of communist power will generate pressures for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the G.D.R., and the withdrawal of the G.D.R. from the Warsaw Pact. Similarly, the collapse of communist power and the likely removal of Soviet troops from the G.D.R. hold out the promise of liberating Bonn from the strategic dilemma of being a frontline state exposed to overwhelming Soviet military power. That inevitably will reduce the Federal Republic's heavy dependency upon the West, above all on the United States, for military security.

There are, however, four compelling reasons why a unified Germany would be interested in remaining in the Atlantic alliance. First, barring a total disintegration of the Soviet state, the U.S.S.R. will remain the dominant land power on the European continent. Even if Soviet forces are removed from east-central Europe, there remains the possibility that a future Soviet government would seek to use its residual military force in the western U.S.S.R. for political purposes vis-à-vis Europe. For geopolitical reasons, therefore, Germany will need a sufficient deterrent against such a danger. At the same time, there will be strong political pressures both within and outside the country to keep German armed forces limited and to rely on a mix of German and allied power. Successive generations of German leaders from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl have argued that only the United States can provide the proper balance to the other superpower in Europe.

Second, the fact that the Soviet Union will remain a nuclear power provides an even stronger incentive for a nonnuclear Germany to remain within the alliance. One of the first acts of any unified German state undoubtedly will be a reaffirmation of its commitment under the Nonproliferation Treaty. A unified Germany will continue therefore to require an extended nuclear guarantee in light of Soviet nuclear capabilities. Security guarantees are most credible if extended by a country more powerful than the recipient, a factor vitiating an extended French or British nuclear umbrella for a unified Germany. In a new Europe in which Germany is the dominant power, by far the most credible guarantee would come from the United States.

Third, a close security relationship with the West always has been seen by West Germans as a guarantee for the stability of German democracy. For the founding fathers of the Federal Republic, entry into NATO was motivated by the belief that their country's foreign-policy posture would simultaneously

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determine the domestic order of that new Germany. Although the days are long gone when NATO and American presence are seen as ensuring a West German democracy, there is no great enthusiasm in Germany or elsewhere for the Germans to again balance East and West in the heart of Europe. The German Question symbolizes Germans in the G.D.R. turning West, not the Federal Republic turning East, and remaining in the Atlantic alliance would allow Germany to avoid a role as the fulcrum of a new security order.

Finally, the alternatives to membership in NATO are not cost-free. Although neutrality might appear attractive at first glance, it is potentially the most destabilizing of options. Germany would be the most powerful state of central Europe, and there could be no guarantee that it would remain neutral. That could lead to a competition among Germany's neighbors to win the loyalties of the new German state in order to tilt the balance of power. Alternatively, faced with a neutral Germany, present alliances may be tempted to transform themselves into organizations designed to check the resurgence of German power. Neutrality, furthermore, would not solve Germany's need for a nuclear guarantee, and would in the long run provide the greatest temptation for the new state to acquire its own nuclear forces.

Collective, or European, security is the other alternative held out by critics of placing a unified Germany in NATO. Undoubtedly, the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will grow in importance and may in the course of time become a key pillar of a Pan-European security regime. Above all, the CSCE is the best means of involving the Soviet Union in a stable European security order. For the immediate future, however, the CSCE is woefully inadequate to assume primary responsibility for a stable peace in Europe. Not only is it too weak to guarantee a meaningful American political and military presence on the continent, but it has few institutional safeguards that could play an effective role in prospective crises. To attempt to leap prematurely into a new and untested system of collective security would be to court disaster.

There are two potential dangers that could undermine a consensus on German membership in NATO. The first lies in the timetable for unification. A rapid push for unification following the March elections in East Germany could lead to a situation in which unification takes place while Soviet troops

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are still on German soil, blurring the basic differences between the American and Soviet presence there and enhancing Soviet leverage.

Second, a rapid unification also may force a divisive German debate over NATO membership in an all-German context. There remains a considerable neutralist and nationalist undercurrent in the G.D.R. While favoring the removal of Soviet troops, many East Germans still harbor a great deal of skepticism toward NATO resulting from forty years of massive propaganda against the alliance, and particularly against the United States. Just how deep such neutralist sentiments run, however, is unclear.

It is therefore vital for the West to bring the Social Democrats into the consensus in favor of unification in NATO, especially since opposition by the SPD could spark a divisive and unwanted inter-German debate. The SPD currently is divided on the security arrangement for a unified Germany. While rejecting neutrality, it has yet to embrace unification in NATO. At the same time, Social Democrats themselves know that their past hopes for gradually overcoming both blocs and moving toward a new collective security system have been undercut by the rapid pace of change and the current weaknesses of the CSCE process.

V

The future security order of a unified Germany will be determined in conjunction with its neighbors, and in particular the Four Powers of World War II, whose special role and responsibility for Germany was explicitly emphasized in Ottawa in February under the "two plus four" formula: the two German states defining their internal relationship, then the Four Powers discussing Germany's external relationships.

The actual weight and relevance of Four Power rights in the "two plus four" framework, however, remain to be seen. The Four Powers enjoy a certain leverage from the fact that they will have to be the official signatories of a peace treaty or any other final settlement. But the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers have not only been diluted or transferred to the two German states over the decades; more important, they are essentially rooted in the right of conquest and reflect a world very different from the political realities of today. Any attempt to overplay Four Power rights would be not only ineffectual, but potentially counterproductive. Such an attempt would

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smack of occupation, and run the risk of reinforcing right-wing anti-Western German nationalism.

Instead, the leverage of Germany's allies and neighbors is rooted in more subtle factors. Germans themselves have a fundamental interest in avoiding international isolation and in forging a resolution to the German Question that neither jeopardizes Bonn's strong ties to the West nor alienates or threatens the Soviet Union. Those Western countries that seek to artificially slow the unification process through the Four Power framework run the serious risk of jeopardizing the political capital and goodwill they have built up over the past decades in Bonn.

The same dilemma confronts Moscow. Soviet leaders seriously underestimated the pent-up pressures for change in the G.D.R. and the potential for the collapse of the communist regime in East Berlin. Gorbachev's vision of a Common European Home was predicated on the belief that reform in Eastern Europe could be controlled and that reformist communist parties would continue to play an important role in their countries' politics, including in the G.D.R. The collapse of communist rule in East Germany not only caught Soviet leaders by surprise, but in many ways shattered the very premise of Gorbachev's European policy, as it precipitated the final collapse of communism in the region, including even in its reformist guise.

The Soviets have fought to regain some influence over the unification process and to ensure that the end result will not unduly harm Soviet security interests. While accepting unification in principle, Gorbachev has continued to reject unification in NATO and instead has called for a neutral Germany. Moscow can be expected to hold fast in terms of negotiating the details of a final security arrangement concerning a unified Germany. The presence of Soviet troops on East German soil gives Moscow an important source of leverage, and Soviet leaders will seek to link Soviet troop reductions and the eventual removal of its forces to restrictions on Western and German military power.

Moscow is likely to push specifically for the removal of American nuclear forces from German soil. While Moscow can hardly insist that a reduced Bundeswehr or U.S. Army presence constitutes a threat to the Soviet homeland, Soviet officials may try to maintain that U.S. nuclear weapons do constitute such a danger. Moreover such a move could reso-

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nate well with existing antinuclear sentiment in West Germany. Soviet leaders will seek to capitalize on a sense of relief and gratitude in West Germany for Gorbachev's willingness to allow change in the G.D.R., and ultimately unification. They also will seek to capitalize on a clear desire in Bonn not to undercut the Soviet leader at home.

It is only against this background that one can understand the emergence of the "Genscher Plan" as the initial West German position for the "two plus four" talks. Despite strident West German opposition in the past to any notion of specific security zones for German territory or any other singling out, Bonn now has tabled a zone proposal par excellence as a way to square the circle between a German wish to remain in NATO and the desire not to alter the strategic balance in central Europe to the detriment of the Soviet Union. Proposed by the West German foreign minister, the Genscher Plan foresees current West German soil remaining part of NATO along with some sort of special demilitarized zone in the current territory of the G.D.R.

A fully demilitarized zone for current G.D.R. territory, similar to the demilitarized status of the Rhineland in the 1930s, would be problematic for three reasons. First, one wonders whether any German leader could allow one third of the nation's territory to remain undefended, especially since this zone includes Berlin. Second, any scheme allowing German and allied troops to move into this territory only during times of crisis raises a number of difficult questions concerning crisis stability, as Western forces would have to advance very quickly during times of high tension. Third, in military terms it would require a force posture with a premium on mobility and mobilization, capabilities that run contrary to notions of defense.

More important, perhaps, is whether it is wise to seek a resolution of the German Question that discriminates against Germany itself. The requirements of political expediency as seen in 1990—especially the desire to appease Soviet sensitivities—must be balanced against the solution's durability in German domestic politics. A settlement must be crafted to stand the test of time in Germany and to discourage future German politicians from pushing for revisions. Any singularization of Germany must be decided clearly by the Germans themselves to avoid false analogies with Versailles and the image of an unfair treaty imposed by external powers. Thus,

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special restrictions for Germany make political sense only if they apply to other countries in central Europe and are linked to similar provisions for European security as a whole.

Such facts also must be grasped by the Soviet Union. The primary Soviet interest in central Europe is to ensure the emergence of a politically stable and secure Germany that will be a reliable political and commercial partner, not one that might be tempted in the future to break out of a regime perceived as discriminating against legitimate German security interests.

VI

How should the United States define its policy in Germany and in central Europe against this backdrop? First, the United States should continue to embrace German unification in NATO as the Bush administration has done. Washington's early and forthright support for German unification was well received and has helped to consolidate America's stature in West Germany. There are compelling reasons why unification in NATO is in the interests of both the Germans and their neighbors and why the alternatives are not.

The NATO alliance would, of course, undergo some radical changes in purpose and structure. The new raison d'être of the alliance would be the management of peace and stability in Europe, and the consolidation of democracy in Eastern Europe. The American role and presence in Europe will be reduced significantly, a trend that will be accompanied by a shifting of leadership responsibilities to the Europeans. In light of a radically reduced Soviet threat, the alliance would assume a more political role, acting as a forum for consultation and coordination of foreign and security policy, and playing a part in arms control verification. NATO would continue to be a security alliance, but would have to develop a military strategy that corresponds to a radically different security environment.

Redefining alliance strategy and, more important, the political ground rules of the alliance will be no easy task. Yet the core of NATO would continue to be a close American-German security partnership. The legitimacy of the American presence in Germany is political. It is rooted not in residual rights of occupation, but rather in the desire of the West German government to maintain a close security relationship with the United States. While the size of the future American military presence is open for debate, it should be large enough to be a serious cooperative partner for the Bundeswehr.

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This discussion raises the question of how much the bloc-to-bloc framework still is relevant for security in central Europe. At issue is the measure of Soviet presence, interim or longterm, and whether Western diplomacy should strive to break the link between the two superpowers in Europe in light of the growing pressures on the U.S.S.R. to remove its forces from the central European stage.

For the West, and the United States in particular, to continue to cling to this bloc-to-bloc framework harbors two risks. The first is that it offers Moscow a powerful argument to maintain a troop presence that otherwise might not be politically sustainable. Alternatively, if Moscow were to decide to draw down its forces in central Europe and in the G.D.R., it would have an instrument with which to seek to ratchet down American force levels at the same time.

To counteract those dangers Washington should tie the presence of foreign troops in a European state to the principle of host-country acceptance: foreign troops should only be allowed on the soil of countries where democratically elected governments approve of their being there. The issue of foreign troops on German soil should not be dealt with in the CFE framework, as that arms control paradigm tends to reinforce symmetry between Soviet and American troops. Instead, a "two plus four" framework that also embraces the principle of host-country acceptance should be used.

It is, therefore, Bonn and a democratically elected government in East Berlin that must take the lead in determining the desirable level of foreign troops on German soil. The presence of Soviet troops on German soil, either during a transition or for a longer period, is acceptable only if agreed upon by Bonn and East Berlin. Alternatively, it also must be the German states that take the lead if Soviet troops are to leave the G.D.R. Unless the German government makes it clear that it wants Soviet troops out and American troops in, the legitimacy of the American and allied presence inevitably will be questioned.

American policy must consolidate the consensus among Germans on unification in NATO. The consensus in West Germany can best be strengthened, and the dangers of neutral sentiment in the G.D.R. defused, by allowing West German parties to sell the virtues of Atlanticism to their East German counterparts. Most important, Washington must persuade the SPD that a unified Germany should remain in the alliance. A solid West German consensus on this issue would have an

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important impact on public attitudes in the G.D.R., and leave the Soviets with little choice but to accept German membership. Alternatively, should the SPD oppose unification in NATO, German public opinion might be further polarized, and the Soviets encouraged to push for a neutral Germany.

A durable solution to the German Question also must take legitimate Soviet concerns into account, not only because Moscow must sign any peace treaty officially resolving the issue, but because it is only by addressing Soviet security needs that a stable and longterm security order can be established. Even if the West were in a position to exploit current Soviet weakness and impose a solution to the German Question on its terms, such an outcome could be a chimerical victory if it resulted in a Soviet Union that felt permanently alienated from the West and exposed to a greater threat from a unified Germany. This would hardly be a solid basis for building a stable system of European security.

What are legitimate Soviet security concerns? Soviet security is clearly not threatened by a Bundeswehr of limited size, nor by the presence of a limited contingent of American and allied forces in a unified Germany. While the West may not feel that the presence of U.S. theater nuclear weapons threatens the Soviets either, Moscow may push for the removal of such forces—a demand that would be difficult for any German government to reject, especially if perceived as the price of unification.

The Soviets' greatest worry must be the reemergence of a strong and independent German military power, in particular one that might seek at some point to obtain nuclear weapons. The West, therefore, must convince all the countries of Europe—including the U.S.S.R.—of the value of a security arrangement that leaves Germany sovereign, stable and secure and provides the new state with little future incentive for abrogation or assertion of a more dominant role in central Europe. Finally, the West also must provide Moscow with a series of concessions to gain Soviet acceptance of unification in NATO and to facilitate the removal of Soviet troops. Such steps could include economic assistance, improved access to trade and technology, a broader improvement in political ties, as well as additional confidence-building measures and constraints on Western troop deployments in central Europe.

There undoubtedly has been a considerable shift in Soviet attitudes in favor of the American presence in Europe. It is not

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yet clear, however, whether the Soviets are willing to sanction membership of a unified Germany in NATO. If Moscow ultimately were to insist on German withdrawal from NATO as the price for withdrawing Soviet forces from the G.D.R., the ability of the West to withstand such pressure will depend on the strength of the domestic consensus in Germany in favor of the alliance. The West should have placed enough goodwill and concession on the table by that point so that the majority of Germans recognize that the Soviets, not the Western allies, are standing in the way of German unity and sovereignty.

VII

Charting the final path toward German unity will undoubtedly require diplomacy and statesmanship. Perhaps the greatest challenge will be to construct a resolution to the German Question that transcends the criteria of political expediency as understood in 1990 and that will both stand the test of German domestic politics over time and lay a secure foundation for a new security regime in Europe.

The nature of German society always has been a key to European security. German society as we have known it in the postwar period undoubtedly will change as the two German states again grow together. It is often forgotten, however, that the real revolution in terms of political values and culture took place in the West, not the East. While a new German republic will continue to be pro-Western, liberal and capitalist, it also will become more traditionally German as its eastern half is merged with the West. It is now the task of the West to ensure that Germans in the G.D.R., too, discover the virtues of the European Community and Atlanticism.

Above all, any solution will require considerable skill and diplomacy on the part of the Germans themselves. For forty years Germans have been shielded from playing the role of a major power. West Germans became accustomed to and profited from a low geopolitical profile, cloaking their national aims in the fabric of the Atlantic alliance or the European Community and often hiding behind their major allies, usually Washington. While it has been clear for some time that the Germans have outgrown the self-imposed restrictions of the early postwar period, a unified Germany now will have to decide how to use its newly acquired power and influence. Adapting to that new role will not be easy, for the breathtaking pace of the unification process has given Germans little time to

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adjust politically and psychologically to the prospect of again becoming a great power.

Overcoming the division of Germany will bring to an end an era of European history, one characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Yet it was in many ways a false stability, as the rapid collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe aptly illustrated. It of course would be foolish to suggest that the future course of politics in Germany and central Europe is preordained. The events of the past year have taught many of us a lesson in humility concerning the remarkable surprises the forces of history can produce.

The best guarantees that history will not repeat itself are democracy and Western integration for Germany. We must not lose sight of the new and positive vista unification opens for both Germany and Europe. The unification of Germany will do more than finally bring to an end the painful realities of the German partition. It will allow Germany to rid itself of the albatross of a neuralgic identity crisis that continually plagued a divided nation. A unified Germany firmly integrated into the West can become a more stable and more predictable ally and neighbor. If properly harnessed, German financial power and political influence could set an example and be mobilized for the new tasks of consolidating democracy in east-central Europe and reconstructing a new and more stable continent.

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William H. Luers

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: ROAD TO REVOLUTION

The Czechoslovak Revolution of 1989 was the most surprising, yet most rational, event in the array of startling upheavals that ended the decade in Eastern Europe. It was surprising in that virtually no one—in Czechoslovakia or abroad—foresaw anything approximating what would happen between November 17 and December 29. It was rational in that all those characteristics that had shaped Czechoslovak history for the past several hundred years seemed to merge in what was clearly the most gentle and complete disestablishment of communism in Eastern Europe.

There were many factors—accidental happenings and political trends—that came together to create that "velvet revolution." The person who started it was Mikhail Gorbachev. The ideas underpinning the clean sweep of the communist dominion in Eastern Europe flowed without question from perestroika and glasnost. Yet the way in which the events in Czechoslovakia unfolded demonstrated Gorbachev's apparent lack of vision or even ignorance of the real forces at play in this important allied nation.

The spark that lit the fire under revolution in November surely came from the explosive events earlier in East Germany, events which Gorbachev condoned if not wholly encouraged. Human waves of East Germans flowing through Czechoslovakia and Hungary to freedom in the West riveted the attention of young Czechs and Slovaks, opening their minds to the potential for mass action and the possible impotence of their security police. Ultimately, however, it was a uniquely Czechoslovak reaction to the prospect of reform in Eastern Europe and to the dramatic change in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev that formed the character of their revolution and led to Václav Havel's election as the Czechoslovak president on December 29.

Historians over decades to come will dissect the almost

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miraculous disappearance of the Cold War and East European communism in 1989. Many in Prague find their own revolution so mystifyingly beautiful that they attribute it to astrological forces, to the recently canonized Bohemian princess St. Agnes, or to the return of Rabbi Loew's golem. For now, however, tracing the earthly steps that led to the momentous changes in Czechoslovakia may help to explain why the world, and even Czechoslovaks themselves, failed to anticipate the "Prague Autumn" of 1989.

II

Gorbachev's revolution is clearly the starting point. Without the Soviet leader's "new thinking," perestroika and glasnost, the fundamentals of Soviet relations with Eastern Europe could not have changed so rapidly. It was Gorbachev's changing vision of Soviet national security and national interests that created the conditions for the revolutions of Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, few experts would have disagreed just two years ago with the basic proposition that Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe profoundly limited the potential there for fundamental change.[1] Even as it became clear that Gorbachev's policies would have unpredictable and possibly dramatic implications for the states of Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Hungary where reforms were evolving rapidly, the Soviet commitment to the retention of the Warsaw Pact alliance and Communist Party rule seemed firm.

The surprisingly rapid collapse of communist power in Czechoslovakia is a metaphor for the failure of the Stalinist system to secure Eastern Europe as a *cordon sanitaire* for the Soviet Union after World War II. In a sense, if the Soviet Union could not impose "friendship" on Czechoslovakia, it could not do so anywhere. The Czechoslovak party and government apparatus of control were never as repressive as in, say, Romania or, at times, in the Soviet Union itself. Czechoslovakia emerged from the war the least damaged economy and country in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Czechs and Slovaks, who had been betrayed by the West at Munich in 1938 ("about us, without us"), had retained a certain cultural and even political affinity with the Russians.

The communist left had a legitimate political following in

[1] This was my view in "The U.S. and Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1987, p. 981.

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Czechoslovakia after the war. After the country was finally subdued in 1948 in the Soviet takeover, however, the communist regime became slavishly submissive to Soviet power. Indeed the "Prague Spring" in 1968 was but a delayed reaction to Nikita Khrushchev's reforms in the U.S.S.R. earlier that decade. Thus the Prague Spring was led by communists who, like the Khrushchev reformers, believed that Soviet-style socialism could have a human face, could be reformed and could be made to work. This paradox found the puppet Czechoslovak regime of Antonín Novotný pursuing Khrushchev's reform policies even after Khrushchev had been deposed in 1964. One-time Czechoslovak Communist Party Secretary Zdeněk Mlynář, who accompanied the reformist leader Alexander Dubček to Moscow for the showdown with the Brezhnev politburo following the invasion that crushed the Prague Spring, describes it this way:

> At a time when Brezhnev was increasingly abandoning the Khrushchevian line—it happened under the Novotný government—anti-Stalinist reform communist criticism was first fully developed not only in Czechoslovak society but also inside the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the power structure.[2]

So it was during the period between 1964 and 1968 that reform trends quickened in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet reformers who survived Khrushchev and watched the rise and fall of the Prague Spring in 1968 knew that the end of Dubček also meant the end of their already lanquishing reform movement under Brezhnev.

Many of the Khrushchev reform generation who were subsequently resurrected from obscure institutes by Gorbachev—or earlier in 1983–84 while Yuri Andropov was general secretary—had spent time (exile is too strong a word) in Prague during the 1960s or early 1970s. Many of them worked on the Cominform publication, *The World Marxist Review*, published in Prague. The list of these Soviet reformers, referred to in Moscow as the "Prague Club," reads like the *Who's Who* of perestroika. It includes Ivan Frolov, editor of

[2] *Nightfrost in Prague*, Zdeněk Mlynář, Karz Publishers, New York, 1978, pp. 70–71. The intimate relationship between the Prague and Moscow reformers is symbolized by the relationship between Gorbachev and Mlynář. Mlynář, who subsequently went into exile in Vienna, has been a major source of information about Gorbachev's openness and questioning approach as a young man in law school at Moscow State University where Mlynář and Gorbachev were friends.

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Pravda and a longtime close adviser to Gorbachev; Gennady Gerasimov, Gorbachev's press spokesman; Georgy Shakhnazarov, a principal foreign policy adviser; Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev's personal assistant; and Fedor Burlatsky, a top Soviet human rights authority. There are many more now working in key Soviet research institutes and in the government.

These Soviet reformers should have had a particularly good understanding of Czechoslovakia and the tragedy of the post-1968 period. Perhaps because that group was so preoccupied with Soviet domestic reforms in the period between 1985 and 1988, it seemed to have had little impact on Gorbachev's own thinking; more likely the top leadership had already decided for other reasons before 1989 not to press reformist views on Czechoslovak authorities.

A second paradox thus arose in the relationship between the Soviet Union and its Czechoslovak satrapy during the early Gorbachev years. The traditional Soviet institutional controls remained in place even though the reformers close to Gorbachev had special knowledge of the particular conservativeness and growing isolation of the Czechoslovak party leadership. During Gorbachev's first years Soviet influence over the top echelons of the Czechoslovak police, party, military, press and trade unions was probably greater than in any other East European country except East Germany. As long as the Soviets chose to exercise that influence and as long as the Czechoslovak old guard installed by Brezhnev after 1968 chose to tolerate it, there was little likelihood that real reform would take hold.

The difficult question to answer is why Gorbachev and these advisers did not move sooner to encourage reforms within the Czechoslovak party before it was too late. There are several possible explanations.

Gorbachev's first principle in dealing with Eastern Europe after assuming power was that the Soviet Union would no longer interfere in the internal affairs of its allies. He thus was caught in the uncomfortable circumstance of deciding whether to interfere in Czechoslovakia to scrape away the residue of prior Soviet interference, or simply to let things go on as they were and trust the Czechoslovak Communist Party to reform itself. He chose the latter course. He did so probably not only to retain his posture of non-interference, but perhaps also because of a fundamental ignorance of Czechoslovakia—

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the questionable strength of the party, the stagnant nature of the leadership, the conservative cut of the Soviet team there. Despite the fact that many of Gorbachev's advisers knew the situation in Czechoslovakia, it is difficult to imagine any apparatchik appreciating the depth of the Soviet problem there.

The Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Viktor Lomakin, played an important role in obstructing reformist tendencies, and Gorbachev trusted him. They had served together for many years as regional party secretaries—a close club in the Soviet party. Gorbachev was party leader in Stavropol, Lomakin in Vladivostok, where for nearly 15 years he worked particularly well with the large military-police establishment of that security-laden zone between China and the Sea of Japan. After his appointment as ambassador shortly before Gorbachev became general secretary, however, Lomakin seemed to look upon his role in Prague as if he were still a ruling party boss. Even Czechoslovaks for the past few years seemed to feel that Moscow looked upon Prague much in the same way it did Kiev or Vilnius.

Gorbachev also had a personal relationship with Miloš Jakeš, who became the Czechoslovak first party secretary in 1987 with a vague promise to reform. They had first met in 1979 and worked together frequently; Gorbachev was Soviet party secretary for agriculture from 1980–85, and Jakeš held the same post in Czechoslovakia.

Then after Jakeš took power, the Soviets may have applied the old principle: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." From the Soviet perspective the Czechoslovak economy was the least troubled in Eastern Europe; Czechoslovak citizens lived relatively well; except for a few unruly students and an occasional crazy intellectual or playwright, the party seemed to have matters well under control. With all of Moscow's problems, why create more? After all, until the incredible events of 1989, Gorbachev retained belief in the ability of the communist parties to pull Eastern Europe out of its economic morass. Given the unraveling of communism in Poland and Hungary, Gorbachev desperately needed at least one successful reform somewhere; perhaps he counted too much on Jakeš and company in Prague.

But there is also evidence from the press and other Soviet sources that Gorbachev had become increasingly impatient with the Jakeš and Eastern Europe's other conservative re-

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gimes even before 1989. Romania's Nicolae Ceauşescu had tried to orchestrate a conservative coalition with Jakeš and East Germany's Erich Honecker to use force if necessary to repress reform in Poland and Hungary. Moreover Jakeš was beginning to play to Yegor Ligachev and other conservative opponents of Gorbachev in Moscow. For all their personal ties, according to a senior Soviet academic, Gorbachev and his advisers would have preferred the more liberal Lubomír Štrougal rather than Jakeš to replace Gustáv Husák in 1987. Gorbachev, of course, knew that Jakeš had led the Czechoslovak party purges of the 1970s.

By 1989, in the end, other dynamics had been set in motion within Czechoslovakia that led to the isolation and eventual downfall of Jakeš and his team. For Jakeš, it was simply too late.

III

What had been so obvious to Western observers for two decades or more was not really understood in the Kremlin: the increasingly anti-Soviet and anticommunist attitude of the Warsaw Pact populations was undermining the security as well as the economies of the region.

At Yalta Stalin had tried to persuade Roosevelt and Churchill that what the Soviet Union required, above all, was a glacis of friendly nations in Eastern Europe. In an aside to an American official Stalin confided that "free elections" were not likely to assure the Soviets that the countries of Eastern Europe would be "friendly." Later Brezhnev, like Khrushchev, was prepared to use force if necessary to preserve the "fraternal relationship." Gorbachev became the first Soviet leader who, perhaps to his own surprise, began to appreciate the depth of hostility that had developed in Eastern Europe as a result of those imposed regimes.

Nonetheless, the Soviet policymaking community simply did not recognize the significance of anti-Soviet attitudes in Eastern Europe, or the potential for change in Czechoslovakia. Soviet diplomats and officials often appeared blind to the steadily eroding base of Czechoslovak popular support for the communist regime and the alliance with the Soviet Union.

One incident stands out among the dozens demonstrating this point. In the spring of 1985, a world hockey tournament was played in Prague shortly after Gorbachev came to power. A young, inexperienced American team made a surprisingly excellent showing. As the tournament progressed the Czecho-

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slovak audience became increasingly vocal and demonstratively supportive of the U.S. team—and overtly hostile to the Russians. In the finals, the Americans played the Soviets for third place. By that time the Soviet embassy had become so embarrassed by the anti-Soviet crowds that the ambassador chose not to attend the game. Indeed the crowd was loudly supporting the Americans even though the Soviet team was clearly superior. Toward the end of the match, after an ugly incident in which a Soviet player bloodied the nose of the U.S. goalie, the American and Soviet teams got into a full-rink fight. The Czechoslovak audience was uncontrollably hostile to the Soviet side and shouted loudly, "Go! Go! U.S.A. Go! Go! U.S.A."

Anecdotal evidence, however, does not adequately describe the sense that had grown among Czechoslovaks that the enormous Soviet power network—permeating the party, the trade unions, the secret police, the army and the media—was profoundly out of touch with the realities of the country, precisely because those Czechoslovak party institutions were themselves so out of touch. The Czechoslovak population was turning inward, engaging in what was called "anti-politics," or internal immigration into their own private lives. Moreover, after Gorbachev's much-anticipated visit to Prague in the spring of 1987, which did not spur the party to reform, Czechoslovak activists and youth became even more convinced that real change was not in the offing.

Nevertheless, during 1988 several important dimensions had begun to emerge that would shape the policies, attitudes and reactions of Gorbachev toward Eastern Europe:

—As Gorbachev came to realize the depth of the problems of the Soviet economic and political system, he and his advisers became more focused on their own domestic issues, placing less emphasis on trying to manage deteriorating relations with the Warsaw Pact and Comecon.

—By late 1988, as reflected in his stunning December speech at the United Nations, Gorbachev had substantially changed Moscow's thinking about the nature of national security and Soviet interests. Security was now defined more in terms of international cooperation and economic stability than in terms of military power.

—Developments in Poland and Hungary had confirmed the degree of a pent-up popular political power in those

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nations as the people were pressing for radical changes in the nature of the communist rule.

A revealing window on the emerging attitudes of Gorbachev's inner circle of advisers came in June of 1988 when a group of Soviet and American specialists met in Alexandria, Virginia, to discuss the role of Eastern Europe in superpower relations. The American experts were not prepared for the candor of the Soviet paper presented at the conference.[3] The profound implications of Gorbachev's new thinking suddenly came into view—at least as far as Eastern Europe was concerned. The paper was strikingly fresh for its recognition of the fundamental problems of Soviet relations with the region and the weaknesses of the region's political and economic systems.

The subject of Czechoslovakia came up. Did the Prague Spring not anticipate the Gorbachev reforms, 20 years earlier? Was it not important for the Soviets to recognize publicly the mistake of the 1968 invasion? Did the current Czechoslovak regime not present the ultimate challenge to Gorbachev, since it was the one most clearly installed by Soviet power yet the one least responsive to reform? The Soviets privately acknowledged that most of these questions were valid. In fact the two officials who knew Czechoslovakia best echoed the concern attributed to Gorbachev, that the decision to make Jakeš party boss instead of Štrougal was a fundamental error on the part of the Czechoslovak party, in effect postponing real reforms and betting on Gorbachev's early political demise.

The Prague leadership's strategy since 1987 had been to keep the old guard together at the top. Through 1988 and into 1989 the leaders continued to resist Gorbachev and the increasingly dramatic reforms of Poland and Hungary. They realized that once a leader came to power who had not shared in the humiliating "normalization" process after 1968, the old guard would be thrown out and blamed for the past twenty years of decline. By the summer of 1988 Štrougal, who was then prime minister, was pressing Jakeš for more aggressive reforms with the backing of the Czechoslovak Institute for Forecasting, led by Waltr Komárek. One of the few who had a

[3] See "East-West Relations and Eastern Europe," published in *Problems of Communism*, May–August 1988. This conference was sponsored by the International Research and Exchanges Board.

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feel for what reform was needed, Štrougal was removed as prime minister in the fall of 1988.

Jakeš and the rest of the old guard determined that they all would have lost out had Štrougal succeeded in launching a genuine reform movement. After Štrougal's departure, however, Jakeš made a conciliatory gesture by retiring the dreaded Vasil Bil'ák—the ideological hard-liner who had set the repressive tone of domestic policy for twenty years. Jakeš also promised a few other liberalizing measures, such as easing foreign travel restrictions and permitting more cultural freedom. But he still resisted fundamental political and economic reform.

During early 1989 democratic changes in Poland and Hungary, the continuing deterioration of the Soviet economy and the dramatic Soviet parliamentary election in March focused the issues even more clearly for the communist leaderships of Eastern Europe. For the first time it became arguable that the Brezhnev Doctrine was in fact dead and that Gorbachev had no intention of using military force to repress democratic change in Eastern Europe—or even, apparently, in the Soviet Union. The repression of the Tbilisi riots in April 1989 had become an embarrassment for Gorbachev, rather than a demonstration of strength. Then in his speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on July 6, 1989, Gorbachev seemed finally to remove all ambiguity about the Brezhnev Doctrine when he pledged that people would have not only the right to choose their social system, but to change it. He rejected any interference in the internal affairs of "friends, allies or anyone else," or attempts to limit their sovereignty.

The conservative regimes of Honecker, Jakeš, Ceaușescu and Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov had become an economic burden and, more important, were creating a credibility gap for Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. The longer these regimes put off reform, the more problems the communists would likely have retaining some role in reconstruction, and the more likely the Soviet political and military presence would be challenged. Moreover, pressure was mounting in Soviet society, particularly in the national republics, for more open debate and candor about the past: 1939–40 in the Baltics, 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Evidence indicates that Soviet policy in the fall of 1989 became somewhat more "interventionist," urging reform particularly among party leaderships in Berlin and Prague.

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Finally the isolation of the communist parties from the populace was demonstrated in incident after incident in Poland, Hungary and even in the Soviet Union. Thus, demoralized communist institutions, combined with the growing boldness of the populace, in the summer of 1989 brought the region to the threshold of its revolution.

IV

Gorbachev's perestroika created the conditions for the Czechoslovaks to rid themselves of communist rule. But it was the intellectuals gathered first under the umbrella of Charter 77, later giving birth to Civic Forum, who gave the "velvet revolution" its gentle and even spiritual character; they made possible the remarkably smooth transition toward a free society.

The history of Charter 77 brings together many other elements that affected Czechoslovak attitudes over the past decade and prepared the society for the events of 1989. In particular, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act played a vital role in providing the Czechoslovak people with political leverage and hope. It also justified Western support for the movement and the mounting number of parallel dissident and opposition groups that became bolder as the decade of the 1980s progressed.

Charter 77 included some of the 1968 "reformers" who were frustrated in their attempts to give socialism a human face, but it also had a broader, more anticommunist group of signatories. Charter "presented a challenge of a new kind, more ethical and less political than its predecessors."[4] Founded in January 1977 by a group led by Václav Havel, Jan Potočka and Jiří Hájek in response to the Helsinki Final Act, Charter 77 declared itself to be:

> a free, informal, open community of people of different convictions, different faiths and different professions united by the will to strive individually and collectively for the respect of civil and human rights in our own country and through the world. Charter 77 is not an organization; it has no rules, permanent bodies or formal membership. It does not form the basis for any oppositional political activity.[5]

[4] *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, by H. Gordon Skilling, George Allen Unwin Ltd., London, 1981, p. 178.

[5] Charter 77 Declaration, January 1, 1977.

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This was and continued to be a very new type of "community"—subtle, anti-party, anti-ideology, ethical and ultimately very powerful. So powerful were its words, ideas and values, and so strong the mutual trust, sense of community and internal communications that Charter 77's work contributed mightily to the simultaneous demoralization and collapse of the Communist Party.

Prior to 1989 most Western experts saw two basic models for reform in Eastern Europe. One model was Hungary, where change was led by the Communist Party reformers. The other was Poland, where the collapse of communist rule was carried out by two strong national institutions—the church and Solidarity. One of the major miscalculations that experts made about Czechoslovakia was in underestimating the capacity of the Charter 77 movement and other intellectual and dissident groups to wrest power from the communists. No Western expert dared to doubt that Czechoslovak rulers would ultimately resort to police or military force to repress an increasingly bold opposition.

Not only the power of the ideas underlying these organizations, but the cunning of their activists was also underestimated. These dissidents claimed in the style of the Good Soldier Schweik that they were not a "political opposition"—in order not to provoke too much repression—and yet they evolved their "informal community" into an effective array of parallel civic groups. They claimed no ideology and no leadership structure, yet the very openness, courage and seemingly abstract philosophical style of a man like Havel enabled individuals of widely differing points of view to trust him, inform him and seek his support and leadership for all variety of happenings.

These dissident leaders simply claimed to be seeking a dialogue with the communist rulers to discuss, for example, how the government would institute practical changes that would enable it to comply with the Helsinki Final Act—a seemingly innocent, almost naïve objective. But as the former dissident and newly named foreign minister, Jiří Dienstbíer, indicated on several occasions, this was essentially a call for the overthrow of the old regime. The old guard communists finally understood better than anyone that Charter 77's game was a direct challenge to communist rule; this was no mere reform movement.

Charter 77 was often hamstrung by its lack of structure and

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organization, by its often maddeningly time-consuming "consensus" approach to decision-making, by its variety of personalities and by the split between its nonviolent human rights purists and its activists who saw value in increasingly political acts and demonstrations. It was, however, this very disorder that gave rise to the movement's improvisation, creativity, individual initiative and dramatic gestures. In particular, that large segment of the movement coming from the theater recognized the important role of symbols in political action, and brought a vitality to Charter's efforts that captured national and world attention for its cause.

Almost from the start, the Charter activists were in close, though highly discreet, contact with parallel dissident movements in Hungary and Poland. As early as 1978, Charter leaders conferred secretly with their opposite numbers from Solidarity; with all the clandestine precautions they could muster, they met in the mountain woods on the Polish-Czechoslovak border—not just that first time but repeatedly over the years—camping out, comparing notes on tactics, strategies and goals.

The man who reluctantly emerged as the leader of the movement was Havel. Like so many other East European intellectuals he was influenced by phenomenology, a philosophical strain stressing personal responsibility and rejecting ideologies that blame others for one's own predicament—whether it be the "class enemy" or the "evil empire." In this system of beliefs, human rights are not something granted as a political reward or withheld as a punishment, but are what allow individuals to flourish in a free society. Havel's teacher in this set of ideas was Jan Potočka, the continuing intellectual father of Charter 77 even though he died shortly after its founding. The Civic Forum, the revolutionary political heir to Charter 77, is based on the same fundamental principles and seeks to revive the sense of personal responsibility lost in a society so long dominated by a dead, utopian ideology that systematically deprived the individual of free thought and self-awareness.

Thus, two important aspects of Charter 77 and Civic Forum are the protection of human rights and the restoration of the traditions of the Czech and Slovak peoples. These traditions draw much from the history of the religious and philosophical heretic (e.g., Jan Hus), the nonviolent response to national conquest (e.g., after the Thirty Years War), the central role of

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philosophy and language in the development of the national political character (e.g., Tomáš Masaryk), and the strength of the democracy and the free-enterprise system that thrived in the period of the 1920s and 1930s. Havel and his fellow writers gained their energy from these traditions and intellectual roots.

There is another side of that history relevant to this modern period—the Roman Catholic Church. The church was seen by Masaryk and Czechs in earlier centuries as a force used to oppress the Czech national character. Slovaks, on the other hand, had long been strongly Roman Catholic. Despite their Czech heritage, Havel and Charter 77 found themselves closely allied with the church—its František Cardinal Tomásek, its dissident priests and the growing number of young intellectuals seeking spiritual refuge in Catholicism. The Catholic Church became not only a powerful force in support of the goals of Charter 77, but is now a potential binding link between the Czech and Slovak peoples.

Another part of this history is the Czech effort after independence to remove centuries of the overbearing presence of German culture. Indeed two of Masaryk's objectives in 1918 were to reduce the role of the Catholic Church and of German culture and economic power in Czechoslovakia. Later, after the Second World War, there was even a repressive period of expelling and persecuting Germans who lived in the Sudeten region. Today, however, Czechoslovak intellectuals have received important support from West Germany, and German economic and political investment in Czechoslovakia's post-communist development is certain to be more abundant than most—and possibly more controversial. Similarly, just as the Czech nation has feared German domination in the past, the Slovaks have harbored anxieties about the Hungarians. It remains to be seen whether the end of communism in Slovakia and Hungary will become a constructive or debilitating factor in the strengthening of the Czechoslovak nation.

Finally, Czechoslovakia's own communist government and that of the Soviet Union over the past forty years have manipulated the relations between Czechs and Slovaks for their own purposes. The period since 1968 has been a particularly difficult one for Czech/Slovak relations. Charter 77 was principally a Czech and Moravian phenomenon, while the dissidence in Slovakia was church-centered. Slovak students and intellectuals clearly played an important role in the

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liberation of Slovakia with their Public Against Violence organization—the equivalent to the Czechs' Civic Forum. But the different ways in which the Slovak and Czech peoples have dealt over the past decade with communism will add one more complexity to the troubled relations between these two principal nations of the Czechoslovak state.

Beyond the cluster of Charter 77 organizations the most important group was the "Jazz Section." Originally a tolerated unit of the Union of Musicians, the Jazz Section had been around since 1971, organizing concerts and publishing magazines. Under the leadership of the energetic and canny Karel Srp, the Jazz Section became much more political by the early 1980s, and boldly began to engage large numbers of young people in quasi-opposition activities beyond the realm of jazz, which the regime found so distasteful precisely because they understood that jazz had become a widespread form of protest. The role of modern music in the dissidence of this very musical nation has become legend in the West. John Lennon, after his death, became a symbol of freedom to young Czechoslovaks, and it was on "Lennon's Wall," across from the French embassy, where protest posters and graffiti appeared throughout the 1980s.

The Jazz Section was unique in that it was a semi-official organization, received UNESCO recognition, published a magazine read by tens of thousands, and had a headquarters. The boldness of Srp and his colleagues in publishing and promoting anti-regime material and in garnering international support prompted the government to arrest and try them in March 1987. These arrests radicalized Srp's many young followers and forced the movement into bolder and more diverse activities. Not only did the "Unijazz" and "ArtForum" groups become direct offshoots of the Jazz Section and attempt to do similar things with young people, but other groups developed in the wake of the Jazz Section trials as well, including the Czech Children, the Society for Friendship with the U.S.A., the Independent Peace Society and the John Lennon Peace Club.

Another vital factor in creating the conditions for revolution in Czechoslovakia was the media, in its broadest sense. One could argue persuasively that the very speed of the transformation of Eastern Europe in 1989 was created by television and radio. The sight and sound of the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Leipzig, Berlin and Prague; East German

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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emigrants jumping over fences and into the West German embassy; the tearing down of the Berlin Wall—these events seemed to give instant courage and a sense of community to cowed citizens of Czechoslovakia.

The persistence of foreign radio stations like the BBC, VOA and Radio Free Europe in transmitting the true story of events in the world, and in Czechoslovakia in particular, eroded the credibility of the communist government and fostered an awareness and sense of judgment and history among the Czechoslovak citizenry. Indeed, in December 1988 when the Czechoslovak government ceased jamming Radio Free Europe as a gesture of reform, much broader and more effective dissemination of the growing popular movements became possible. Finally, samizdat and other publishing activities grew in Czechoslovakia in 1987–88 with increased foreign support and greater boldness on the part of Charter 77 and other groups. Such journals as *Lidove Noviny*, *Revolver Review* and dozens of others, plus an unapproved videocassette news program, *Original Video Journal*, emerged despite government efforts to restrict circulation.

A third relatively new development in Czechoslovakia in the 1988–89 period was the successful organizing of demonstrations and petitions that engaged much larger numbers more actively against the regime. Demonstrations had been tried for years, but had not been greatly effective. Unlike Poland and Hungary, where large public manifestations had been effective tools of political action, large crowds gathered in Czechoslovakia only at officially organized events or in Catholic pilgrimages in Moravia and Slovakia. Charter 77 and some of the larger dissident groups used traditions like Human Rights Day (December 10), John Lennon Day (December 8), the anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion (August 21) and the anniversary of the Czechoslovak state (October 28) to prod the authorities by trying to entice large numbers into the streets.

In 1988 the demonstrations began to get serious. On the anniversary of the Warsaw Pact invasion up to 10,000 gathered. Another several thousand massed on October 28 to appeal for new laws to permit the right of assembly, and an even larger demonstration took place on December 10. Perhaps the most impressive demonstration of public support in 1988 for an opposition cause was the 31-point petition for religious freedom signed by over 600,000 people, including non-Catholics and non-dissidents, along with a letter of sup-

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port from Cardinal Tomásek. The petition was a powerful public "vote" that brought a firm response from the regime against the activists who had organized it.

Western governments and private human rights organizations played an important role in encouraging and supporting these signs of dissidence. In particular, American support of the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act—the promotion of human rights and freedom of the press, religion and assembly—was critical. Officials at the American embassy in Prague met regularly throughout the 1980s with leading opposition groups, and encouraged prominent private and official Americans visiting Czechoslovakia to do the same. Virtually no other Western embassy offered similar support in the mid-1980s, and often diplomats were critical of the extent to which the U.S. ambassador met with opposition groups. Yet by 1988 several of the other NATO governments began following the American lead and encouraged visiting senior government officials—most significantly French President François Mitterrand—to meet dissidents in Prague.

Finally helping to set the stage for 1989 was Helsinki Watch, a human rights organization based in New York, which together with the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights organized international support for the Czechoslovak dissidents. Many European-based groups also lent their support, most particularly the Charter 77 Foundation of Stockholm and the Jan Hus Foundation of London.

The primary impact of Western support was to strengthen the sense of purpose and respectability among the Czechoslovak community of dissidents and, more important, to demonstrate to the Czechoslovak government and party the "legitimate" role that the opposition groups were playing in promoting the rights guaranteed by the Helsinki Final Act and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both of which the government had signed.

V

The revolutionary events inside Czechoslovakia in 1989 are among the most interesting and also the most difficult to grasp of all the upheavals of Eastern Europe.

A series of demonstrations began on January 15, around the 20th anniversary of Jan Palach's self-immolation to protest the Soviet suppression of the Prague Spring. The demonstrations had not been planned, but grew from a plea by Havel to the

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writer of an anonymous letter not to repeat Palach's sacrifice of 20 years before. Havel's plea was broadcast on foreign radio stations into Czechoslovakia and caught the attention of opposition groups as well as the government security forces. For a week young people and independent organizations came to Prague's Wenceslas Square in large numbers, but police used violent methods to disperse the crowds. Havel and several other dissidents were arrested. On February 21, Havel was sentenced to nine months in jail.

The arrests and sentencings turned out to be a major tactical error for the government. Havel's supporters throughout the country took the opportunity to circulate a petition for his release. Signed by thousands of intellectuals and others who had not previously signed such documents, this petition created widespread sympathy for Havel at home and abroad. The government's actions provoked condemnation from foreign governments and intellectuals, including some even from the Soviet Union. The event also further radicalized the nation's youth, especially students and the members of Prague's theaters. Tactical differences emerged, however, between the different generations of the opposition in Czechoslovakia. Younger and newer organizations sought a more radical response, while some of the purists of Charter 77 rejected demonstrations that could provoke further violence and retaliation.

The arrests also prompted the People's Party and the Socialist Party, the two satellite parties that had done the bidding of the Communist Party since the late 1940s, to strike out tentatively on their own. It is still unclear whether that initial split was stimulated by Charter 77 initiatives or simply the opportunism of those in the parties who saw the writing on the wall. Nonetheless those two parties sponsored a draft bill in parliament in the spring to permit greater freedom of assembly for the public. The newspapers of the two parties also took a more independent line from the Communist Party newspaper *Rudé Právo*, and several journalists from the two fellow-traveling newspapers began to write for the clandestine *Lidove Noviny*.

Charter 77's still-inchoate strategy of isolating the leadership of the Communist Party was beginning to make some sense. On July 17 party First Secretary Jakeš delivered a speech to party officials in western Bohemia, which was secretly recorded. The recording was passed to Western radio stations, and its sound quality was so good as to indicate it must have

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been taken directly from the microphone, suggesting a planned effort—probably by party insiders and possibly encouraged by opposition elements—to discredit the bumbling party leader.

The foreign broadcasts of the Jakeš talk were heard inside Czechoslovakia, to the humiliation of party and government officials who already held Jakeš' intelligence and speaking ability in low regard. Among the recorded remarks was Jakeš' recognition that it had been a mistake to arrest Havel, "because the more we persecute him, the greater a hero he will be." Jakeš warned, "We must not direct our hits directly against Havel, but against the others. Otherwise cultural figures all over the world and the democratic world will stand up in his defense." The "others" by late 1989 had become a very large number indeed.

Havel, released from jail that May on parole, had continued with renewed energy and a reinforced national and international reputation to expand the network of opposition forces. He crafted yet another document entitled, in typical Czechoslovak understatement, "A Few Words." That document was issued on June 29 and garnered 1,800 signatures, many of which were not those of prominent dissidents. It was the most radical demand for change to date. Yet as late as August, Havel was still struggling with the dilemma of whether to mount demonstrations that might provoke further crackdowns and violence and raise the ante against an increasingly isolated government.

By September or early October a small contingent of Havel's more innovative followers had decided that Charter 77 strategy should be to try to drive a wedge between the government and the party leadership. Czechoslovak rock star Michael Kocáb said he began to establish a "bridge" for contacts between Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec and Havel. Kocáb carried messages back and forth, seeking to nurture Adamec's instinct for accommodation and playing on his growing awareness of Jakeš' isolation. Kocáb could perform that task because of his stature as a national celebrity, and because he was emerging as one of Havel's most cunning political strategists and advisers. The two interlocutors, Adamec and Havel, finally met face to face for the first time on November 21.

The strategy of isolating Jakeš and the other party leaders was effective because of signals coming from the Soviet Union

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that implied a need to reevaluate the Warsaw Pact suppression of the Prague Spring, and consequently the current Czechoslovak leadership that still firmly defended the action. Those signals included an interview with Dubček carried on a Leningrad television program, a debate in the *Moscow News* about the need to reassess 1968, an interview in *Izvestia* with Dubček's foreign minister, Jiří Hájek—a strong opponent of the Warsaw Pact invasion—and a forceful article in *Izvestia* in October calling for a condemnation of the Warsaw Pact action in order to make the new Soviet foreign policy credible at home and abroad. According to one Czechoslovak source, Jaromír Sedlák, the Soviets even told the Czechoslovak leadership that "further delay in introducing political change could cause serious trouble."[6]

The East German exodus in September through Czechoslovakia and Hungary into West Germany inspired young Czechoslovaks. They witnessed young East Germans boldly resisting Czechoslovak police and senior authorities; they learned the police could be intimidated by unarmed citizens; when the authorities ultimately let the East Germans leave, they learned that authorities could be made to back down. Before and after Gorbachev's October visit to Berlin, hundreds of thousands of people were demonstrating in East Germany and were not stopped by police. As the Honecker government fell, and with it the Berlin Wall, young Czechoslovaks quickly got the message: thousands of demonstrators could make a difference, the police would not necessarily use force, and the Soviets would not intervene.

Early in November young Polish musicians organized a jazz concert in Wrocław, near the Czechoslovak border, and thousands of Czechoslovak jazz fans flocked across to join in a sort of East European "Woodstock."

The demonstration in Prague on November 17, organized to pay tribute to a student killed by the Nazis, became the event that transformed Czechoslovakia. It had been organized legally by students through the communist youth organization. Many of these young organizers were children of Charter 77 activists, but many more were bold students and young workers who were prepared to test the police. Nearly 100,000 gathered to march on Wenceslas Square, and the police reacted with unexpected brutality. Opposition reaction was

[6] *The New York Times*, Nov. 15, 1989.

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speedy in taking advantage of the moment, dramatizing the violence, calling it a massacre (although no one was killed), and appealing to the broader population. The national theater shut down at intermission that night, and other theaters and university faculties went on strike that weekend. Havel and his many groups of supporters coalesced to form the Civic Forum, and the demonstrations grew day by day.

The events that followed have been well described elsewhere, particularly by Timothy Garton Ash in his remarkable first-hand accounting of the "velvet revolution."[7] Yet a few of the more peculiar circumstances that made that revolution possible remain unclear. Within the Civic Forum, for example, and among Czechoslovak Communist Party officials, suspicion exists that the KGB played an important and perhaps provocative role in suppressing the November 17 demonstration. Then, under new guidance from Moscow, the KGB is also thought to have influenced the forbearance of the Czechoslovak police and military in confronting later demonstrations. Havel's confidant, Kocáb, said that a senior KGB official was with the Czechoslovak police on November 17, and that the Czechoslovak secret police began burning and destroying their secret papers two or three days later; the secret police seemed to realize before anyone else that the struggle was turning against them. Kocáb admitted, however, that no one really knows who ordered the strong police response to the November 17 demonstration.

There are other reports from Czechoslovak sources suggesting the Soviets gave the Jakeš leadership a strong warning against the use of force on November 19 or 20. When asked about those reports the present prime minister, Marian Calfa, said the old-guard party leader Alois Indra told him in December 1989 that it was the Soviets who ultimately made possible the overthrow of communist rule in Czechoslovakia. Havel, asked why the police and military did not crush the uprising, said he could write a book on that subject but that "love, tolerance, nonviolence, the human spirit and forgiveness became the bacteriologic weapons" that intimidated the armed forces and police.

Kocáb, by now an experienced go-between, became the liaison between the Soviet embassy and the Civic Forum

[7] "The Revolution and the Magic Lantern," Timothy Garton Ash, *The New York Review of Books*, New York, Jan. 18, 1990, p. 42.

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beginning November 19. During the next weeks he had several meetings with Soviet embassy officials in which he described how Czechoslovaks wanted their country back, they wanted the Soviet troops to leave, and they wanted Havel, not Dubček, as their leader.[8] The Soviets wanted to speak directly to Havel but Kocáb continued to act as his messenger. One senior Soviet official seemed to seek assurances from Kocáb that the new government would "not begin to kill communists." This official praised the Czechoslovak revolution because it was so gentle and was being carried out "after work"—that is, the economy and society were continuing to function. He added that the Czechoslovaks were a "new wind of ethical politics." Another Soviet official praised the Czechoslovak instinct for pluralism and history of humanism, and said the Soviet Union "would learn from Czechoslovakia [about the need for many political parties] but not sooner than seven years from now."

VI

The events of the autumn of 1989 that eliminated 41 years of communist rule were unplanned and unexpected by all parties involved. The young people and students who initiated the demonstrations on November 17 and afterward were following an instinct, a pattern set by earlier demonstrations that the larger the numbers in the streets of Prague, the more dramatic the "vote." Likewise, the various opposition groups brought together by Havel did not orchestrate the November 17 demonstration, and the founding of the Civic Forum was an improvised response to an opportunity by a group of people who had grown to trust each other and work together. At no time prior to these events had opposition groups openly called for the overthrow of the government. But their plan to pressure the authorities into reform and dialogue set up a challenge that the party was afraid to accept, and consequently resulted in its effective isolation.

At no point in the preceding four years did Soviet authorities plan, anticipate or even imagine their policies would eliminate communist rule from one of their most important allies. The overthrow was a surprising consequence of the failure of the Czechoslovak Communist Party to reform itself,

[8] In his speech to the U.S. Congress Havel gave credit to Kocáb for having been first to suggest that Havel, not Dubček, should be president.

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and its reluctance to use force to remain in power. Party leaders failed to support reform because they were convinced that in doing so they would create a momentum that would sweep them from power. They did not respond more forcefully to the mounting demonstrations after November 20 because of Soviet opposition and the prospect of having to let too much blood. Ultimately they left power because they were demoralized. Then, unable to use military force in the face of overwhelming masses of demonstrators, they became powerless.

The revolution was a popular and peaceful uprising driven and controlled by spontaneity and improvisation. The Czechoslovak people had swept aside their own government and the Civic Forum, as the only alternative group left in the society with some organizational ability and moral authority, simply filled the vacuum.

Searching for an explanation of how it happened, Czechoslovaks often fall back on the spiritual or the mystical. One Civic Forum leader, a philosopher and historian, claims to have read in some sixteenth-century Czechoslovak chronicles that Bohemia would achieve independence two weeks after Agnes, the pious Czech princess of the thirteenth century, was canonized. In fact, the canonization of St. Agnes was celebrated in St. Vitus' Cathedral in the Hradčany Castle on November 25, a few days before the fall of the communist government. Later in the same cathedral during the *Te Deum* celebrating Havel's installation as the new president on December 29, one of his aides remarked, "St. Agnes had her hand under our gentle revolution."

But if Stalin were to ask from his grave who destroyed communism in Czechoslovakia, the long and eclectic list would have to include—in addition to St. Agnes and St. Wenceslas—Thomas Jefferson, Tomáš Masaryk, the Muses, the Dalai Lama, history's first Slavic pope, John Paul II, the seemingly unquenchable Mikhail Gorbachev, and of course, the irresistibly refreshing Václav Havel and his band of gentle revolutionaries.

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Stephen J. Solarz

CAMBODIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The Cambodian endgame has entered a new and critical stage. The regime installed in Phnom Penh by Vietnam eleven years ago—the People's Republic of Kampuchea—continues to hold sway over the major cities and most of the countryside. But with the withdrawal of Vietnamese combat forces in September 1989, its capacity to counter the Khmer Rouge remains in serious doubt, and it is entirely possible that Pol Pot could battle his way back to power in Phnom Penh.[1]

Continued fighting in Cambodia serves the interests of the Khmer Rouge. Sustained by a mixture of intimidation and indoctrination, as well as Chinese support and Thai sanctuary, the Khmer Rouge is once again a fanatical and formidable force. It has given up neither its goal of regaining power by whatever means necessary nor its xenophobic brand of communism. The best way to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power is to shift the conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box.

Clearly, the best outcome for Cambodia would be a comprehensive political settlement that demilitarized the internal struggle, neutralized Cambodia as an arena for superpower and regional rivalry, and gave the Khmer people an opportunity for free and fair elections. In the last three years there has been a variety of efforts to produce such a settlement. All have failed, however, largely because the formulas put forward have been more unacceptable to the parties concerned than a continuation of the conflict itself.

In the absence of a settlement the most that Cambodia can hope for is to become a kind of Southeast Asian Lebanon,

[1] In late February, news reports indicated that Vietnam sent elite combat units back into Cambodia at the end of October 1989. This both restores the Vietnamese presence to the agenda of issues to be addressed in a political settlement and indicates the fragility of the PRK hold on the country.

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condemned to continuous civil strife and economic deprivation. In a worst-case scenario Cambodia could even witness a resumption of the Killing Fields should Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge return to power.

In response to the diplomatic deadlock and deteriorating military situation, the Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, has launched a new initiative designed to end the fighting and give the Cambodian people an opportunity to determine their own destiny. The core of the Australian proposal—that the United Nations assume responsibility for the administration of Cambodia during the interim period between the establishment of a ceasefire and the emergence of a new government following an internationally supervised election—has attracted an unprecedented consensus among the great powers. In view of the difficulties the Cambodians have had in reaching agreement among themselves on almost all issues, the fate of Canberra's initiative will probably be a litmus test for the possibility of any agreement at all. Indeed, it does not seem an exaggeration to suggest that the Australian proposal constitutes the last best hope for a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian conflict. No less certain is the danger the Khmer Rouge poses for Cambodians if negotiations fail.

The chances for a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia are not high. Yet no one knows whether a mutually acceptable agreement is impossible or merely difficult. In view of the consequences of a continuation of the conflict, it would be a serious political and moral mistake to let the fear of failure preclude the possibility of an overall settlement. Indeed, if the international community neglects the nation's bloody past, defenseless Cambodians may be condemned to repeat it.

II

For the United States, Cambodia is primarily a moral and humanitarian issue. For the countries of Southeast Asia, it is strategically important because of its geographical position as a potential buffer state for both Vietnam and Thailand. Hanoi has traditionally sought to dominate Phnom Penh or at least deny hegemony to Bangkok. Thailand would prefer to keep Cambodia in its sphere of influence or at least out of Vietnam's. Thailand's partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore—have all sought to keep Vietnam out of Cambodia, both to support Thailand's strategic objective

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and to reaffirm the principles of nonintervention and self-determination.[2] Cambodia has also been the object of great-power conflicts. Beijing's primary objective has been to have a client in power in Phnom Penh and, failing that, to support resistance to Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina, while Moscow has supported Hanoi as a counterweight to Beijing.

There is, however, a precedent for isolating Cambodia from regional and superpower conflict. Once Cambodia became independent from the French in 1953, its ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, sought to preserve autonomy through a policy of neutrality. For more than a decade he succeeded in steering a course among Thailand, South Vietnam and the United States on the one hand, and North Vietnam and China on the other. With the coming of the Vietnam War, however, superpower involvement in Southeast Asia intensified and the vise constraining Cambodian independence tightened. The prince had to concede the eastern portion of the country as a logistics base to North Vietnam and turn a blind eye to the massive American bombing campaign that followed.

Compounding the difficulty of Sihanouk's effort to preserve his country's stability and independence was the evolution of the Cambodian Communist Party. The movement was originally led by individuals who traced their ancestry to the anti-French struggle of the Viet Minh. Challenging them was a group of nationalistic intellectuals who regarded Hanoi's guidance of their party as a type of colonialism. The latter group, led by Pol Pot (né Saloth Sar), gained preeminence in 1960. Five years later, when Vietnam and China urged the Cambodian Communist Party to cease its challenge to Sihanouk's regime—as the expedient price of Sihanouk's tolerance of the Vietnamese presence in the eastern part of the country—Pol Pot refused. At the same time, these "Khmers Rouges" supplemented their disdain for the norms of proletarian internationalism with an ultra-radical approach to the revolution within, a metastasis of China's Cultural Revolution. Thus were sown the seeds of auto-genocide.

Beset on all sides, the prince was deposed in 1970 by Lon

[2] This pattern began in the fifteenth century, with the Vietnamese and Thai courts trying to control Cambodia or at least bar the other's influence. The most common scenario before the arrival of French colonialism was for factions in the Khmer court to seek the aid of Hanoi or Bangkok, each of which was all too willing to use the conflict to wrest control of zones of Cambodian territory and otherwise protect their interests.

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Nol, whose forces in turn proved unable to stave off the victory of the Khmer Rouge in April 1975. Once in power Pol Pot proceeded to depopulate the cities, slaughter the educated, and impose an unrelenting program of forced-draft economic development. When communism did not materialize overnight, the revolution began to devour itself, with some elements of the party escaping to Vietnam. Thousands of cadres were tortured and murdered in Tuol Sleng, a special concentration camp in Phnom Penh for party members. Close to 30 percent of the population died as a result of Khmer Rouge misrule.

In Southeast Asia, nationalism triumphed over ideology after 1975. The Khmer Rouge xenophobia for the Vietnamese and China's rivalry with Vietnam shattered the facade of Asian communist unity. The split deepened between China (which backed the Khmer Rouge) and the Soviet Union (which increasingly favored Vietnam). In late 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia to end the latter's challenges to its territorial integrity.[3] Hanoi quickly took over most of the country and installed the remnants of the pro-Vietnamese wing of the Cambodian communist movement as the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Vietnam's victory produced a strategic nightmare for both China and Thailand. Beijing faced powerful "barbarians" to both the north and the south, which it renamed "global and regional hegemonists." Bangkok saw its traditional buffer occupied by its historic adversary. Thailand and China then conspired to redress the balance of power by an act of complete moral cynicism—the resurrection of the nearly devastated Khmer Rouge. Pol Pot's forces became the lever for removing Vietnam from Cambodia, or at least a rein to render it incapable of aggression elsewhere.

The United States and the rest of ASEAN went along, sometimes reluctantly, with this strategy. In order to put the best light on it and to provide a counterweight to the Khmer Rouge, two small political groupings—the Khmer People's National Liberation Front and the National Front for an

[3] In a conversation in 1981, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach told me that Vietnam's motivation for intervening was not to protect the human rights of the Cambodian people, which Hanoi regarded as Cambodia's internal affair, but to bring an end to a series of destructive cross-border raids by the Khmer Rouge. He said nothing about Vietnam's historical ambition to establish an Indochinese federation under its control, which presumably was one of Hanoi's motives as well.

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Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, led respectively by former Prime Minister Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk—were joined with the Khmer Rouge in 1982 to form a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The CGDK was imposed on Sihanouk and Son Sann to prevent the United Nations from substituting the PRK for the Khmer Rouge as the occupant of Cambodia's seat in the United Nations or from declaring the seat vacant. From a Leninist perspective this coalition was a classic united front, in which communists used "royalists" and "bourgeois nationalists" to promote their interests.[4]

In time Cambodia became Vietnam's Vietnam, an obstacle to Vietnam's economic development and a drain on Soviet-supplied resources. As Moscow's interest in regional conflicts waned under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, Hanoi resorted to its own version of "Vietnamization." It made commitments—which few believed at the time—to withdraw its forces by 1990, and worked to build up the PRK regime—now led by Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge regimental commander—as an economic, political and military bulwark strong enough to withstand a challenge by the Khmer Rouge. At the same time, Vietnam sought a political settlement in which its adversaries would accept the legitimacy of the PRK. Not until the summer of 1988, however, did the international community take seriously the possibility that Vietnamese forces would indeed withdraw from Cambodia and leave the world to face the problem that remained: an armed and revitalized Khmer Rouge.

III

The tortuous process of finding a negotiated settlement to the Cambodian problem has been long and complex, usually conducted under a glare of publicity, marked first by signs of progress but then followed by bitter reversals. A number of different approaches have been tried, but all the formulas required the verified end of foreign engagement in the military struggle in Cambodia: the total withdrawal of Vietnamese

[4] This was not the first time that Prince Sihanouk entered into an alliance with the Khmer Rouge. After his fall in 1970, he lent support to Pol Pot's cause. Khmer Rouge cadres carried his picture as a kind of revolutionary icon. Far more than the American bombing, the willingness of Prince Sihanouk to let the Khmer Rouge recruit and mobilize in his name was a key factor in its ultimate triumph. It was a mistake of disastrous proportions for which the prince has never forgiven himself.

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troops, the end of Thai sanctuaries for the Khmer Rouge and the noncommunist resistance (NCR), and the end of external support for the Khmer factions. All envisage some type of election as a necessary act of self-determination by the Cambodian people.

The core disagreement concerns the political arrangement that will exist in Cambodia from the time a settlement is concluded until the emergence of a new, electorally legitimate government. On this question, there have been two basic approaches. The first advocates the creation of a quadripartite interim government in which all four factions, including the Khmer Rouge, share power. The second plan argues for the preservation of the current PRK regime, supplemented by mechanisms that provide some role for all four factions. Neither of these approaches has been acceptable to all the parties concerned.

The quadripartite formula was the proposal of Prince Sihanouk in his capacity as president of the CGDK. It is supported by his coalition partners (Son Sann and the Khmer Rouge), by China and the ASEAN countries, and was generally endorsed by the United States. As originally tabled at the Paris conference in August 1989, it envisaged the simultaneous dissolution of the CGDK and the PRK as legal entities, and the sharing of ministerial power on a four-party basis. The Sihanouk proposal included, under U.N. aegis, an international peacekeeping force and international supervision of elections. The four military forces would be either disbanded or reduced to 10,000 fighters each, pending the creation of new Cambodian armed forces.

The basic PRK proposal, which was also presented at the Paris conference by Prime Minister Hun Sen, called for a ceasefire in place and a continuation of the political status quo—the PRK regime—until general elections. A supreme steering council would be established, composed of representatives of the PRK, the CGDK and a number of unaffiliated Khmers. The supreme steering council, under international supervision, would create an electoral system and conduct elections. An international control mechanism would verify the end of external assistance, but there would be no provision for peacekeeping forces. Nor would this control commission be under U.N. aegis since, in Phnom Penh's view, the United Nations had shown itself to be biased by passing resolutions hostile to the PRK and by continuing to seat the CGDK. In the

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hard-line version of the PRK proposal, the Khmer Rouge military and political organizations would be abolished and their leaders punished. In other versions, Khmer Rouge fighters who laid down their arms would be reincorporated into the political life of the country.

Each of these proposals has been consistently rejected. The CGDK has opposed the standard PRK proposal because it would legitimize a regime imposed on the Cambodian people by force of Vietnamese arms. Moreover, the CGDK argues, the PRK's control of the administrative apparatus would virtually guarantee a victory by Hun Sen in any election, thereby depriving the Cambodian people of the opportunity to freely and fairly determine their own destiny and denying the other factions any chance of gaining power.

On the other hand, the PRK has rejected the CGDK proposal, claiming that its effect would be to legitimize the Khmer Rouge and delegitimize the PRK, whose ideological raison d'être has been unyielding opposition to "the Pol Pot clique." Moreover, the PRK believes that a quadripartite approach would give the Khmer Rouge a better opportunity to come to power than it would have in the absence of a political settlement. Hun Sen has expressed the fear that his party, as only one element of a coalition government, would be outvoted by the other three factions. The Khmer Rouge would therefore be able to subvert the government from within while attacking it from without.

Advocates of a quadripartite approach answer Hun Sen's objections by asserting that the Khmer Rouge does not wish to regain exclusive power in Phnom Penh. As evidence they point to the five pledges of Khmer Rouge representatives at the Paris conference:

—support for Sihanouk's leadership;
—support for disarmament of all the factions;
—support for a strong international peacekeeping force under U.N. auspices;
—conditional support for internationally supervised elections and the promise to abide by the outcome;
—willingness not to insist on equal power-sharing in the quadripartite interim authority.

Some argue that the Khmer Rouge pledges should be put to the test. Pinning one's faith in the quadripartite proposal on such promises is a dangerous and perhaps deadly gamble on the goodwill of a movement for which truth—let alone decency—has been a totally alien concept. Moreover, the U.S.

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government and most independent observers believe that the objective of the Khmer Rouge is to regain its monopoly of power by whatever means necessary. The continued harsh treatment of civilians in refugee camps by the Khmer Rouge belies any claims of a more humane approach. The claim by the Khmer Rouge that Pol Pot has "retired" when, in fact, he continues to dominate and direct the Khmer Rouge is persuasive evidence of its continued passion for prevarication. Finally, its characterization of the auto-genocide as a "mistake" indicates that all it has learned from the past is the need to employ euphemisms to divert international attention from its barbarous record.

IV

Inhibiting the search for a negotiated settlement has been a reluctance on the part of the parties concerned to summon the political will to make the necessary concessions. Hun Sen and his colleagues clearly believe that their survival depends upon isolating the Khmer Rouge as a military and political force. As former Khmer Rouge officials who know first-hand the duplicity and treachery to which Pol Pot will resort to achieve his goals, the PRK leaders wish to minimize the size of the arena in which the Khmer Rouge will be able to operate. They also know the political benefits that will flow to them if they can keep world attention focused on the horrors of Pol Pot's rule and the need to prevent its resurrection in the future.

Hun Sen has therefore insisted on the preservation of the PRK regime. He has been willing to include Sihanouk in a purely symbolic role—reigning but not ruling—because that would legitimate the PRK regime without forcing it to relinquish any power. But he is prepared to go his own way if the prince continues to reject cooperation.

Hun Sen's confidence was buoyed for a while by apparent cracks in the policy consensus in Thailand. Since late 1988, Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhavan has taken a much softer line on Cambodia than his predecessor and the Thai foreign ministry and army. Chatchai appeared willing to recognize the "reality" of the PRK regime once Vietnam withdrew, and favored turning the Indochina battlefield into a marketplace dominated by Bangkok. He toyed with the ideas of denying sanctuary on Thai soil to the three wings of the resistance and of choking off the supply of Chinese military assistance to them—actions that the PRK and Vietnam believe would cause

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the Khmer Rouge and the NCR to wither on the vine and guarantee Phnom Penh's ability to contain them. Chatchai's initiative took its most visible form in January 1989 when Hun Sen visited Bangkok at the prime minister's invitation. He has subsequently backed away from his proposals because he was unwilling to accept a break with China, which took a dim view of his move toward Hun Sen. Yet as long as the PRK believes that the Chatchai card might be played, and the Khmer Rouge rendered impotent as a result, its incentive for compromise tends to remain low.

Sihanouk's political constraint stems from his dependence on China. Always aware of Chinese influence, the prince in the last decade has had also to rely on Beijing for diplomatic and financial support and for material assistance to the NCR. In exchange for Chinese aid, Sihanouk has given China a veto, in effect, over his negotiating proposals. Although he knows the dangers posed by the Khmer Rouge—many members of the royal family met their end in the Killing Fields—Sihanouk has vigorously advocated a quadripartite interim government. In public defense of that proposal he asserts that it would be easier to "keep an eye on" and control the Khmer Rouge if it were included in an interim regime than if it remained in the jungle. In his franker moments, he admits that his hands are tied with a Chinese knot.

For this reason Sihanouk has been reluctant to consider what would be a morally more acceptable alignment: a tripartite coalition arrangement in which he and Son Sann would join with the PRK against the Khmer Rouge. By joining Hun Sen, Sihanouk would burn his bridges to China without any advance guarantee of a new patron in order to provide the role of front man for the pro-Vietnam wing of the Cambodian communist movement, just as he has in the past given respectability to the Khmer Rouge. In any event, it appears that although Hun Sen has offered Sihanouk the position of chief of state in his regime and posts for some of his followers, he has not proposed a genuine power-sharing arrangement.[5]

In November, in the wake of the failure of the Cambodian factions to resolve their differences at the Paris conference,

[5] Sihanouk's objections aside, a tripartite arrangement has other problems. It would neither stop the fighting nor guarantee an end to Chinese assistance. Furthermore, any type of international presence under United Nations auspices would be impossible, since the United Nations only enters situations where all parties agree, and China would certainly veto a U.N. role under such an agreement.

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Australian Foreign Minister Evans proposed establishing a U.N.-supervised interim administration as a way of removing the key obstacle to a political settlement and bringing the conflict to an end. His proposal emphasizes the following elements of a comprehensive settlement:

—a U.N. peacekeeping force that would be responsible for implementing a ceasefire in cantonments, disarming the forces, destroying military stockpiles and monitoring the ceasefire;

—internationally supervised elections to select a constituent assembly;

—an internationally supervised end to external sanctuaries and external assistance for military purposes to all parties;

—a massive international program of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Cambodia;

—permitting civilians in all camps associated with the resistance factions to have freedom of movement to return to their place of origin or to accompany their faction back into Cambodia.

In order to break the logjam on interim political arrangements, the Evans initiative would have the United Nations play a significant role in governing Cambodia between the time an agreement is reached and the emergence of a new Cambodian government. An enhanced U.N. role that would supervise an interim Cambodian administration creatively circumvents Hun Sen's objection to the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in a coalition government and the CGDK's objection to recognizing the PRK regime as the basis for a settlement.

The U.N. secretary general, with the agreement of all parties concerned, would appoint a special representative to serve as head of an interim authority. He and the international civil servants he brings with him would supervise the existing bureaucracy, although the depth of U.N. involvement is still a matter for negotiations. The four factions would continue to exist at least as political parties (but not as coalition partners in an interim government). Whether the PRK and the CGDK would cease to exist as legal entities is as yet unresolved.[6]

The initial positive responses from most of the parties, including Vietnam and the PRK, were somewhat encouraging.

[6] Cambodia's seat at the United Nations, now under the exclusive control of the CGDK, would either be declared vacant or filled in a way acceptable to each of the factions, thereby giving Hun Sen, who has criticized the United Nations for being biased in the past, some assurance that it would be more objective in the future.

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The main point of contention is how the concept will be fleshed out. China still prefers the quadripartite interim proposal, but if that approach is not acceptable it is prepared to support "in principle" a supervisory role for the United Nations. Only the Khmer Rouge has displayed some public resistance.

More disquieting have been the results of initial soundings concerning the U.N. role in administering Cambodia during the interim period. Understandably, Hun Sen has asked for a minimum of U.N. interference in the running of the country. The Chinese, on the other hand, have argued for a root-and-branch removal of PRK officials. In effect, the disagreement over power-sharing that derailed the 1989 Paris conference has been transposed into the U.N. frame of reference. Yet because the concept of U.N. supervision of the interim administration is designed to circumvent the stalemate over power-sharing, negotiations will run aground unless the four factions and their partners can reach a compromise on this central issue.

The U.N.-based settlement should have a better chance of being accepted than previously rejected proposals because it would give something to everyone and requires capitulation by no one. For the NCR, such an agreement would put an end to the fighting in Cambodia, provide for the presence of an international peacekeeping force and avoid a legitimation of the PRK. It would also give them the opportunity through free and fair elections to shape Cambodia's political future, and thus reduce the political advantage that Hun Sen might otherwise gain from control of the administrative apparatus.

A U.N. agreement on Cambodia would also enable China and the ASEAN countries to verify the Vietnamese withdrawal and deny Hanoi the victory of international acceptance for the PRK regime. China would then be able to tell the Khmer Rouge that it is on a par with the other parties. Furthermore, by facilitating a settlement, Beijing could reduce some of the international notoriety it earned in the Tienanmen massacre.

Although the Khmer Rouge would gain the dissolution of the PRK regime, it is less inclined to go along with a U.N. formula than the other factions because its prospects for seizing power would clearly diminish. Yet Beijing is the key: if China supports the formula, the Khmer Rouge would probably be compelled to go along, given its dependence on China. The prospects for a settlement therefore depend, among

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other things, on China's willingness and ability to deliver the Khmer Rouge.[7]

For the PRK, it would secure an end to the fighting, a cessation of Chinese support for Pol Pot, the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from the interim administration, an opportunity to do well in the elections, increased foreign assistance, enhanced international legitimacy, and perhaps a share of the Cambodian seat at the United Nations.

For Vietnam, a U.N. agreement would provide the opportunity for Hanoi's leaders to end their international isolation and provide their protégé, Hun Sen, with the possibility of a significant political role in the new government. An accord would also reduce the chances that Vietnamese troops would have to return to Cambodia to prevent a Khmer Rouge victory.

An agreement would allow the Soviet Union to end its involvement in another regional conflict—certainly more cleanly than was the case in Afghanistan—and gain the benefit of a further reduction in East-West tension. Moreover, a U.N. solution would be consistent with the growing emphasis in Soviet foreign policy on using the United Nations as the mechanism for resolving regional disputes. The United States would also achieve its policy objectives—an act of self-determination for the Cambodian people and some certainty that the Khmer Rouge will not return to power.

Whether the United Nations should shoulder the burden that Foreign Minister Evans has suggested, and whether the governments and taxpayers of wealthy countries are willing to pay the price, reflects the more basic problem of political will. Without a willingness on behalf of all parties to the Cambodian conflict to take risks for the sake of the Khmer people, no settlement will ever be possible. It is the task of diplomacy to determine whether a compromise can be reached, and given the consequences should negotiations fail, it is important to make the effort.

Will the Cambodian factions accept a U.N.-supervised interim administration? If China supports the Evans formula, or

[7] Some have objected to the Australian initiative because it would give the Khmer Rouge the right to participate in elections. Yet if there is to be a settlement that ends the fighting and permits an act of self-determination by the Cambodian people, the Khmer Rouge leaders will have to be included as participants, albeit in a way that reduces the risks that they could undermine the settlement. If they cannot even participate in the elections—which they are sure to lose—they and their Chinese patrons will never agree to a settlement in the first place and the fighting will continue.

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does not actively oppose it, Sihanouk will probably jump at the chance to appear more independent.[8] More problematic are the motives of the two communist factions. If neither is truly willing, despite its public statements, to run the risk of a contest for power through internationally supervised elections, then there will never be a political settlement. If Hun Sen in fact is able to contain his adversaries close to the Thai-Cambodian border, then he will probably expect the international community to confer legitimacy on him. If the Khmer Rouge believes that, even without Chinese support, it can seize power through armed struggle at an acceptable cost, it will probably not be willing to subject itself to the popular will.

Between these two scenarios, however, may exist a zone of opportunity in which the risks of a continuing struggle outweigh those of a political settlement that seeks to demilitarize the conflict, particularly if external backers choose to cut their losses. In that zone of opportunity lies the proposal for a U.N.-supervised interim administration. Hun Sen and Pol Pot should be put to the test.

V

During the ten years that Vietnam occupied Cambodia, the United States, haunted by its Indochina nightmare, tended to follow the lead of China and the ASEAN countries. Washington took a back seat in defining the shape of a political settlement, and was reluctant to provide assistance for the noncommunist resistance. When the United States decided to provide aid, it was only of a non-lethal character and was given on the condition that it not enhance, directly or indirectly, the fighting capacity of the Khmer Rouge. There have been U.S. proposals to provide lethal aid for the forces of Sihanouk and Son Sann, but the requisite political consensus has been lacking and no such aid has been provided.[9]

Although Washington had no role in developing Sihanouk's quadripartite formula, the United States became associated

[8] Prince Sihanouk's latest resignation, in January 1990, appears designed to distance himself from the Khmer Rouge now that a political settlement seems to be in the cards. Realistically speaking, however, he will probably preserve the possibility of a return to the Chinese-Khmer Rouge fold in case the U.N. formula does not result in a settlement, particularly if Beijing is the only certain source of weapons for his troops.

[9] Although it is conceivable that minimal amounts of assistance intended for the NCR have ended up in Khmer Rouge hands, such "leakage" is insignificant, since the total amount of aid reaching the NCR is a fraction of what the Khmer Rouge receives from China.

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with it. At the same time, the Bush administration was unable to dispel the serious concerns that such an agreement would provide Pol Pot with his best chance of returning to power, and that Sihanouk appeared to be acting less and less as a symbol of Cambodian nationalism and more and more like a front man for China and the Khmer Rouge. Whether these concerns were well founded or not, their existence made it difficult to build a broad and sustainable consensus for U.S. policy.

The current U.S. objectives in Cambodia are to secure a verified withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, bring an end to the fighting, prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power, and encourage Cambodian self-determination. In pursuit of those goals and in the wake of the positive response to Foreign Minister Evans' initiative regarding interim political arrangements, the United States has undertaken to build consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council on all the elements of a U.N.-based comprehensive settlement. The first stage of this process occurred in mid-January 1990 in Paris, when officials at the level of assistant secretary exchanged views on a peacekeeping force, elections, costs and so on. The result was a "summary of conclusions" that expressed agreement on "an enhanced U.N. role in the resolution of the Cambodian problem," and consensus on most of the elements of a settlement.

On the critical point of a U.N.-supervised interim administration not even a vague public agreement was achieved, but that is not surprising given the preliminary stage of the discussions. Presumably, U.S. officials will attempt to forge consensus around some variant of the Evans initiative, in part because they know that it is probably the only idea left for cutting the Gordian knot of power-sharing.

In addition to playing the important role of building a great-power agreement, Washington should also undertake several bilateral initiatives. It should urge Moscow to cease military aid to the Hun Sen regime, and encourage Bangkok to inhibit Khmer Rouge activities and secure greater freedom for the civilians under Khmer Rouge control. To make the proposal as attractive as possible to Vietnam, the United States should be prepared to offer full normalization of relations, including the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Hanoi, and the elimination of the embargo on trade and investment. Given Vietnam's economic crisis and Hanoi's desire to break

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out of its isolation, a U.S. offer to open a new chapter in the relations between the two countries should be a powerful incentive for Vietnam to cooperate in the search for a Cambodian settlement.[10]

Because China has been the sole supporter of the Khmer Rouge, and because the Khmer Rouge will probably not agree to a reasonable settlement without Chinese pressure, Washington should:

—inform Beijing of the importance it attaches to China's role in this issue;

—explicitly reject the quadripartite formula, which the United States previously had quietly endorsed and which China continues to support, in order to make clear to Beijing that there can be no fallback from the U.N. formula;

—call on Beijing to immediately end its support for the Khmer Rouge;

—promise an improvement in U.S.-China relations if Beijing gets the Khmer Rouge to agree to a settlement.

Securing genuine Chinese endorsement of a U.N.-based settlement for Cambodia would be one way for the administration to prove that the dispatch to China of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in July and December 1989 was justified.

The Chinese have indicated that they do not want the Khmer Rouge to return to exclusive power, and that if Pol Pot rejected a reasonable settlement, China would end its assistance to the Khmer Rouge. If Khmer Rouge intransigence results in a breakdown of negotiations, therefore, it will still result in a cutting of the Chinese lifeline, the probable emergence of a coalition of Cambodian factions opposed to Pol Pot, and the end of Thai sanctuary for the Khmer Rouge, thus greatly reducing the threat it poses. At best, the U.N. approach will produce a negotiated settlement that puts the Khmer Rouge in a political box. At a minimum, it could serve to place the Khmer Rouge in isolation—which is precisely where it belongs.

Others have argued that because a settlement is highly

[10] It would be a mistake to establish diplomatic relations and lift the embargo before the outcome of this round of negotiations is clear. If we were to do so, it would significantly diminish Hanoi's incentive to exercise leverage on Hun Sen in order to facilitate a settlement. Once a settlement is achieved, we should move swiftly to normalize relations between the United States and Vietnam.

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unlikely, the United States should recognize the PRK regime as the strongest bulwark against the Khmer Rouge and even provide it with assistance. If a political settlement on any terms is impossible, the international community may confront a choice between supporting the PRK or watching the Khmer Rouge return to power. Indeed, if the Evans-U.N. formula fails, Western governments such as Britain and France may well be forced to yield to the pressure of anti-Khmer Rouge public opinion and begin opening embassies in Phnom Penh. They will surely be unwilling to continue voting at the United Nations to give the Cambodian seat to the Khmer Rouge and its noncommunist partners in the CGDK.

Choosing between the PRK and the Khmer Rouge would present the United States with a Hobson's choice. Support for the Khmer Rouge would be, of course, utterly unthinkable. Yet backing Hun Sen is hardly an enticing proposition. In the first place, the PRK may prove to be quite weak, even with U.S. support, when confronted by the full force of the Khmer Rouge. If the United States were to provide support to the PRK regime—whether political or military as well—it would probably not make much difference in stopping the Khmer Rouge.[11]

In any case, building political support for U.S. recognition of the PRK, even on anti-Khmer Rouge grounds, would not be easy. Hun Sen's party remains a Leninist party both organizationally and ideologically. The PRK's leaders are tainted, moreover, by a sordid past. Most of the members of the PRK politburo are former Khmer Rouge who were part of the killing machine established by Pol Pot. They defected to Vietnam not for reasons of principle but because they were about to be devoured themselves. Having ridden into Phnom Penh on Vietnamese tanks, they then engaged in human rights abuses that, according to Amnesty International, included the execution, incarceration and torture of thousands.

It is doubtful, therefore, that either the Bush administration or Congress would be willing to materially support the Hun Sen regime—even though, should the Australian initiative fail,

[11] The failure of the Lon Nol regime to defeat the Khmer Rouge after receiving over $1 billion in U.S. military aid from 1970 to 1975 suggests that American backing alone hardly constitutes an adequate basis for preventing the return of the Khmer Rouge. Then, as now, Pol Pot's opponents did not lack for military equipment. Now, as then, the deficiency lies in the areas of leadership, morale, training and so on.

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U.S. support for the PRK would clearly be the lesser of two evils.

The only way to avoid the difficult choice between the Khmer Rouge and PRK and the best way to achieve U.S. objectives—the most important of which is to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power—is to secure a sound political settlement in Cambodia. If Washington were to recognize the regime in Phnom Penh before the search for a political settlement was exhausted, Hun Sen would inevitably conclude that time was on his side and he would undoubtedly be less willing to make the kind of concessions necessary for an agreement. Furthermore, siding now with the PRK, thereby greatly reducing the prospects for a comprehensive settlement, would rule out the other major objectives of American policy—true independence for Cambodia and self-determination of the Cambodian people.

Prior to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, no country lifted a finger to stop the slaughter by the Khmer Rouge of innocent people. While a powerful moral argument might be made for an international police action to prevent a Khmer Rouge return to power again, the prospects for such an initiative in 1990 are as slim as they were in 1975. Regrettably, there are limits to what people of goodwill can do to stop inhumanity and injustice.

Yet the impossibility of stopping some abuses in the past is no justification for doing nothing when new disasters loom in the future. If the international community truly believes that humane treatment of the defenseless is a norm that should be applied wherever possible, it must act now and to the utter limits of its capacity to block a new round of genocide in Cambodia. Even if chronic civil war is the ultimate outcome in that country, it is not an acceptable one as long as a satisfactory political settlement remains possible. Cambodians have suffered too long because of the moral cynicism of others. We degrade our own values if we unnecessarily permit them to suffer any longer.

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B. R. Inman
Daniel F. Burton, Jr.

TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITIVENESS: THE NEW POLICY FRONTIER

International competition has eroded the once commanding U.S. advantage in technology. It has caused a shift in government and business relationships in the United States and raised fundamental questions about the conduct of American foreign policy. Both the public and private sectors are increasingly concerned with a new set of technological issues related to industrial competitiveness. This concern has forced a reassessment of national priorities and caused both industry and government to rethink their traditional roles in the development and application of technology. The implications for foreign policy stem from one overriding fact: when it comes to advanced technology, national security can no longer be viewed in purely military terms; economic security is also a vital consideration. Moreover, just as it is increasingly difficult to make a meaningful policy distinction between military and commercial technologies, so is it difficult to determine how to manage international relationships, since important political allies in military technology are often hard-nosed economic competitors in commercial technology.

As a result of these trends a new U.S. public policy framework is emerging that focuses on industrial competitiveness and technology. This focus raises some important issues about the evolving roles of business and government in the economy, and forces new thinking about how U.S. foreign policy can accommodate strategic economic concerns.

II

Recent policy debates reflect the concern with the erosion of U.S. technological superiority and shifting business and gov-

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ernment interests. In many ways the debate about the proper policy for technology mirrors the debate about the proper role of government in the economy. Should the government intervene to assist certain sectors? If so, what form should government intervention take? Which sectors should receive public assistance? How should government policies and institutions be structured to facilitate commercial technology? Recent technological developments have highlighted questions such as these and generated a lively policy debate, pitting traditional notions about the proper role of government against the need for prompt, pragmatic policy responses. The answers to these questions and the implications for U.S. foreign policy are only beginning to be understood. Indeed some observers have complained that Washington suffers from a "technology of the week" syndrome, in which such diverse technologies as cold fusion, supercomputers and biotechnology emerge unexpectedly as burning issues and stir tremendous policy debates, only to be forgotten in a few weeks.

Five technological debates profile the changing public policy dialogue: consumer electronics, semiconductors, superconductors, the FSX fighter airplane and high-definition television (HDTV). These debates do not include all of the technologies that have engaged the federal government in recent years, but they are indicative of the kinds of issues that are driving public policy deliberations.

Consumer Electronics

The decline of the American consumer electronics industry was one of the early signals that the United States was facing a challenge to its technological leadership. For most of the past century American industry enjoyed a strong position in consumer electronics. During the past fifteen years, however, U.S. companies have ceded that market to foreign competitors. The American era of consumer electronics manufacturing began in 1887 with Thomas Edison's invention of the phonograph. That breakthrough was followed by a string of other U.S. inventions, including the cathode ray tube (1897), wireless transmission of speech (1900), radio broadcasting (1920), television receivers (1923), magnetic wire recorders (1946), the transistor (1947), color televisions (1954), portable radios (1954) and home videocassette recorders (1963).

Until 1970 American industry dominated these fields and enjoyed almost complete control of the American consumer

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electronics manufacturing market. Since then it has lost virtually the entire market. At present the U.S. industry has less than five percent of the consumer electronics market, despite the fact that it has more than tripled in value to $25 billion in annual sales over the last decade.

Some highly visible industries, such as stereo equipment and television, are indicative of this trend. In 1970 the U.S. industry held a 90-percent share of the American market for phonographs; today it holds one percent. Similarly in 1970 U.S. companies held a 90-percent share of the American market for color televisions and 65 percent for black and white televisions; today they account for about ten percent and one percent of the U.S. market, respectively.

Many economists dismissed the demise of the U.S. consumer electronics industry as the inevitable result of the law of comparative advantage. According to their analyses, consumer electronics was destined to go the same route as the shoe and apparel industries—American industry simply could not compete with such low-wage countries as Japan and Korea, which enjoyed an inherent advantage in low-tech mass-produced commodity products. Those who held such a view counseled U.S. industry to quit the consumer electronics market and move into more sophisticated technologies in which those factors were not as important a determinant of market success.

What this perspective failed to take into account, however, was the linkage between low-tech and leading-edge electronics. Although the end products that distinguish the two segments of the market may differ, the manufacturing expertise and technical competence that underpin them are closely related. Furthermore, because of the sheer size of the consumer electronics market, firms that are active players in it benefit from large economies of scale that give them a competitive advantage in related markets, such as semiconductors. The decision to abandon the consumer electronics market in the 1970s would come back to haunt the U.S. electronics industry in the 1980s.

Semiconductors

While it may be convenient to write off troubled U.S. industries as the victims of the law of comparative advantage, it becomes increasingly difficult to do so when leading high-tech industries begin to stumble when faced with foreign

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competition. This lesson was driven home during the 1980s by the U.S. semiconductor industry.

Semiconductors, as the name suggests, are materials that are neither good insulators nor good conductors. They are usually made of silicon, germanium or gallium arsenide. The term has come to refer to all electronic devices made of semiconducting material, including integrated circuits, transistors and diodes. The semiconductor debate of recent years has focused on the integrated circuit, which is a complete electronic circuit. It is composed of interconnected diodes and transistors that channel the electron flows used to process information extremely rapidly.

The integrated circuit was invented almost simultaneously in 1959 by two Americans, Jack Kilby, working at Texas Instruments, and Robert Noyce, working at Fairchild. During the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. companies dominated the world market for the design and manufacture of integrated circuits. In 1976, however, the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) launched the Very Large Scale Integration program, which helped participating firms develop process technology and 64K memory chips. This program was terminated prematurely in 1979 after the United States pressured Japan in trade cases and raised questions about industrial targeting. Japanese participants in the VLSI program were so convinced of its merits, however, that they launched a three-year private sector follow-up initiative with no government funding in order to complete its research agenda.

Japanese producers of semiconductors complemented the VLSI research agenda with intense concentration on the manufacturing process. As a result they were able to parallel advances in technology with gains in quality, productivity and reduced cost. The results exceeded all expectations. By 1980 Japanese companies had surpassed U.S. merchant semiconductor firms in the design and manufacture of the latest generation of semiconductor devices. By 1983 Japanese-based firms held a share of the world market equal to that of U.S.-based firms. By 1986 the Japanese had taken 65 percent of the world market for memory products, while the U.S. share had fallen to under 30 percent. In 1988 Japan held 85 percent of the market for one-megabit memory chips, while the American share (not including IBM, which makes memory chips for its own use) had dwindled to eight percent. In retrospect the success of the VLSI program represented a

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historical watershed for public policy—it worked. And governments and industries in other countries took notice.

The trials of the U.S. semiconductor industry captured the public's imagination. For many Americans, semiconductors symbolized high technology. They were invented by Americans, the market was developed and initially dominated by U.S. firms, and they are closely linked to computers and national defense. The sudden and unforeseen reversals suffered by the U.S. semiconductor industry made it clear that there were new forces at work in world markets; the American lead in technology could no longer be taken for granted. Four policy lessons are worth noting.

First, the problems of the semiconductor industry demonstrated that the competitive challenge facing the United States is not limited to low-tech or low-wage industries; even high-tech industries can be devastated by foreign competition. Second, semiconductors highlighted the impact that government intervention can have on industrial performance. The loss of U.S. market leadership was not due to a sudden shift in inherent national abilities or resources, but in large part to a foreign government's technological program. After the success of Japan's VLSI program, there was no longer any question that prudent government intervention in the marketplace could compensate for a late start in technology and significantly contribute to an industry's comparative advantage.

Third, semiconductors forced attention on the importance of the commercialization process. The problem that the U.S. semiconductor industry faced was the same one that the U.S. steel and automobile industries had faced earlier. It was not a lack of advanced technology or a failure of research. On the contrary, many American firms had a clear advantage in leading-edge technology. Instead the problem was related to their ability to bring new technology rapidly to the market and to manufacture high-quality products. There is no doubt that the private sector has the primary responsibility for commercializing technology. It alone can develop, produce and market new products and processes. But because public policies create the climate in which American scientists, engineers and managers work, they must facilitate private sector efforts to commercialize technology.

Fourth, the difficulties facing the U.S. semiconductor industry demonstrated that the U.S. government not only lacked a coherent set of policies for commercial technology, it also

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lacked appropriate institutions. When the American semiconductor industry proposed a joint private/public venture—which ultimately came into being as Sematech (Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology)—their motivation stemmed primarily from concern about commercial markets, although there were also legitimate national security concerns. Since World War II, however, U.S. science and technology policy has focused primarily on basic research and military security, not on commercial technology. Therefore, when the semiconductor proposal surfaced, there was neither the consensus nor the institutional capability within the U.S. government to sponsor such a commercial venture. Consequently, when Sematech was ultimately created in 1988, it was placed under the umbrella of national security and funded by the Department of Defense. Sematech's objective is to achieve global leadership in semiconductor manufacturing technology by 1993. Its five-year $1-billion budget is funded half by the federal government and half by U.S industries.

Superconductors

Close on the heels of the semiconductor debate came the superconductor breakthrough. In late 1986 two researchers in an IBM lab in Zurich pioneered a revolutionary discovery in high-temperature superconductors. Superconductors consist of materials that conduct electricity with no loss of energy. Prior to 1986 superconductors had been known to work at extremely low temperatures (-459.7° Fahrenheit), but they had few practical uses. The "high-temperature" breakthrough resulted from the discovery of exotic new ceramic compounds that could reach a state of superconductivity at temperatures as high as -230° Fahrenheit. Although this is still too cold for most practical purposes, it has opened the possibility of important new commercial applications, magnetically levitating trains being perhaps the best-known example.

Within a few months after the initial discoveries, U.S. federal agencies had redirected $45 million for research and development of high-temperature superconductivity. In July 1987 President Reagan proposed an 11-point superconductivity initiative at a much-publicized conference in Washington that was closed to non-Americans. Congress in turn drafted numerous bills with proposals ranging from study commissions to full-scale national programs. Other countries, notably Japan, were also quick to respond with their own technological

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programs. Whereas American programs focused primarily on basic research, however, Japan focused on commercial applications.

The debate over superconductors demonstrated two important lessons. First, it showed just how quickly technical knowledge is diffused throughout the world. The scientific breakthrough in Switzerland set off an international chain reaction. The existence of high-temperature superconductors was confirmed quickly by scientists in Tokyo, and subsequently extended by U.S. researchers working at the University of Houston. Within a matter of weeks, new advances were being regularly publicized and confirmed by laboratories in China, Europe, Japan and the United States.

In addition, the policy debate over superconductors directed American attention to the overriding issue: how to translate basic research into products and processes that would yield military and economic benefits. Congress was especially concerned that the United States avoid the situation that had occurred in consumer electronics and semiconductors, in which American industry had pioneered the initial breakthrough only to cede much of the market to foreign competitors who were able to commercialize the technology rapidly.

So far no U.S. or foreign company has announced full commercialization of complex devices using high-temperature superconductors. Nonetheless, progress is being made. Fujitsu has already developed a prototype for a crude superconducting chip, and Japan's International Superconductivity Technology Center has more than 50 full members and 100 associate members. By contrast, with much of the basic science surrounding superconductors still unresolved, the U.S. push for commercial applications has proceeded more cautiously. In addition to the government seed money provided for research, several start-up ventures have been formed and some cooperative research ventures have been created, but overall U.S. commercialization efforts are not nearly as ambitious as those of Japan.

The FSX Fighter

In the spring of 1989 another technological issue made front page news—the FSX fighter. The source of the debate was a proposed joint venture between the United States and Japan to coproduce a new tactical fighter plane. Mitsubishi was to be the prime contractor for the new plane, which was to be

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based on the American-made F-16 produced by General Dynamics.

Critics of the deal feared that it would result in a giveaway to Japan of American technology. They emphasized that Japan's ultimate objective was not military, but commercial. The FSX deal would help Japan achieve its goal of launching a civilian aerospace industry that might well take jobs and profits from the United States. In particular, they were concerned that the joint-production agreement would give Japan access to the systems integration knowledge that is a major strength of the U.S. aerospace industry. Instead they proposed that Japan simply buy the F-16 off-the-shelf from the United States or, as a second-best option, that Japan enter into a coproduction arrangement with the United States with a minimal transfer of technology. This view focused primarily on the economic implications of the FSX deal. It was supported by the economic agencies of the U.S. government, such as the Commerce Department, the Energy Department and the U.S. Trade Representative's Office.

Proponents held a different view. They argued that the deal would keep Japan from building its own plane. Rather than worrying about Japan's access to U.S. technology, they emphasized that the United States would actually gain access to Japanese technology. They rejected the option of having Japan purchase off-the-shelf U.S. technology as unrealistic, pointing out that Japan had not done so since the 1950s. Furthermore they noted that the president had already established the precedent of joint U.S.-Japanese ventures with the F-86, the F-104 and the F-15. This perspective concentrated primarily on military issues related to national security. It was supported by the Pentagon and the National Security Council.

Although a modified version of the original U.S.-Japanese agreement to coproduce the FSX was eventually agreed to, the debate highlighted a deeper policy question: Should American economic interests be given as much weight as traditional national security concerns in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy? In the past negotiating such technological arrangements has fallen exclusively to the Department of Defense, which tends to view them in purely military and geopolitical terms. Because of the erosion of America's international position in industrial technology and the new spirit of accommodation with the Soviet Union, however, there is renewed interest in strategic economic issues related to proprietary

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technology, leverage across markets and development of manufacturing know-how.

The lesson of the FSX deal is clear: where advanced technology is concerned, it is no longer possible to treat defense and economic concerns as two separate policy issues. U.S. international competitiveness is central to America's standing and influence in the decades ahead. In the future, the traditional U.S. approach to foreign policy will have to give more serious consideration to strategic industrial issues, such as the strength of the American manufacturing base and the leverage of key technologies across industries. This shift in focus will require a reassessment of both the priorities that govern foreign policy and the government institutions that are involved in the policymaking process. National security can no longer be viewed exclusively in military terms; economic security must also be taken into account.

High-Definition Television

For the last two years Washington has been embroiled in a policy debate about HDTV—a new television technology that provides picture clarity comparable to 35-mm film and has wide-screen pictures and digital stereo sound. Backers have hailed it as the most significant breakthrough since color television. They believe that it will deliver motion-picture-quality television to consumers before the end of the century. They are convinced that it is not only a major market but also a driver of several related technologies, and that the U.S. industry must therefore establish itself as a serious player in its manufacture and distribution. Critics have downplayed HDTV as a technical advance that is limited to a narrow segment of the consumer electronics market, since the large television screens required to carry HDTV would currently cost about $2,000. Nor are they convinced that U.S. manufacturers should attempt to establish themselves in this industry since Europe and Japan already have a lead in the technology as well as a well-established television industry.

For many the controversy over HDTV has come to symbolize the government's difficulty in developing a coherent policy on technology. The urgency of the debate stems from the perception that the United States is behind in a technology that not only has immense market potential, but also is a critical driver of several important electronics-related industries. Although the technology for HDTV is understood by the U.S.

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industry, Zenith is the only American company that is still in the television business. Consequently, U.S. industry does not have the capacity to develop the technology, manufacture it and bring it to market on a large scale.

The policy debate is characterized by disagreement on several fronts, including appropriate technical standards, the size of the potential market, the readiness of the technology, the role of foreign companies and the linkage across technology-intensive industries. Those differences became most evident on February 1, 1989, when industry, academic experts and special interest groups submitted about two dozen reports on HDTV to the House Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee. The debate picked up steam in early May 1989 when the Senate Commerce Committee held hearings on HDTV. At this hearing, the American Electronics Association presented a plan calling for the creation of a corporation to guide the development of the U.S. HDTV industry. This corporation would be managed by a board appointed by the president and Congress, representing government, industry and academia. The AEA requested $1.3 billion in government assistance for HDTV in the form of direct loans, loan guarantees and funding for research.

The AEA proposal met with a mixed reaction. Many American electronics companies supported it, but critics of HDTV viewed it as unnecessary. Even the federal government was split. While the Department of Commerce has emphasized the importance of HDTV, the Congressional Budget Office released a study in August 1989 that questioned the market projections and technological linkages that formed the basis of the AEA's analysis. Current government programs for HDTV are much more modest than the AEA proposal. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency at the Defense Department has funded some research in this area, but it does not appear that the government is prepared to provide the scale of support recommended by the AEA.

Nonetheless, the HDTV controversy highlighted several critical aspects of the technology policy debate. First, it demonstrated the complexity of the policy debate on technology. Technical feasibility, standards, market demand, the implications for military technology and the role of foreign competitors are all hotly debated issues. The debate is further complicated by the active involvement of numerous interest groups, both domestic and foreign, with widely varying per-

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spectives about what is feasible and appropriate. The fact that policymakers have to anticipate future trends in technology and markets only makes the decisions more difficult.

Second, the HDTV debate has drawn attention to the fact that a solid manufacturing base is essential to technological leadership. U.S. industry got out of the television business when it was considered a low-tech, low-value-added industry. As a result the United States now finds itself faced with a competitive disadvantage in the production of advanced HDTV technology.

Third, it has highlighted the "food-chain" linkages between related technologies, such as semiconductors, computers, software and medical imaging. One senior government official summed up this point forcefully by stating that "the next generations of TVs are the next generation of computers."

Fourth, like the semiconductor debate, the HDTV controversy shows the absence of government institutions capable of dealing with complex technological issues that have both commercial and military implications and that cut across several industries. So far the federal response to HDTV has emphasized traditional policy measures centering around military applications and basic research. Efforts to develop policies for commercial applications have been hampered by lack of institutions capable of dealing with issues related to commercial technology.

III

Similar debates on technology are being played out in other countries. Although circumstances differ from one country to the next, governments are increasingly concerned with the impact of technology on their international competitiveness. Both in the United States and overseas, governments are attempting to develop domestic technology policies that are in tune with global market realities. In the scramble for new ideas governments are constantly looking over their shoulders to try to ascertain what technology policies have given other countries an advantage in world markets, and then borrowing those policies and adapting them to their own situations. This process has led to an international policy ricochet among the United States, Japan and Western Europe and has resulted in an increasing convergence of public policies for technology.

Perhaps the most obvious example of the international policy ricochet in technology is the rush toward cooperative

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research and development. Both Europe and the United States view cooperative R&D as an important element in Japan's technological success, and they are therefore experimenting with new R&D programs involving companies, universities and government. Among the best-known European cooperative R&D projects are Airbus, a consortium of aerospace companies from France, Britain, Spain and West Germany; Esprit, a multibillion-dollar European Community program with dozens of cooperative projects aimed at improving microelectronics technology; Eureka, a 19-nation program involving 297 research projects in which corporations cooperate to develop technologies with government funding; and Jessi, the $5-billion Joint European Submicron Silicon program to develop new generations of semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. These cooperative European programs have been paralleled by efforts in the United States, which include among the best-known projects the Microelectronics and Computer Corporation and Sematech. In addition, the National Science Foundation has established several engineering research centers and science and technology centers that bring together university and industry researchers.

Japan also continues to borrow ideas from the West. Japan views basic research as a key to U.S. and European technological strength, and is moving to improve its national research base. In September 1988 a MITI White Paper on industrial technology stated that while Japan is known for the excellence of its application of industrial technology, it needs to put more emphasis on basic research. While noting that most of the conventional industrial products manufactured in Japan are technologically equal or superior to comparable products elsewhere, the White Paper emphasized that the research base in Japan is inadequate. MITI noted four concerns: (1) government investment in basic research in Japan remains below that of other industrial nations; (2) Japan has a large pool of researchers, but few hold doctorates or masters degrees; (3) the Japanese research environment is not as creative or flexible as that of the United States and Europe; (4) Japan lags behind other countries in large-scale research facilities. MITI concluded by recommending that the Japanese government play a much more significant role in research.

Another example of the tendency of governments to borrow policy ideas from their competitors and adapt them to their

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own situations is the plan for European economic integration. It is no secret that Europe views economies of scale as critical to the technological success of Japan and the United States. Consequently, one of the major concerns of "Europe 1992" is the creation of economies of scale that will allow European technology-intensive industries to flourish.

IV

Global competition and the international ricochet of government policies have set the stage for a new U.S. public policy framework for technology. Although the policy debate is still unfolding, some basic concerns are widely shared. Discussion revolves around four issues: strengthening the American manufacturing base, improving the U.S. policymaking machinery for advancing the creation and use of technology, rebuilding the nation's technological infrastructure and encouraging wider national R&D efforts. Although several new programs have been created to address these needs, new policies on technology have yet to be fully developed, and the institutional capacity that is necessary to implement them has yet to be put in place.

Strengthening the U.S. manufacturing base

One issue on which there is wide consensus is the need to strengthen the U.S. manufacturing base. At one time U.S. manufacturing was viewed as synonymous with moribund industries that had more to do with America's industrial past than its high-tech future. This perspective has changed, in large part because of the technological debates discussed above. It is now generally recognized that a strong manufacturing base is essential to leading-edge industries as well as to mature industries. Moreover, mastery of the manufacturing process is increasingly viewed as an essential part of the technical competence that is necessary to advance existing technologies and create new ones.

In discussing manufacturing, two concerns immediately surface: the relatively high cost of capital in the United States and the pressure on American management for short-term results. Managers in U.S. technology-intensive industries claim that the high cost of capital in the United States puts them in a difficult competitive position by forcing them to forgo investments with low yields, even if these investments are important to the long-term health of their company. Further-

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more, it means that the investments they do make must earn either a higher return or a faster return than their foreign competitors, thus reinforcing the tendency toward short-term thinking.

The primary reason for high capital costs is the low U.S. saving rate. Record U.S. federal budget deficits—averaging more than four percent of GNP in the 1980s—have eroded the pool of national savings needed to finance investment in both human and physical capital. Net national savings in 1986 and 1987 stood at only two percent of the nation's GNP, well below historical averages of approximately seven percent. The by-product of low national savings and the tight monetary policy that has been required to offset the massive fiscal stimulus has been high real interest rates and low levels of investment. Net investment in the 1980s—averaging 4.8 percent of GNP—is significantly below historical postwar averages of seven percent.

In addition to the cost of capital, the short-term bias of American management is a recurrent theme in policy discussions about U.S. manufacturing. In many ways the discussion about short-term versus long-term is a discussion about the increasing tension between the U.S. financial and manufacturing sectors. Financial markets, faced with a broad array of international investment opportunities, are increasingly unwilling to make long-term investments in U.S. manufacturing when they can earn a higher return in a shorter time period by investing in other areas. Manufacturing, by contrast, requires long-term investment and patient capital. The discussion about short-term versus long-term is therefore in many ways a commentary about the diverging interests of the financial and manufacturing sectors.

Improving the policymaking machinery

Another issue on which there is widespread agreement is the need to improve the U.S. policymaking machinery for technology. Because public policy has not addressed the issue of the commercial application of technology, government policies often tend to impede rather than assist industrial efforts to bring new technology rapidly to the world's market. No one agency of the federal government has broad responsibility for research and other activities related to civilian technology or for strategic coordination of technology policy at the national level. In the executive branch, responsibility for R&D is

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dispersed among 12 agencies. In Congress, the civilian science budget alone is divided among as many as 13 different appropriations subcommittees, and there is no mechanism for devising reasonable compromises or setting priorities.

An example of the confusion that results from this situation is the Reagan administration's 1987 proposal to double the National Science Foundation's budget over a five-year period. Although this proposal was initially greeted with enthusiasm by Congress, the funding targets have not been met because the subcommittee responsible for determining the NSF budget has had to choose between funding for science and funding for housing subsidies and veterans' benefits.

The problem is compounded by the lack of federal focus on technology's economic implications. Individual agencies are responsible for the research and technology that relate solely to their particular missions. Only the Department of Energy and the Department of Agriculture extend their focus to economic performance, and then only in specific sectors. The one organization that provides an overview of federal research and other activities related to economic performance is the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. The OSTP advises the president and helps coordinate federal R&D activities, but it has no line functions and a small budget, with staff mostly on temporary loan from other agencies.

The Department of Commerce has a wider economic perspective, but its new programs for technology are just beginning to take shape. The NSF also has a series of broader responsibilities. It supports education, research and information transfers in most scientific and engineering fields and, in effect, serves as the general science and engineering agency of the federal government. The NSF budget, however, accounts for only 2.5 percent of total government R&D funding.

The dispersed responsibility for technology apparent in the federal government is unusual among industrialized countries. Most national governments maintain a ministry of science and technology or a ministry of trade and industry that has broad responsibility for research and technology-related activities. Although there has been discussion of the creation of such an agency in the United States, it remains unclear how such an agency would be structured or what its responsibilities would be.

This does not mean, however, that there is no effort under way to strengthen the government's focus on industrial technology. Three government agencies are at the forefront of this

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trend: the OSTP, the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense. President Bush has proposed an increase in the budget of the OSTP and elevated the National Science Adviser (who also serves as the head of the OSTP) to Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Allan Bromley, who has assumed this position, has stated that one of his top priorities is strengthening U.S. industrial technology.

The Department of Commerce is also playing a more significant role in technological issues that are relevant to industry. The 1988 Omnibus Trade Act legislated an expanded involvement for Commerce in industrial technology, and Secretary Robert Mosbacher has stated that technology will be a priority focus of the department. The trade act created a technology administration at Commerce, renamed the National Bureau of Standards as the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and established the Advanced Technology Program in NIST. Although these new programs have yet to be fully implemented, they signal a growing government concern with industrial technology.

The Department of Defense has also been active. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has a tradition of developing technology with military applications. It is important to note, however, that about half of DARPA's $1.4-billion budget is invested in dual-use technologies that have both civilian and military applications. DARPA is currently the source of funding for Sematech, the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences, and research in such technologies as X-ray lithography. The Defense Science Board and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions have also been trying to address issues related to competitiveness and the military's industrial base.

The NSF is also increasingly preoccupied with issues related to the development and commercialization of technology, and has launched a series of efforts to focus on issues more closely related to technology and competitiveness. For other agencies, such as NASA and the federal laboratories, technology transfer has been the rallying cry for new programs. Just how successful these programs will be, however, remains to be seen.

Rebuilding the technological infrastructure

The third area in which there is widespread consensus is the need to strengthen the education system, facilities and equipment that constitute the nation's technological infrastructure.

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While the federal government is being called on to assume a new role in some technological areas, there is a long tradition of government involvement in ensuring that the U.S. science and technological infrastructure is sound. Government programs contribute importantly to the education of scientists and engineers, provide equipment and facilities, and encourage the basic research that industry utilizes in its efforts to commercialize technology. Sustained investments in these areas are critical to the nation's economic future.

Although some recent initiatives highlight the importance of rebuilding the nation's technological infrastructure, these efforts continue to be hampered by a lack of funding. New congressional fellowships have been established for American students interested in pursuing science and engineering education, and funds have been reallocated in the Department of Defense to enable more graduate students to pursue an education in these fields. But these efforts fall far short of the national need. There are approximately 1,500 vacant engineering faculty positions in U.S. colleges and universities; moreover, according to the NSF, some 60,000 math and science teachers in America's secondary schools are not fully qualified to do their jobs. The shortages of trained faculty in these fields will increase during the 1990s as a wave of retirements of the faculty trained in the 1950s takes place.

University research facilities face similar problems of neglect. Over the past two decades, while many foreign competitors have been aggressively building up their R&D infrastructure, U.S. federal funding for university research plant and facilities declined by over 90 percent in real terms. In a 1986 study on the health of U.S. colleges and universities, the White House Science Council estimated that a $10-billion program over the next ten years would be required to bring U.S. university research facilities to an adequate level. Although legislation has been passed in Congress that would be able to provide some of the necessary funding, these funds have not been fully appropriated because of federal budget constraints.

Other indications of the growing recognition of the need to strengthen the nation's technological infrastructure are the proposed U.S. supercomputer network and the establishment of regional generic technology centers. Although these programs face funding and implementation problems, they are indications of the growing government concern with the nation's technological base.

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Encouraging new national R&D efforts

The fourth area in which there is heightened interest and growing consensus is the need to forge new kinds of national R&D efforts. The most visible sign of this new commitment is the profusion of cooperative R&D ventures. Since the 1984 Cooperative Research Act was passed, more than 140 cooperative research ventures have been launched in the United States. They have been complemented by a host of state technological programs that attempt to harness technological development for economic growth. Even the federal government has embarked on some new policies, such as the program to encourage technology transfers from the national labs to U.S. industries.

Although these new initiatives are important, one should not let their stated objectives overshadow the underlying dynamic at work. While these efforts are effective in generating concentrated, long-term funding and an excellent pool of talent, it remains uncertain what their ultimate contribution to industrial technology will be. It is unrealistic to expect new technology of vital interest and immediate relevance to industry to be developed rapidly as a result of these new cooperative relationships. In fact, their primary importance may not be creating state-of-the-art technology that can be readily applied by industry, as much as building the new relationships necessary among businesses, universities and the government to compete in an increasingly competitive international environment.

V

The debate about U.S. policy on technology is already beginning to have an impact on the conduct of American foreign policy. The basic message is clear: national security can no longer be viewed in exclusively military terms; economic security and industrial competitiveness are also vital considerations. Indeed, where technology is concerned, it is difficult to tell where military concerns stop and economic issues begin. The implications for U.S. foreign policy are only beginning to be understood. The debate about technology and competitiveness promises to have a far-reaching impact not only on the strategic objectives the nation pursues, but also on the institutions that shape our policies.

The shift in the focus of U.S. foreign policy is already apparent. Along with the easing of the East-West military

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tensions that have been the central factor in U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II, new economic issues are emerging. The fact that important political allies are also hard-nosed economic competitors means that the U.S. foreign policy establishment can no longer afford a cavalier attitude toward international competition in industrial technology. The performance of U.S. technology-intensive sectors, the strength of the American manufacturing base, the leverage of key technologies across different industries, the state of the nation's technical infrastructure—all these issues will increasingly occupy U.S. policymakers in the future. And as they grow in importance, they will exercise a mounting influence over our relationships with other nations. In some regions, such as Asia, the increasing U.S. preoccupation with economic issues will complicate existing diplomatic relationships; in others, such as Eastern Europe, it may provide a means by which to overcome traditional political tensions.

A new set of issues is emerging hand in hand with these strategic economic concerns. Arcane topics that in the past have been considered the realm of obscure bureaucrats will increasingly engage the highest levels of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. The growing preoccupation with such subjects as international technical standards, patent law, intellectual property protection and dual-use technology demonstrates that this trend is already well underway.

Finally, the policy shift toward strategic economic issues will require institutional realignments in Washington. As the FSX deal so clearly demonstrates, the Department of Defense and the State Department can no longer base policies solely on military and diplomatic criteria. There is a pressing need to incorporate economic issues related to industrial technology into the decision-making process that determines U.S. foreign policy. This new focus will require both internal reorganizations and new institutional alignments among government departments involved in the exercise of U.S. foreign policy.

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THOMAS JEFFERSON AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Two hundred years ago, on March 21, 1790, Thomas Jefferson arrived in New York City to assume his duties as secretary of state, the first under the new national government. No man had a greater impact on the day-to-day conduct of American foreign policy than Jefferson during his long life of public service. And throughout the course of American history few can rival Jefferson as a living symbol of the nation's purpose. That his writings might be invoked on every side of a given controversy has always added to the uses of the Jeffersonian past; all the great conflicts of the nineteenth century—over slavery, union and democracy—found partisans on either side appealing to the "sagacious aphorisms and oracular sayings" of the great Virginian. The same has been true in foreign policy, where Jefferson's name has been invoked on all sides of the ever-recurring debates on the nation's diplomatic stance.

It is in Jefferson's sense of values that the deepest association exists between his own outlook and the American mind. The institutions that characterize American public life today—the standing military establishments, the ballooning debt and high taxes, the whole complex of banks, corporations and financial markets, the subordinate position of state governments in relation to national power, the exalted status of federal judicature—all this he would have beheld with a kind of sacred horror, as constituting the victory of Alexander Hamilton's Federalist vision of American life. Uncannily, however, the ideals of American life remain Jeffersonian, even in the midst

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of all these powerful and corrupting institutions; we cannot help but turn to Jefferson, even with the knowledge that the values he championed can often be made a subject of reproach against him.

The main source of Jefferson's continuing appeal lies in the facility with which he evoked the meaning of the American experiment in self-government. He thought of America the way we like to think of ourselves, and saw its significance, as we still now tend to do, in terms larger than itself. Whether in relation to the domestic experiment at home or the conduct of the republic toward foreign powers, his most characteristic utterance was the contrast he drew between the high moral purpose that animated our own national life and action, and the low motives of power and expediency that drove other nations. Even the labor of the farm had a meaning beyond the hard drudgeries of existence—of clearing the forest, tending to crops and providing shelter. To the meanest dirt farmer Jefferson gave the conviction that he—the American—was part of a form of civilization higher than the polished societies of Europe, with their artificial distinctions between social classes, their oppressive restrictions on human freedom, and their crushing burden of debt and taxes. That a republic so constituted should be guided in its foreign policy by the same calculations of power and expedience as animated the states of Europe was unthinkable. Those who felt power and forgot right could teach only negative lessons, by showing the path by which America might become corrupted.

Jefferson's vision was not without its critics, then or later. Europeans found laughable the notion that American civilization, with no art or literature considered worthy of mention, and animated in its daily life by the drives of "sordid avarice," might be held to represent a higher form of communal life; European diplomats gave no credence to the view that the external policy of the young republic was inspired by a noble moral purpose. The denunciations did not matter, and barely disturbed the American in his illusions, if illusions they were. America—the "solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rights . . . the sole depository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from hence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions of the earth shall ever become susceptible to its benign influence"—this "hallowed ark of

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human hope and happiness" involved for Jefferson "everything dear to man."[1]

II

Jefferson is the great exemplar, along with Woodrow Wilson, of the national conviction—so persistent and profound—that we have rejected an ancient reason of state, that we stand for something new under the sun, and that our destiny as a nation is to lead the world from the old to the new. No one gave more fervent and eloquent expression to this conviction than Wilson, at a time when the nation's star, though already very high, was still rising. But the same conviction was apparent from the outset, as Jefferson testifies, though the circumstances attending it were quite modest. America was destined to set an example to the world both in the principles of society it entertained at home and in the policies it followed abroad. "We are firmly convinced, and we act on that conviction," Jefferson declared in his second inaugural address, "that with nations, as with individuals, our interests soundly calculated will ever be found inseparable from our moral duties."[2] The foreign policy that faithfully reflected this conviction was bound to be radically different from the foreign policies of the European states.

The origins of the belief that this nation had rejected an ancient reason of state must be found in the first instance in the differences seen to separate republics from monarchies. The logic of reason of state was the logic of monarchies, not of republics. It was the logic of those who found in war the principal outlet for their passions and energies, who made of the "military system" the first principle of government. "Why are not republics plunged into war," Thomas Paine had asked, "but because the nature of their government does not admit of an interest distinct from that of the nation?"[3] Paine's answer might just as well have been given by Jefferson. Only when the decision for war rested on the will of the community rather than the will of an unrepresentative government would this ever-present specter of the old diplomacy begin to recede and

[1] Letter from Jefferson to the "Citizens of Washington," March 4, 1809, in Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Bergh, eds., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. XVI, Washington, D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903–05, pp. 347–348.

[2] Paul Leicester Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892–99, vol. VII, p. 343.

[3] "The Rights of Man" (1791), in *The Writings of Thomas Paine*, Moncure Daniel Conway, ed., New York: AMS Press, 1967, vol. II, p. 388.

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a great step toward permanent peace be taken. Hamilton had inveighed against the view that the "genius of republics is pacific," just as he had objected to the equation of peace with the spirit of commerce. "The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable," he had argued; they operate independently of forms of government.[4]

The argument found no favor with Republicans. Indeed, it was generally at odds with the progressive thought of the time, and certainly at odds with the thought of the *philosophes* which Jefferson found so congenial. And if Jefferson, and James Madison as well, did not share the extreme view that saw in a world of republics the guarantee of universal and perpetual peace, they, and Republicans generally, did find in the advent of republican governments not only the prospect of a radical decline in the role played by war but the prospect as well of a virtual revolution in the conduct of diplomacy.

The belief that America had rejected a traditional reason of state was deepened still further by the identification of the nation's fate with the fate of freedom in the world, by the sense that the security and well-being of the United States were inseparable from the prospects of free government everywhere. This outlook, it seems almost redundant to observe, became deeply embedded in the nation's psyche early on and is today more triumphant than ever. America's national purpose is seen not only to distinguish it from other nations but to give its interests a special character. The vital interests of other states, even of great states, are bounded ultimately by the state itself. But the same cannot be said of the state that stands for the freedom of people everywhere, on whose continued strength and well-being the hopes and future of freedom rest. The equation of America's security and survival with that of freedom in the world has not only given to American statecraft a dimension above and beyond a conventional reason of state, but has made the two seem somehow qualitatively different. Jefferson was not the only early American statesman to articulate this credo. Yet none gave it more eloquent and enduring expression than he.

Did Jefferson in fact reject a traditional reason of state? Certainly he appeared to reject the three claims that formed the basis of the doctrine: that statecraft constituted an auton-

[4] *The Federalist*, ed. Jacob E. Cooke, Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961, p. 29.

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omous realm governed by its own rules, that the vital interests of the state were supreme over the interests of civil society, and that the restraints of legality must give way before necessity. In place of the dual standard of the reason of state, he had "but one system of ethics for men and for nations—to be grateful, to be faithful to all engagements under all circumstances, to be open and generous, promoting in the long run even the interests of both."[5]

Against the assertion of the primacy of foreign over domestic policy, he insisted that the objectives of foreign policy were but a means to the end of protecting and promoting the goals of domestic society, that is, the individual's freedom and society's well-being. And as against the view that necessity might override legal obligation, Jefferson held that the chief security of liberty lay in the iron constraints of a written constitution.

There are moments in Jefferson's life when his rejection of reason of state appears final and irrevocable, when the whole soul of his political existence seems directed against state power and its insidious auxiliaries. That rejection went deeper than an insistence on a strict construction of the Constitution and a belief that to take a single step beyond those limited grants of authority was to open wide the field to unbounded power and ambition. He rejected, in fact, the whole apparatus of the modern state that had emerged in Europe in the eighteenth century. The combination of funded debt, executive power, burdensome taxation, government-supported manufactures and standing military establishments that characterized the great powers in the eighteenth century (and that continues to characterize the modern state today, only more so) was thought by Jefferson to constitute the very essence of tyrannical government.

In the Jeffersonian scheme of things, America was to be different. It was meant to escape the corruptions of Europe, something it could not do if it succumbed to the blandishments of the power state. When Hamilton threw his support behind measures designed to bolster the state in the approved European manner at the outset of the Washington administration, Jefferson detected a design to subvert the Constitution and abort the American experiment in liberty. To this supposed project, and to Hamilton's associated plans to establish a

[5] Letter to Madame La Duchesse D'Auville, April 2, 1790, in Ford, *op. cit.*, vol. V, p. 153.

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national bank, secure bounties for domestic manufactures and expand the army and navy beyond the merest of constabulary functions, Jefferson was passionately and systematically opposed.

These considerations go far toward explaining Jefferson's attitude toward war, that great instrument of reason of state. War, and the necessities that were regularly alleged to attend its conduct, constantly threatened the very institutions and values that provided its ultimate justification—and above all for republics. Hence, for Jefferson and for Republicans generally, war was the great nemesis. In *Political Observations* (1795), an essay that stands out as a classic expression of the Republican credo, Madison wrote:

> Of all the enemies to public liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few.[6]

This outlook did not prevent the Jeffersonians from embracing what would now be called police actions against either American Indians or Algerines; it did, however, make the prospect of war with the great powers—preeminently Britain and France—something to be avoided save in the worst extremity. War would introduce into the republic all the elements of its corruption—debt, taxes, standing armies, artificial privileges of all kinds, ultimately an enlargement of executive power that would lead to the reintroduction of monarchy. This was Jefferson's deepest instinct, and though he drew close to war on many occasions throughout his life and indeed sometimes wished dearly that it might come to purge his rage against foreign transgression, in the end he nearly always drew back.

If doubt must nevertheless persist that Jefferson rejected the central contentions of a traditional reason of state, it is not only because he employed most of the means characteristic of the old statecraft but also because of the ambitious objectives that he had for the United States. The means that he adopted often conflicted in fact with the principles he championed, and seem on occasion scarcely reconcilable with gratitude,

[6] *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison*, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1865, vol. IV, pp. 491–492.

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honest dealing and a strict observance of legal obligations. The ends that he embraced, moreover, were scarcely modest. The belief in the necessity of territorial expansion, alongside the conviction that no constitution was as well suited as America's for "extensive empire and self-government"; the principle of freedom of commerce, which sought to free trade from the shackles of mercantilism; the attachment to neutral rights, or freedom of commerce in war, which aimed at mitigating the hardships that war imposed on neutral states while extending the benefits war brought to them; finally, the idea of the two hemispheres, which found its way into the Monroe Doctrine and declared the American continents beyond the reach of European war and despotism—all these objectives run throughout Jefferson's career as an American statesman. They constituted an imposing edifice; they described a structure of power that, if realized, would place few obstacles in the way of the territorial and commercial expansion of the United States. What Montesquieu and Frederick the Great said of the diplomacy of the *ancien régime* might also be said of Jefferson's. In both cases, "the fundamental rule of governments" was "the principle of extending their territories."

III

The great dilemma of Jefferson's statecraft lay in his apparent renunciation of the means on which states had always ultimately relied to ensure their security and to satisfy their ambitions, and his simultaneous unwillingness to renounce the ambitions that normally led to the use of these means. He wished, in other words, that America could have it both ways—that it could enjoy the fruits of power without falling victim to the normal consequences of its exercise.

He had good reasons for wanting both of these things, because both were indispensable to the realization of his vision of the American future. Both sprang from his vision of American society, and reflected classic instances of the primacy of domestic policy. But to pursue them together created for him a dilemma with which he wrestled throughout his presidency—one that forced him to articulate and ultimately to employ a new diplomatic method, sharply opposed to the classical statecraft of Hamilton. "To conquer without war" was the prime objective (the "first fact") of Jeffersonian politics, observed the French diplomat Louis Marie Turreau in 1805—

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and so it was.[7] Jefferson was not the first statesman to think of conquering without war. But he was the first to take the thought seriously and to seek to put it into practice. How he might do so constituted the essence of his problem in dealing with the external world.

The threats of war and alliance represented one way of conquering without war, and Jefferson recurred frequently to these altogether traditional diplomatic means. He was never averse to securing his aims by conjuring up before his adversary a diplomatic combination on the enemy's opposite flank, and he often threatened war against Spain. But this was playing at the devil's game, and he knew it. If forced to make good on either threat, he understood that his enemies might have the "consolation of Satan in removing our first parents from Paradise."[8]

The core of his diplomatic method lay elsewhere, in the instrument of "peaceable coercion." By this he meant an ordering of American economic relations that would leave the mercantilist states of Europe no choice but to succumb to American demands. Premised on the great advantages the European powers derived from their commerce with America, he thought that by mere domestic legislation he could work his will upon other powers, despite their hostility.

The promise of Jefferson's statecraft was thus of a new diplomacy, based on the confidence of a free and virtuous people, that would secure ends founded on the natural and universal rights of man, by means that escaped war and its corruptions. He himself never employed the term "new diplomacy," perhaps because the French had already made use of it. But that it was in substance new, that it constituted a radical break from the traditions of Old World diplomacy—of this he was utterly persuaded. America stood against force in two respects. Unlike other states, it did not make the fatal confusion between might and right. In its stance toward the external world, no less than in its constitutional order at home, it stood on principles that were freely accessible to all men through reason, and that did not depend for their validity on local circumstances and particular interests, still less on raw power.

[7] Letter to Talleyrand, July 9, 1805, cited in Henry Adams, *History of the United States of America during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903, vol. III, p. 85.

[8] See letter to William Short, Nov. 28, 1814, in Lipscomb and Bergh, *op. cit.*, vol. XIV, p. 214: "from a peaceable and agricultural nation, [our enemy] makes us a military and manufacturing one."

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These principles were to be validated, in turn, by a new diplomatic method that was coercive yet eschewed force. The traditional view, shared by Hamilton, had been stated most succinctly by Frederick the Great: diplomacy without armaments, he had held, was like music without instruments. Jefferson meant to show the falsity of this doctrine, and he would ultimately come to stake the whole of his statecraft on the demonstration.

IV

The Jeffersonian legacy in foreign policy has always been identified with a distinctive conception of the role that external affairs ought to play in the American scheme of things. In this view, the purposes and objectives of foreign policy may be properly understood only as a means to the end of protecting and promoting individual freedom and well-being. No end of foreign policy can be morally autonomous, self-justifying, an end in itself. Instead, all the ends of foreign policy must be seen as means to the ends of society, which are in turn ultimately the ends of individuals.

In this respect, as in so many others, the outlook of Jefferson has been contrasted regularly with that of Hamilton. Yet the principle that subordinated foreign to domestic policy was not characteristic only of Jefferson and of those sharing his position. It did not as such distinguish Republican thought and conviction. Federalists, too, believed that the ends of foreign policy were not morally autonomous or self-justifying but had to be seen as means to the ends of society, that is, the ends of individuals. Certainly, Hamilton believed this. As much as Jefferson, he belonged to those who, in George Kennan's telling division, wish to conduct foreign policy in order to live rather than live in order to conduct foreign policy. When Hamilton replied to Charles Pinckney of South Carolina in the Federal Convention that the distinction Pinckney had sought to draw between a government capable of making its citizens "happy at home" and one that made them "respectable abroad" was an "ideal distinction," he said nothing that supported the principle endorsing the primacy of foreign policy. The distinction was ideal, Hamilton argued, for the reason that "tranquility and happiness at home" depended on "sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad."[9]

[9] *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, Max Farrand, ed., New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1937, vol. I, pp. 466–467.

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The difference in this critical respect between Hamilton and Jefferson did not arise over the desirability, in principle, of subordinating foreign to domestic policy, but over the prospects for doing so in practice. Jefferson saw the circumstances marking the early life of the republic as placing the United States in a far stronger international position than did Hamilton—an optimistic judgment that rested on the value of American commerce to the European powers. This conviction underlay the strategy of peaceable coercion Jefferson followed in his second administration, a strategy that, in the form of the embargo of 1807–09, led to such disastrous results. Had he been right about the nature of the American position, the new republic clearly would have been in a far stronger position in relation to Britain and France, the chief rivals in the great armed struggle then raging, than proved to be the case. In the event, the embargo demonstrated that the leverage Jefferson had expected to enjoy from commerce was misplaced and that the attempt to exploit such leverage as the nation did possess worked a harder necessity than did war itself.

The logic of the embargo was to give a primacy to foreign policy that has remained to this day as onerous as any the nation has experienced. The measures taken to implement the embargo brought much of the economy to a virtual standstill, whereas the measures taken to enforce it brought Massachusetts and Connecticut to the verge of rebellion. Yet great as the financial, political and moral costs of the embargo were, it proved a failure. Taken to escape the alternatives of national humiliation or war, it led first to humiliation and then, ultimately, to war. The system of war that Jefferson had hoped beyond hope to reform by the embargo was not reformed, and this despite his commitment to take any and all measures necessary to give effect to the embargo. That in the end Jefferson came close to embracing measures which called into question almost every principle of government he professed to believe was the ironic though inevitable result of attempting to defy the limits imposed on the statesman.

In part, of course, this ironic outcome must be traced to events in Europe that were not of Jefferson's doing. In greater part, however, the dominant role of foreign policy during his presidency followed from the domestic vision that Jefferson and Republicans generally entertained, a vision that dictated an active and assertive foreign policy. Although Jefferson had a profoundly isolationist outlook, one that might have been

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expected to lead to passivity and avoidance of conflict in foreign policy, his vision of domestic society was contingent upon the fulfillment of expansive territorial and commercial goals.

By contrast, his great Federalist adversary, Hamilton, entertained a view of the nation's internal development that was far better suited to a policy of isolation. It was the Republicans rather than the Federalists who had, by virtue of their domestic vision, a greater dependence on foreign policy and, accordingly, a greater need to accept the primacy of foreign policy. For it was the Republicans who defined domestic welfare and happiness in such a way as to make the realization of these ends—ends that were equated with the very continuity of the nation—dependent largely upon external change.

Did the primacy of foreign policy nevertheless have a meaning in Jefferson's statecraft that was essentially different from the meaning given it in the statecraft of the *ancien régime*? In its classic meaning, the necessities imposed by the vital interests of the state overrode all other interests. In Jefferson's hand, the primacy of foreign policy took on much the same meaning. What he regarded as the necessities of the state and nation overrode other principles and interests that appeared to jeopardize these necessities, including principles that had otherwise commanded his undeviating allegiance.

Thus it was that, as president, Jefferson abandoned his constitutional scruples rather than run the risk that Louisiana, purchased from France in 1803, might be lost as a consequence of adhering to them. So, too, the subsequent diplomacy over East and West Florida demonstrated the ingenuity and single-mindedness of Jefferson in the cause of expanding the nation's territory, but scarcely showed devotion to principle, particularly such principle as might operate to inhibit expansion.

In his determination to acquire the Floridas, Jefferson evidenced not the slightest hesitation in siding with Napoleon against the freedom of those who were resisting the great Corsican's efforts to reduce them to submission. Although the black people of Santo Domingo had by their desperate struggle successfully resisted Napoleon's plan to enslave them anew, and by so doing had prevented the French from undertaking at a critical point the military occupation of New Orleans, Jefferson showed no sympathy for their plight. Instead, he sought to appease Napoleon and to enlist support for Amer-

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ican claims to West Florida by appearing to embargo American trade with the island. Again, when the Spanish nation in May 1808 rose up in resistance to Napoleon, Jefferson, while voicing in private his sympathy for Spain's struggle, did not seriously consider deviating from a policy that in effect supported the French effort. In this instance as well, a response that appeared indifferent to the cause of a nation's freedom was motivated in large part by the hope that Napoleon might at last favor the American aspiration to the Floridas.

In national memory, no association comes more readily to mind than that between Jefferson and liberty; yet from the vantage point of 1808, nothing seems more absurd. For then a foreign policy dedicated to the vindication of neutral rights ranged the United States against the Spanish patriots fighting for their freedom against Napoleon—and as it would later, under Madison's administration, place the United States against the whole European movement to throw off Napoleon's domination. At home it produced violations of civil liberties on a scale that would not be equaled in American history until the Civil War.

V

For most of his life, Jefferson championed a policy of isolation for the new nation. In doing so he joined his voice to that of many others. The desire to pursue a political destiny separate from Europe enjoyed a virtual consensus among the founding generation of American statesmen.

The classic expression of the desirability of pursuing a policy of isolation from Europe is George Washington's Farewell Address of 1796. In it, Washington declared:

> The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. . . . Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.

The "different course" advised was "to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far . . .

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as we are now at liberty to do it" and to "safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."[10]

Drafted by Hamilton, Washington's advice was cast in qualified and tentative terms. The "great rule of conduct" was not set forth as an absolute principle that represented, whatever the circumstances, the timeless interests of the nation, but as a policy for a state of only modest power that was consolidating a newly won independence and a still precarious security. It expressed what Washington and Hamilton considered the true interest of the nation in the given circumstances ("our detached and distant situation"). It reflected no expectation that the system of European politics might soon be changed. Instead, it intimated that the European system would persist and that this country should take such advantages as it could from "so peculiar a situation."

Was the outlook embodied in the Farewell Address the outlook of Jefferson as well? Certainly, Jefferson may reasonably be cited to the same effect with respect to policy. In March of 1799 he wrote to a friend:

> I sincerely join you in abjuring all political connection with every foreign power; and tho I cordially wish well to the progress of liberty in all nations, and would forever give it the weight of our countenance, yet they are not to be touched without contamination from their other bad principles. Commerce with all nations, alliance with none, should be our motto.[11]

Jefferson would not have expressed himself thus in the early years of the decade: he would not have spoken in terms that implied the moral equivalence of "all nations," including France. Then, as secretary of state, he had equated the fate of the French Revolution with that of liberty everywhere. Were France to go down before the might of the First Coalition, he had believed, its defeat could be expected to result in the permanent ascendancy of the enemies of liberty in America. The cause of republicanism would seriously decline and perhaps even perish.

It was largely out of this same conviction that Jefferson in 1793 wished to intervene in the European conflict, not by abandoning America's neutral status but by insisting on a view of neutral rights that would work to France's distinct advan-

[10] John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington 1745–1799*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931–44, vol. XXXV, pp. 233–235.

[11] Letter to Thomas Lomax, March 12, 1799, in Ford, *op. cit.*, vol. VII, p. 373.

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tage. That the course he favored would presumably also accomplish the goal of freeing this country from Britain's economic domination made it doubly desirable. But Washington did not respond in the way Jefferson desired. Unwilling to play a high-stakes game that might draw the country into war, he did not accept Jefferson's strategy of making American neutrality contingent upon a British acceptance of an expansive definition of neutral rights. Nor did Congress adopt the Republicans' proposals to discriminate against British commerce. Confronted by a possible war with Great Britain, the Washington administration ultimately settled on a less ambitious understanding of neutral rights than Jefferson desired, and entered into an accommodation with England—the Jay Treaty—that Jefferson detested.

The year 1793 marks Jefferson's first attempt—tentative and qualified as it was—to intervene in the great conflict brought on by the French Revolution. The second occurred in 1807–09 and took the form of the embargo, Jefferson's great experiment in peaceable coercion. As before, a particular interpretation of the rights of neutrals was championed that tilted heavily in support of France. In this second effort, however, the hope and expectation that informed the first was gone. With the coming to power of Napoleon in 1799, Jefferson no longer found moral importance in the European war. A conflict once endowed with profound moral significance, the outcome of which Jefferson had identified with the future of liberty, was now viewed as a mere struggle for power between the "tyrant on land" and the "tyrant of the ocean."

Jefferson continued to insist on the moral equivalence of France and Great Britain to the end of their armed struggle. In his view, there was no room for the consideration that the one belligerent—the "tyrant of the ocean"—was defending the international order within which America could enjoy a basic security, whereas the other belligerent—the "tyrant on land"—was intent on destroying this order and the security of the states that formed it.

Nor was this refusal to differentiate between the belligerents essentially qualified by Jefferson's occasional bow to balance-of-power considerations. After Trafalgar and Austerlitz, he had insisted that "our wish ought to be that he who has armies may not have the dominion of the sea, and that he who has

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dominion of the sea may be one who has no armies."[12] But the "wish" that he expressed in 1806 did not inform the policy he pursued in 1807–09. So enraged was he over English transgressions of neutral rights that he no longer troubled himself over the danger that "he who has armies" might gain "the dominion of the sea." He acknowledged his change of attitude by confessing that it was "mortifying that we should be forced to wish success to Bonaparte, and to look to his victories as our salvation." He had never expected that he would be placed in this position. "But the English being equally tyrannical at sea as he is on land, & that tyranny bearing on us in every point of either honor or interest, I say, 'down with England' and as for what Bonaparte is then to do with us, let us trust to the chapter of accidents." Dismissing the prospect of danger from Napoleon even in the event of a conquest of Britain as "hypothetical" and "chimerical," Jefferson's true policy was to assert neutral rights against England and otherwise trust to "the chapter of accidents" to preserve a balance of power. Given that outlook, there could be no outcome other than a policy that objectively favored the "tyrant on land."[13]

Though separated by a decade and a half, these two critical episodes illuminate the tension in Jefferson between the desire to reform the international system and the desire to remain separate from it. Reformation could come only as a result of successfully imposing one's will on the system, or, at least, on a significant part of it. But this could prove difficult and dangerous. Men and nations being what they are, the world is resistant to reform. Whatever their initial intention, those bent on reform, and therefore on intervention, have generally had to resort to the sword. This Jefferson did not want and had no intention of doing. Force threatened the very interests for which he had sought reform.

The result of this reasoning could only lead to withdrawal. If the state system could not be reformed, it had to be abandoned. Then Jefferson could speak of the desirability of "Chinese isolation" and of the need to place "an ocean of fire between us and the old world."

Jefferson's isolationism reflected an outlook that was unwill-

[12] Letter to Thomas Lomax, Jan. 11, 1806, cited in Dumas Malone, *Jefferson The President: Second Term, 1805–1809*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1974, p. 95.

[13] See letter to Col. John Taylor, Aug. 1, 1807, in Lipscomb and Bergh, *op.cit.*, vol. XI, p. 305; letter to Thomas Leiper, Aug. 21, 1807, in Ford, *op. cit.*, vol. IX, p. 130; letter to John Langdon, March 5, 1810, in Lipscomb and Bergh, *op. cit.*, vol. XII, pp. 374–375.

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ing to come to terms with the political world of his time. In its essential features, this outlook expressed a true isolation, a real separateness, from the international system. In this vital respect, as in others, it was profoundly parochial. Unable to adjust to the existing world, it pointed either to the withdrawal from that world or to the attempt to reform it by imposing one's will on it.

Jefferson was the first president who sought to reform the international system. He was not the last. In the history of the nation's encounter with the world, the themes of withdrawal and reformation are deeply embedded and apparent throughout. They have formed the enduring characteristics of the American outlook on the world. For Jefferson, as for subsequent American statesmen, the desire to change the world was at war with the desire not to be corrupted by the world. The desire to change the world sprang, for the most part, from the conviction that only in a changed world could republican institutions in America flourish and be secure. But the very attempt to change the world incurred the risk of contamination by it, for the methods by which it had been changed in the past were those that held out the greatest threat to republican institutions.

VI

Of all the nation's enduring traditions that Jefferson so influenced, none is more striking in its significance than the deeply ingrained inwardness of national feeling that marks to this day the American outlook. Foreign observers have always been impressed by this trait, which they have not hesitated to identify with the parochialism of Americans. That it should be traced in part to so cosmopolitan a figure as Jefferson cannot but appear paradoxical. Yet in this as in so many other respects there were two quite different sides to Jefferson, just as there have been two quite different sides to the nation.

A vision of man's future that was as grand as it was timeless was joined to a view that seemed not only unwilling but almost unable to transcend, however modestly, the particular interests of the state. This combination of the universal and the particular is bound to create difficulties when applied to the realm of diplomacy. For the outlook that informs a successful diplomacy must fall somewhere between these two perspectives. The grand vision is too elevated to make meaningful and effective contact with political reality, while the parochial view

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is too self-centered to achieve the kind of compromise diplomatic solutions normally require. Jefferson's diplomacy nevertheless encompassed both of these perspectives and on more than one occasion sought to combine them in a manner that would give the nation's particular interests a universal significance.

The maritime crisis in Jefferson's second administration illustrates these two sides of Jefferson's diplomatic outlook just as it illustrates his almost inveterate propensity to convert issues of interest into matters in which great moral principles were held to be at stake. The conflict with England over impressment and neutral rights was marked from first to last by a view that seemed incapable of giving serious consideration to any interests, let alone to the possible legitimacy of any interests, save those of the neutral. That England was engaged in a war for its very survival as a great power, that the ferocity of the hegemonic struggle with France made British adherence to neutral rights as defined by the Jefferson administration difficult to reconcile with survival, and that on the outcome of the conflict depended the preservation of the balance of power, which was the only safeguard, inadequate though it had always been, of any neutral rights—all of these considerations counted for very little against the rights America insistently advanced.

Unwilling to consider these rights in relation to a larger diplomatic constellation, Jefferson remained equally unwilling to consider the kinds of compromise that might have substantially eased, if not entirely resolved, the conflict with Great Britain. Such compromise was viewed as a betrayal not merely of interest but of "the laws of nature on the ocean" that interest presumably reflected. There was no room for normal diplomatic give and take in the position Jefferson came to embrace. For that position identified the pursuit of self-interest with the vindication of sacred right.

It was not only the maritime crisis with England that revealed these traits. They were equally apparent in the diplomacy of American territorial expansion. No chapter of American diplomacy would appear to lend itself less to the category of a morality tale than the diplomacy over the Floridas. From start to finish it was attended by threats made on behalf of what were, at best, dubious claims. Yet it is not so much the diplomatic tactics employed against Spain that are revealing but the moral judgment Jefferson made of those

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tactics (which had stopped short of the use of force). They reflected, he insisted, America's respect for the France of Napoleon and, of course, this nation's sense of forbearance even against a Spanish nation that had supposedly, in the course of the dispute over the Floridas, set a record in perfidy and injustice.

What may account for a diplomatic outlook that combined such disparate perspectives? In large measure, surely, the explanation must be found in the conviction that identified the nation's fate with the fate of freedom in the world. If the security and well-being of the United States were inseparable from the prospects of free government everywhere, as Jefferson was so deeply persuaded, it followed that American interests were invested with a sanctity that exempted them from the kind of compromise endemic to diplomacy. If America was the last, best hope for the cause of freedom in the world, it was apparent that the justice and rectitude of its diplomatic behavior followed by virtue of this historic role. The combination of universalism and parochialism is the result of a self-consciousness over role that forms a constant in the nation's history.

A belief in the justice of American behavior does not settle the issue of what that behavior should be. A conviction that the role of the nation is to promote the cause of liberty does not settle the issue of how that cause is to be served. Nor was there need to resolve this matter in the early history of the republic. Whether the United States should serve as an exemplar or a crusader on freedom's behalf could scarcely prove a meaningful question then, given the precarious position of the new nation and the modest power at its disposal. It is only in the twentieth century that this question has taken on a meaning and relevance it could not earlier possess.

The case for concluding that Jefferson intended the nation to serve in the role of exemplar of freedom rather than crusader for freedom may be summarized thus. Given what he saw as the conditions of other peoples and the circumstances marking their development, Jefferson became increasingly skeptical over the prospects for the spread of liberty. Freedom was a plant, he often observed, that could grow and flourish only in a favorable environment. That environment was present in America, but could it be found—or developed—elsewhere?

As Jefferson grew older, he entertained growing doubt.

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That doubt was not consistently adhered to even in later years; from time to time his innate optimism would have out. Still, his disillusionment over the course of the French Revolution ended the only real "enthusiasm" he ever entertained regarding the imminent prospects for liberty among the nations of Europe. Of the governments of Europe, he wrote to James Monroe in 1823, "All their energies are expended in the destruction of the labor, property and lives of their people."[14] Thus it was, thus it always had been and, Jefferson finally came close to believing, thus it always would be. A continent the nations of which were doomed—if only by virtue of their proximity—to never-ending rivalries and wars was one that also afforded small prospects for the development of free institutions.

Nor did he think these prospects any better among the peoples of this hemisphere. "What kind of government will they establish? How much liberty can they bear without intoxication?"[15] These questions Jefferson put to Alexander von Humboldt in 1811, at a time when the revolutionary movement in Latin America promised to result in several independent nations. The answer he eventually gave was pessimistic. While wars were the "natural state of man" in Europe, in Central and South America the new nations were made up of "priest-ridden" peoples.[16] Writing in 1818 to John Adams, who shared his views on this matter, Jefferson observed that while the peoples to the south "will succeed against Spain . . . the dangerous enemy is within their own breasts. Ignorance and superstition will chain their minds and bodies under religious and military despotism."[17] At the same time, he went on to declare that "it is our duty to wish them independence and self-government, because they wish it themselves; and they have the right, and we none, to choose for themselves, and I wish, moreover, that our ideas may be erroneous, and theirs prove well founded."

Even if Jefferson had seen the world as being more receptive to the institutions of freedom than he did in his later years, there still would have remained strong reservations on his part

[14] Ford, *op. cit.*, vol. X, 256.

[15] Letter to Baron Alexander Von Humboldt, April 14, 1811, in Lipscomb and Bergh, *op. cit.*, vol. XIII, p. 34.

[16] See letter to Von Humboldt, Dec. 6, 1813, in Ford, *op. cit.*, vol. X, p. 430: "History, I believe, furnishes no example of a priest-ridden people maintaining a free civil government."

[17] Ford, *op. cit.*, vol. X, p. 107.

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to taking up the role of crusader for freedom. Any role that went beyond exemplar necessarily incurred the risk of war. But that risk in turn raised prospects—executive aggrandizement, debt, taxes and so on—that Jefferson believed were fatal to republican institutions. The role of the crusader was to change the world. Yet even for the powerful crusader, the effort to reform a world resistant to change thus raised the prospect of corruption. Jefferson's sensitivity to that prospect and the intensity of his desire to escape it were proverbial.

These considerations weigh heavily against any attempt to make of Jefferson the crusader for freedom in the world. And yet a case for doing just that can be plausibly made. There is to begin with the consideration that Jefferson did not consistently find the circumstances of American society so exceptional as to preclude their emulation elsewhere. In 1801, on the eve of his inauguration as president, he wrote to John Dickinson that "a just and solid republican government maintained here will be a standing monument and example for the aim and imitation of the people of other countries."[18] Although he did indeed become increasingly skeptical over the prospects for freedom elsewhere, his skepticism never quite overcame a deeper and congenital optimism. The experience of the French Revolution had been painful, in ways even shattering, but neither it nor subsequent events led Jefferson to abandon his deepest hopes and beliefs about the prospects for freedom. To John Adams he could write in 1816: "I steer my bark with Hope in the head, leaving Fear astern. My hopes indeed sometimes fail; but not oftener than the forebodings of the gloomy."[19] While declaring to one correspondent in 1820 that Europe was a region "where war seems to be the natural state of man,"[20] he could also write on the same day to Lafayette that he was still hopeful that "the disease of liberty is catching."[21]

Then too, there were very important reasons for not abandoning hope in the prospects for freedom in the world. If one did concede that these prospects were negligible, could liberty be secure even in this country? In a world that was ruled by

[18] Ford, *op. cit.*, vol. VIII, pp. 7–8.

[19] Lipscomb and Bergh, *op. cit.*, vol. XIV, p. 467.

[20] Letter to David Bailey Warden, Dec. 26, 1820, in Ford, *op. cit.*, vol. X, p. 171.

[21] Letter to Lafayette, Dec. 26, 1820, in Ford, *op. cit.*, vol. X, p. 179. Also see Jefferson to Lafayette, Oct. 28, 1822, in *ibid.*, p. 227: "I will hazard . . . but the single expression of assurance that this general insurrection of the world against all tyrants will ultimately prevail by pointing the object of government to the happiness of the people and not merely to that of their self-constituted governors."

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arbitrary power, the fate of free institutions in America would never be quite assured, however much we might try to isolate ourselves from the world. For monarchy meant war and, despite our best efforts, Europe's wars might always spread their deadly virus to this hemisphere. Only a world made up of republics would be a world where peace was truly possible. The great and indispensable step toward promoting a lasting peace, as Madison had written in 1792 in an essay on "Universal Peace," was the replacement of monarchical governments by governments that rested on consent.[22] A world made safe for republican government was a world made safe for, as well as by, peace.

The logic of arbitrary power was not only that of war, it was also the logic of a closed system. By contrast, the logic of republics was not only that of peace, but of an open system. The enduring issue that thrust an unwilling Jefferson onto the world was not political or ideological but commercial. Persuaded that the health and well-being of the American republic required an open—that is, free—trading system, Jefferson also believed that he could isolate the commercial interest from the political entanglement he was determined to avoid. But events were to show that the insistence on preserving an open trading system entailed the need to intervene against those whose efforts were directed to keeping the system closed. It did so then just as it did so again in the years that led to American intervention in the First World War.

Certainly Jefferson never consciously contemplated casting the nation in the role of crusader. He did not do so in his own day and for the most apparent and compelling of reasons. But what of the day that he was sure would come, a day when America might "shake a rod over the heads of all" and do so with relative impunity? Why should it not do so then, if doing so might contribute to America's security and well-being while also striking a blow for the cause of liberty? It was one thing to reject "a war to reform Europe" and quite another to eschew "shaking a rod" over others' heads. The former implied a course of action that might always prove disastrous for us internally, a prospect that necessarily outweighed that of attempting to replace arbitrary power elsewhere with govern-

[22] "As the first step towards a cure, the government itself must be regenerated. Its will must be made subordinate to, or rather the same with, the will of the community." See Gaillard Hunt, ed., *The Writings of James Madison*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1906, vol. VI, p. 89.

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ment based on consent. The latter held out a far different course, one that promised reformation of the international system at but modest cost. Such a course was in the tradition of "peaceable coercion," and it is difficult to understand why Jefferson should reject it.

To the degree that Jefferson never abandoned his earlier conviction of America serving as an exemplar to the world, the temptation persisted to equate, at some point and in some circumstances, the role of exemplar with more than just a passive stance. The conventional contrast of the roles of exemplar and crusader has often obscured the affinity that may also exist between them. A marked self-consciousness about serving as an exemplar may well act, under the proper circumstances, as a standing temptation to go beyond that role. The same sentiments that find gratification or fulfillment by serving in the role of exemplar also sustain at some point the role of crusader.

On the issue of the nation's proper role in the world, then, Jefferson's legacy remains ultimately ambiguous. It is this ambiguity, among others, that lends Jefferson's name to such conflicting uses in the never-ending debate over the purposes of American foreign policy. Among the statesmen of the early republic, he is more responsible than any for warning of the hazards that must attend the role of crusader. Yet he is also the statesman more responsible than any for evoking the perennial attractions of this role.

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George F. Kennan

AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE

Editor's Note: As the Cold War intensified after the invasion of Korea in 1950, a few political thinkers sought to examine the kind of Soviet Union that might emerge from a general war, or even the overthrow of the communist regime. George F. Kennan, then on leave from the State Department, warned against a preoccupation with military solutions in addressing the broad question of "America and the Russian Future" in the April 1951 issue of Foreign Affairs. *Ambassador Kennan's point of departure was the Russia that existed before the Bolshevik Revolution; the collapse of that revolution in 1989 confronts the United States with the need to consider once again the long-term characteristics and traditions of the Russian state. Finding that Kennan's observations from 1951 hold perhaps even greater interest for current readers, we now republish excerpts from the original article.*

The very virulence with which Americans reject the outlook and practice of those who now hold power in the Kremlin implies in the strongest possible way the belief in, and desire for, an alternative—for some other Russian outlook and some other set of practices in Russia to take the place of those we know today. Yet we may be permitted to ask whether there is any clear image in our minds of what that outlook and those practices might be, and of the ways by which Americans might promote progress toward them.

What sort of Russia would we like to see before us, as our partner in the world community?

Perhaps the first thing to get straight here is the sort of Russia there is no use looking for. And such a Russia—the kind we may *not* look for—is easy to describe and envisage, for it would be a capitalistic and liberal-democratic one, with institutions closely resembling those of our own republic.

If we look first at the question of the economic system, we see at once that Russia has scarcely known private enterprise as we are familiar with it in this country. Even in pre-revolutionary times the Russian government always had a close hold on a number of economic activities, notably transportation and the armament industry, which in our country have traditionally, or at least normally, been private. There were, to be sure, in the earlier period of Russian history, distinguished families of private Russian entrepreneurs, famous for their bold commercial pioneering in the undeveloped areas of the

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realm. But by and large indigenous private capital remained more conspicuous in the exchange than in the production of commodities. The great domestic business was trade, rather than manufacture. And business did not stand in so high repute as in the West. There was a traditional, and deeply Russian, merchant class; but it was not generally noted or respected for breadth of outlook or for any enlightened concept of its own responsibility to society. The portrayals of it in Russian literature are generally negative and depressing. The members of the landed gentry, whose tastes and prejudices were authoritative in the social field, often looked down on business, and themselves tended to avoid participation in it. The Russian language, in fact, never acquired a word comparable to our expression "businessman"; it had only the word for "merchant," and this term did not always have a pleasant connotation.

As Russia became industrialized, in a sudden rush of activity which took place around the turn of the century, there were clearly apparent the absence of an adequate tradition of responsibility and restraint on the part of the capital-owning class and a general lack of preparedness, on the part of the state and of society generally, to cope with the new strains. This industrial development, proceeding largely on a basis of individual enterprise rather than of widely distributed corporative ownership, was marked by sudden accumulations of fortunes in the hands of individuals and families not always well prepared for such affluence. Often the mode of expenditure of wealth appeared to other people as little creditable as the means by which it had been accumulated. Individual capitalists and workers lived in close proximity—indeed, many of the factory owners lived in the compounds of their factories. Such conditions often bore greater resemblance to the pattern of early Industrial Revolution capitalism, as Marx had described it, than to conditions in advanced Western countries. This fact may well have had something to do with the success of Marxism in Russia. The Russian industrial capitalist was generally visible in the flesh, and as often as not he had the rotundity, and sometimes (not always) the vulgarity and callousness, of the capitalist of the early communist caricature.

All these things go to show that whatever private enterprise may have been in tsarist Russia, it had not yet come to hold anything resembling the respect and significance in the eyes of the people that it had acquired in the older mercantile coun-

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tries by the beginning of this century. Perhaps with time it would have. The prospects were steadily improving. Examples of efficient and progressive industrial management existed in Russia before the revolution, and were increasing.

We see that there is no Russian national understanding which would permit the early establishment in Russia of anything resembling the private enterprise system as we know it. This is not to say that some such understanding will not some day develop. It may, if circumstances are favorable. But it will never be a system identical to our own. And no one will usefully be able to force the pace, particularly no one from the outside.

Turning to the political side, we could not expect to see the emergence of a liberal-democratic Russia along American patterns. This cannot be too strongly emphasized. It does not mean that future Russian regimes will necessarily be unliberal. There is no liberal tradition finer than the strain which existed in the Russia of the past. Many Russian individuals and groups of this day are deeply imbued with that tradition, and will do all in their power to make it the dominant element in the Russian future. In that effort, we may wish them well without reservation. But we will be doing them no favor if we permit ourselves to expect too much to happen too fast, or look to them to produce anything resembling our own institutions. These Russian liberals will have no easy road to walk. They will find in their country a younger generation that has known nothing but Soviet power and has been trained to think subconsciously in the terms of that power even when it has resented and hated it. Many features of the Soviet system will stick, if only for the reason that everything has been destroyed which might seem to have constituted an alternative to them. And some features will deserve to stick, for no system that lasts over decades is entirely without merits. Any program of government for a future Russia will have to adjust itself to the fact that there has been this Soviet interlude, and that it has left its positive marks as well as its negative ones. And no members of future Russian governments will be aided by doctrinaire and impatient well-wishers in the West who look to them, just because they are seeking a decent alternative to what we know today as Bolshevism, to produce in short order a replica of the Western democratic dream.

Above all, it behooves us Americans, in this connection, to repress, and if possible to extinguish once and for all, our

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inveterate tendency to judge others by the extent to which they contrive to be like ourselves. In our relations with the people of Russia it is important, as it has never been important before, for us to recognize that our institutions may not have relevance for people living in other climes and conditions and that there can be social structures and forms of government in no way resembling our own and yet not deserving of censure. There is no reason why this realization should shock us. In 1831 de Tocqueville, writing from the United States, correctly observed: "The more I see of this country the more I admit myself penetrated with this truth: that there is nothing absolute in the theoretical value of political institutions, and that their efficiency depends almost always on the original circumstances and the social conditions of the people to whom they are applied."

Forms of government are forged mainly in the fire of practice, not in the vacuum of theory. They respond to national character and to national realities. There is great good in the Russian national character, and the realities of that country scream out today for a form of administration more considerate of that good. Let us hope that it will come. But when Soviet power has run its course, or when its personalities and spirit begin to change (for the ultimate outcome could be one or the other), let us not hover nervously over the people who come after, applying litmus papers daily to their political complexions to find out whether they answer to our concept of "democratic." Give them time; let them be Russians; let them work out their internal problems in their own manner. The ways by which peoples advance toward dignity and enlightenment in government are things that constitute the deepest and most intimate processes of national life. There is nothing less understandable to foreigners, nothing in which foreign interference can do less good. There are, as we shall see presently, certain features of the future Russian state that *are* of genuine concern to the outside world. But these do not include the form of government itself, provided only that it keep within certain well-defined limits, beyond which lies totalitarianism.

II

What, then, do they include? To what kind of a Russia may we reasonably and justly look forward? What attributes are we, as responsible members of the world community, entitled to look for in the personality of a foreign state, and of Russia in particular?

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We may look, in the first place, for a Russian government which, in contrast to the one we know today, would be tolerant, communicative and forthright in its relations with other states and peoples. It would not take the ideological position that its own purposes cannot finally prosper unless all systems of government not under its control are subverted and eventually destroyed. It would dispense with this paranoiac suspiciousness we know so well, and consent to view the outside world, ourselves included, as it really is and always has been: neither entirely good nor entirely bad, neither entirely to be trusted nor entirely to be mistrusted (if only for the simple reason that "trust" has only a relative significance in foreign affairs). It would consent to recognize that this outside world is not really preoccupied with diabolical plots to invade Russia and inflict injuries on the Russian people. Viewing the outside world in this way, the statesmen of a future Russia could approach it with tolerance and forbearance and practical good humor, defending their national interests as statesmen must, but not assuming that these can be furthered only at the expense of the interests of others, and vice versa.

No one asks for a naïve and childlike confidence; no one asks for a fatuous enthusiasm for all that is foreign; no one asks that the genuine and legitimate differences of interest which have always marked, and will always continue to mark, the relations between peoples be ignored. We must expect Russian national interests not only to continue to exist but to be vigorously and confidently asserted. But in a regime that we could recognize as an improvement over what we know today we would expect that this would be done in an atmosphere of emotional sanity and moderation: that the foreign representative would not continue to be viewed and treated as one possessed of the devil; that it would be conceded that there might be such a thing as innocent and legitimate curiosity about a foreign country, which could be permitted to be gratified without fatal detriment to that country's national life; that it would be recognized that there might be individual foreign business aspirations which did not aim at the destruction of the Russian state; that it would be admitted, finally, that persons desirous of traveling across international borders might have, and are even apt to have, motives other than "espionage, sabotage and diversion"—such trivial motives, in fact, as the enjoyment of travel or the peculiar impulses that move people to wish to visit relatives from time to time. In

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short, we may ask that the grotesque system of anachronisms known as the Iron Curtain be lifted from the world, and that the Russian people, who have so much to give and so much to receive as mature members of the world community, cease to be insulted by a policy that treats them as children, too immature to have normal contact with the adult world, too undependable to be let out alone.

Secondly, while recognizing that the internal system of government is in all essential respects Russia's own business and may well depart drastically from our own, we are entitled to expect that the exercise of governmental authority will stop short of that fairly plain line beyond which lies totalitarianism. Specifically, we may expect that any regime which claims to contrast favorably with that which we have before us today will refrain from enslaving its own labor—industrial and agricultural. There is a reason for this: a reason even more solid than the shock we experience at witnessing the sickening details of this type of oppression. When a regime sets out to enslave its own working population in this way, it requires for the maintenance of the arrangement so vast an apparatus of coercion that the imposition of the Iron Curtain follows almost automatically. No ruling group likes to admit that it can govern its people only by regarding and treating them as criminals. For this reason there is always a tendency to justify internal oppression by pointing to the menacing iniquity of the outside world. And the outside world must be portrayed, in these circumstances, as very iniquitous indeed—iniquitous to the point of caricature. Nothing short of this will do.

The third thing we may hope from a new Russia is that it will refrain from pinning an oppressive yoke on other peoples who have the instinct and the capacity for national self-assertion. In mentioning this matter, we are entering upon a delicate subject. There is no more difficult and treacherous one in the entire lexicon of political issues. In the relationships between the Great Russian people and nearby peoples outside the confines of the old tsarist empire, as well as non-Russian national groups that were included within that empire, there is no conceivable pattern of borders or institutional arrangements which, measured against the concepts prevailing to date, would not arouse violent resentments and involve genuine injustices in many quarters. If people in that part of the world are going to go on thinking of national borders and minority problems in the way that they have thought of them

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in the past and continue to think of them today, Americans would do well to avoid incurring any responsibility for views or positions on these subjects; for any specific solutions they may advocate will some day become a source of great bitterness against them, and they will find themselves drawn into controversies that have little or nothing to do with the issue of human freedom.

What is plainly necessary, and the only solution worthy of American encouragement, is the rise of such a spirit among all the peoples concerned as would give to border and institutional arrangements in that troubled area an entirely new, and greatly reduced, significance. Whether that spirit will actually arise, we cannot tell. And precisely because we cannot tell this, Americans should be extremely careful in committing their support or encouragement to any specific arrangements in this sphere; for we cannot know what they mean until there is clarity as to the spirit which will underlie them. How can we know whether a given national group will require an independent status, or a federal status, some special brand of local self-government, or no special status at all, until we know something about the psychological climate in which these arrangements would operate? There are peoples of non-Russian ethnological character on the borders of the Great Russian family whose economic existence is intimately bound up with that of the Great Russians. The future should see a minimum of disruption of these economic ties, and that in itself would normally warrant a close political connection. But its nature would always have to depend on what sort of attitudes prevailed on both sides of the line: on the degree of tolerance and insight which the peoples involved (and not only the Russian people) might be able to bring to the establishment of these relationships.

We are all agreed, for example, that the Baltic countries should never again be forced against the innermost feelings of their peoples into any relationship whatsoever with a Russian state; but they would themselves be foolish to reject close and cooperative arrangements with a tolerant, nonimperialistic Russia, which genuinely wished to overcome the unhappy memories of the past and to place her relations to the Baltic peoples on a basis of real respect and disinterestedness. The Ukraine, again, deserves full recognition for the peculiar genius and abilities of its people and for the requirements and possibilities of its development as a linguistic and cultural

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entity; but the Ukraine is economically as much a part of Russia as Pennsylvania is a part of the United States. Who can say what the final status of the Ukraine should be unless he knows the character of the Russia to which the adjustment will have to be made? As for the satellite states: they must, and will, recover their full independence; but they will not assure themselves of a stable and promising future if they make the mistake of proceeding from feelings of revenge and hatred toward the Russian people who have shared their tragedy, and if they try to base that future on the exploitation of the initial difficulties of a well-intentioned Russian regime struggling to overcome the legacy of Bolshevism.

There is no use underestimating the bitterness of these territorial problems, even assuming the utmost of goodwill and relaxed tolerance on the part of the peoples concerned. Some of the dispositions taken at the close of the Second World War (made even worse today by the deliberate policy on the part of certain governments to turn the provisional prematurely into the permanent) represent distinctly unhealthy situations, not conducive to a peaceful future. Some day these dispositions must be changed; and it will admittedly require tact on the part of all concerned, and forbearance bordering on the miraculous, if these changes are to be effected without a further compounding of violence and bitterness. For that unhappy situation the peoples of Europe have to thank the calculating cynicism of the Bolshevik leaders and the amiable indulgence of the Western Powers.

These, then, are the things for which an American well-wisher may hope from the Russia of the future: that she lift forever the Iron Curtain, that she recognize certain limitations to the internal authority of government, and that she abandon, as ruinous and unworthy, the ancient game of imperialist expansion and oppression. If she is not prepared to do these things, she will hardly be distinguishable from what we have before us today, and to hasten the arrival of such a Russia would not be worth the care or thought of a single American. If she is prepared to do these things, then Americans will not need to concern themselves more deeply with her nature and purposes; the basic demands of a more stable world order will then have been met, and the area in which a foreign people can usefully have thoughts and suggestions will have been filled.

National greatness is a difficult thing to define. Every nation

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is made up of individuals; and among individuals, as is known, there is no uniformity. Some are charming, others irritating; some are honest, others not exactly so; some are strong, others weak; some command admiration, others, by general agreement, are anything but admirable. This is true in our own country; it is true in Russia. Just what, in these circumstances, national greatness consists of, is hard to say. Certainly it rarely consists of those qualities in which a people thinks itself great; for in nations, as in individuals, the outstanding virtues are generally not the ones for which we fancy ourselves distinguished.

Yet that there *is* such a thing as national greatness is clear; and that the Russian people possess it in high degree is beyond question. They are a people whose progress out of darkness and squalor has been a painful one, marked by enormous sufferings and punctuated by heartrending setbacks. Nowhere on the face of the globe has the tiny flame of faith and dignity and charity of man flickered more precariously under the winds that tore at it. Yet it has never gone out; it is not extinguished today even in the heart of the Russian land; and whoever studies the struggle of the Russian spirit through the ages can only bare his head in admiration before those Russian people who kept it alight through their sacrifices and suffering.

These, then, are the reflections which give the writer, for one, faith that if the necessary alternatives are kept before the Russian people, in the form of the existence elsewhere on this planet of a civilization which is decent, hopeful and purposeful, the day must come—soon or late, and whether by gradual process or otherwise—when that terrible system of power which has set a great people's progress back for decades and has lain like a shadow over the aspirations of all civilization will be distinguishable no longer as a living reality, but only as something surviving partly in recorded history and partly in the sediment of constructive, organic change which every great human upheaval, however unhappy its other manifestations, manages to deposit on the shelf of time.

But how those changes are to come about is something which cannot be foreseen. If there are, indeed, such things as laws of political development, they will surely play a part here; but then they would be the laws of development peculiar to the phenomenon of modern totalitarianism, and these have not yet been adequately studied and understood. Whether such

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laws exist or not, developments will be modified both by national character and by the tremendous part which the fortuitous unquestionably plays in the shaping of human events.

These things being so, we must admit with respect to the future of government in Russia, we see "as through a glass, darkly." Superficial evidences would not seem to leave much room for hope that the changes we would wish to see in the attitudes and practices of government in Moscow could come about without violent breaks in the continuity of power, that is, without the overthrow of the system. But we cannot be sure of this. Stranger things have happened—though not much stranger. And, in any case, it is not our business to prejudge the question. It is not necessary for us, merely in order to shape our own conduct in a way conducive to our own interests, to decide what we admittedly cannot really know. We should allow, here, for all possibilities, and should exclude none. The main thing is that we keep clearly in mind the image of what we would like to see in the personality of Russia as an actor on the world stage, and let that be our guide in all our dealings with Russian political factions, including both that which is in power and those which are in opposition to it. And if it should turn out to be the will of fate that freedom should come to Russia by erosion from despotism rather than by the violent upthrust of liberty, let us be able to say that our policy was such as to favor it, and that we did not hamper it by preconception or impatience or despair.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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CONFLICTS UNENDING: THE UNITED STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES. By Richard N. Haass. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, 184 pp. $22.50.

This well-reasoned argument should receive special attention because of the author's current position as director for Near East and South Asian Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council. The thesis is that regional conflicts are not subject to resolution until conditions are sufficiently ripe for diplomacy to work. Haass buttresses his thesis with five case studies including the Middle East, India and Pakistan, and Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Although these conflicts are often cited as candidates for major diplomatic initiatives, Haass argues that they are not "ripe" for a successful outcome. A number of preconditions for "ripeness" are identified by the author. The argument in some ways goes against the optimistic grain of Americans, yet is also very much in keeping with the current low-key atmosphere in Washington.

GETTING TO THE TABLE: THE PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL PRENEGOTIATION. Edited by Janice Gross Stein. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989, 273 pp. $35.00 (paper, $12.95).

A fine companion to the book above, this volume looks at the conditions and processes that encourage parties to consider negotiation. Here the emphasis is simply on starting negotiations rather than the outcome, and the role of crisis avoidance or management becomes a key to this when there is a conjunction of threat and opportunity. The argument is that prenegotiation triggers, shapes and structures the negotiations that follow and contributes in important ways to the learning process. Together these two works make a significant contribution toward a broader theory of negotiation.

LORDS OF POVERTY: THE POWER, PRESTIGE, AND CORRUPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL AID BUSINESS. By Graham Hancock. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989, 234 pp. $17.95.

This is a rousing condemnation of the national and multilateral aid programs of the past forty years. But in focusing on the alleged misdeeds of the bureaucracy of development aid, rather than evaluating the effectiveness of the economic assistance programs, the journalist author lets pass an opportunity to write a more significant work. The allegations regarding the expense-account high life of officials at the U.N., the World Bank and elsewhere are deeply disturbing if true. Yet the reader's outrage is tempered by the author's failure to outline a plan for reform of the system and by his skimpy analysis of how to meet the continuing urgent needs of the less-developed countries.

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REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Edited by Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan. New York: Oxford, 1989, 430 pp. $50.00.

The past decade produced a marked increase in the number of refugees seeking a haven from war or economic or political oppression. The refugee flows often have foreign policy roots, and because of intractable regional conflicts are not amenable to easy solution through resettlement. They also place great economic burdens on host countries and can create security problems since refugee camps are often on disputed borders. The essays of this excellent book do more than describe the problem; they prescribe appropriate responses. Many of the authors have had direct experience with the U.N., government agencies or voluntary organizations. Clearly there is no "quick fix," but imaginative steps are carefully laid out.

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Jack Donnelly. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1989, 295 pp. $36.50 (paper, $12.95).

This wide-ranging book looks at all aspects of human rights, drawing upon political theory, sociology and international relations as well as international law. Cogently argued, it seeks to construct a theory of international human rights. The author deals successfully with two of the principal challenges to the notion of the universality of human rights: the argument that some non-Western societies are not subject to Western norms, and the claim that economic development may require the sacrifice of some human rights.

POWER, THE PRESS AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF FREEDOM. By Leonard R. Sussman. New York: Freedom House, 1990, 514 pp. $24.95.

Drawing on a lifetime of interest in international journalism, the author, former director of Freedom House, makes some pungent observations about the power of information. He has many concerns about the impediments to the free flow of information, especially in the Third World and in socialist societies. Imbued with optimism, he sees a new information age ahead based on Integrated Systems Digital Networks, which will make available easily and instantaneously all forms and types of news in the coming global village.

REINVENTING THE FUTURE: GLOBAL GOALS FOR THE 21st CENTURY. By Rushworth M. Kidder. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989, 194 pp. $17.95.

The dust jacket tells us that "there are many books about the future: only *Reinventing the Future* takes you there." But even well-written summaries of international conferences with distinguished participants, as is the case here, don't do that. The issues addressed include North-South economic development, East-West relations, environmental degradation and ethics. They are too complex, too numerous when looked at in detail, and require too much hard thought to be satisfactorily dealt with in the brief manner employed here.

TRYGVE LIE AND THE COLD WAR: THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUES PEACE, 1946–1953. By James Barros. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989, 445 pp. $37.00.

As the first secretary-general of the United Nations, Trygve Lie ran into

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many difficulties: the powers of the office were not established and he sought a broad conception of them, the East-West confrontation was at its height and this Norwegian had the confidence of neither camp. Barros approaches the man and his times in a thoroughly balanced and scholarly manner in this most impressive book. While sympathetic to his aims he faults Lie for being too political and incautious. Despite Lie's total commitment to the United Nations he is seen as having been "the wrong man, in the wrong job, at the wrong time."

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Gregory F. Treverton

MEETING GORBACHEV'S CHALLENGE: HOW TO BUILD DOWN THE NATO-WARSAW PACT CONFRONTATION. By Jonathan Dean. New York: St. Martin's, 1990, 360 pp. $45.00 (paper, $16.95).

Dean, a former U.S. conventional arms control negotiator, knows his subject better than anyone; his historical chapters and appendices provide a wealth of useful background. His call for a sharp conventional arms build-down, cast against the rush of events since his writing, raises sharply the question of whether the bloc-to-bloc arms control format that seemed promising when the Russian bear was strong still makes sense when the bear is weak, the Warsaw Pact crumbling and East European states eager to be rid of Soviet forces.

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND WESTERN POLICY. Edited by Gregory Flynn. New York: Routledge, 1989, 418 pp.

This thoughtful book takes up the question of why Western policy, in particular American nuclear policy, has seemed so disconnected from understandings of Soviet doctrine—first expecting Soviet doctrine to converge with American, then reacting sharply when it didn't. It is food for thought as military relations change again, perhaps more than ever before in the postwar era.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TABLE: THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. Edited by Michael Mandelbaum. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990, 209 pp. $16.95 (paper).

While Flynn's authors look at American images of Soviet doctrine, Mandelbaum's review American assessments of Soviet arms control practice. They do so in careful case studies, ranging from the test ban in the 1950s to intermediate nuclear forces in the 1980s, each case having been discussed with actual participants. Their conclusions also contain intriguing pointers for the future; some reinforce conventional wisdom (political considerations loom larger in Soviet calculations than in American), some cut across it (Soviet negotiators have tended to make more concessions in pursuit of agreement).

THE NUCLEAR SEDUCTION: WHY THE ARMS RACE DOESN'T MATTER—AND WHAT DOES. By William A. Schwartz and Charles Derber. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, 294 pp. $25.00.

The authors, part of a Boston antinuclear group, set out to answer the establishment across town, Harvard's project on *Living With Nuclear Weap-*

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ons. They discovered that Bernard Brodie was right all along—the dominant fact about nuclear weapons is how awesome they are—and so both the nuclear enthusiasts and disarmers make the mistake of concentrating on changes in weaponry that are marginal, not on the political conflicts behind the weapons. Their conclusion is fodder for debate: nuclear horror does not make the use of nuclear weapons unthinkable even once conflict begins; rather, "the political conflict and violence raging around the world . . . could one day spin out of control and set off a nuclear cataclysm."

NATO AT FORTY. Edited by James R. Golden and others. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1989, 318 pp. $35.00.
IN DEFENSE OF NATO: THE ALLIANCE'S ENDURING VALUE. By Keith A. Dunn. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1989, 114 pp. $23.95.

The Golden volume, a product of West Point's social science department, brings together a distinguished group of contributors to look forward and backward. Their speculations now look timid, but their background remains valuable. The same can be said of Keith Dunn's brief for the primacy of Europe in American national security planning.

THE TWO GERMAN STATES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. Edited by F. Stephen Larrabee. New York: St. Martin's (with the Institute for East-West Security Studies), 1989, 330 pp. $39.95 (paper, $15.95).

The year 1989 embarrassed many students and analysts of Europe, and the authors of this volume are especially vulnerable. Yet if their answers were often wrong, the authors did pose the right questions before other people did—relocating the center of Europe's future in Germany and asking what reform in the Eastern bloc meant for the G.D.R.

WALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DIVIDED BERLIN. By Peter Wyden. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989, 762 pp. $27.50.

The opening of the Berlin Wall, which came just as his book was published, surprised Wyden as much as the rest of us, but his book is little the less absorbing for its lack of foresight. For those interested in policy, his insights about the building of the wall itself, especially actions within the East German regime, are fresh. For others it is a gripping human account of a city split in half, written by a native Berliner and only slightly marred by some casual prose and loose editing.

PUBLIC OPINION AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN WESTERN EUROPE. By Richard C. Eichenberg. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1989, 293 pp. $29.95.

Pollsters find paradoxes in public opinion that would not surprise security specialists—for instance, publics have liked NATO but not its strategy—but these same specialists often fall prey to casual uses of public opinion data. This meticulous book seeks to bridge those gaps, looking at opinion in Britain, Holland, France and West Germany; it produces conclusions about how attitudes have changed—and how they haven't—that are subtle.

THE UNKNOWN CIA: MY THREE DECADES WITH THE AGENCY. By Russell Jack Smith. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989, 221 pp. $18.95.

This is an amiable memoir of a career in what, as Richard Helms put it,

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the CIA "was really set up to do"—patient analysis in Washington, not derring-do abroad. Smith was the deputy director for intelligence of what he—and every other ex-professional, no matter how disaffected—calls "CIA"; outsiders say "the CIA." He does not propose to be analytic about the craft of analysis, but he gives us a rich feel for workaday life inside intelligence, and he rails gently against (the) CIA's deformation by covert operations.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. By John H. Jackson. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989, 417 pp. $45.00.

This excellent book is at once an authoritative treatise, a comprehensive, clear and quite detailed reference, and an informed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the international trading system. Focusing on GATT, it also gives major attention to American trade law and practice, including such troubling matters as major ambiguities and the way the fair trade laws have become a dangerous morass. As the international system is clearly "defective," Professor Jackson of the University of Michigan Law School says we must "worry . . . whether the 'trade constitution' can stand up to the stresses it is likely to face during the next few decades." He makes a number of suggestions as to how it can be strengthened.

U.S. PROTECTIONISM AND THE WORLD DEBT CRISIS. By Edward John Ray. Westport (CT): Quorum Books, 1989, 250 pp. $45.00.

Professor Ray of Ohio State University reminds Americans that if they want to do something to relieve the debt burden of developing countries they can help by reducing trade barriers. He shows that measures already taken have lost much of their potential value through concessions to domestic American industries and gives some persuasive arguments as to why things should be different in the future.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH. By David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 330 pp. $29.95.

No one doubts the economic importance of science and technology but, as the authors gently put it, the "factors that lead to differences among nations and firms with respect to innovative performance are not well understood." Their method of digging into these problems is largely historical, using American—and to some extent British—experience since the mid-nineteenth century and stressing the changes since World War II, notably in government help and the internationalization of business. Differences abound among countries, time periods, industries and firms, so the voluminous data and often fascinating analyses do not yield clear and simple conclusions. Doubts are thrown on many common prescriptions for policy by this fine study, which is worth far more than the exhortations that have become so frequent.

ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION. By Alice H. Amsden. New York: Oxford, 1989, 400 pp. $29.95.

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"Korea is an example of a country that grew very fast and yet violated the canons of conventional wisdom." Instead of liberalization, entrepreneurship, export specialization and the play of market forces, Professor Amsden of the Harvard Business School traces Korea's success to strong government that gave large firms protection and support in return for good use of imported technology and cheap labor. Her findings—supported by a look at several major industries—not only give a new picture of Korea but challenge much conventional economic teaching about development.

BENEATH THE MIRACLE: LABOR SUBORDINATION IN THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM. By Frederic C. Deyo. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, 273 pp. $30.00.

This pioneering study does much to explain the "continued stagnation in the power and effectiveness of organized labor" in South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. Similarities and differences are attributed in large part to the structure of the economies as well as political and cultural factors. There are comparisons with several Latin American countries, but nothing is said about Japan. Professor Deyo is not immune to using jargon but he explains his terminology clearly. A long bibliography and good tables add to the value of the book.

THE EUROPEAN PAYMENTS UNION: FINANCIAL DIPLOMACY IN THE 1950s. By Jacob J. Kaplan and Günther Schleiminger. New York: Clarendon Press/Oxford, 1989, 396 pp.

The EPU (1950–58) was a major step toward West European integration, an essential factor in expanding trade among countries receiving Marshall Plan aid and a key factor in making their currencies convertible. Using an immense collection of documents plus interviews, and sometimes drawing on their own recollection as participants, the American and German authors have produced the authoritative history of this interesting and important effort. Their valuable and detailed account covers not only negotiations and operations but the problems of major countries and the constant serious disputes, not least within the U.S. government.

THE WORLD BANK AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE. By Philippe Le Prestre. Cranbury (NJ): Susquehanna University Press, 1989, 263 pp. $36.50.

Since 1970 the World Bank has used ecological criteria in considering loans but, at least until recently, this has not helped very much to improve the environment in developing countries. Why this is so, and how the World Bank has tried to cope with negative pressures, are systematically examined in this valuable study by Professor Le Prestre of the University of Quebec. The book will be essential groundwork for the new writing that an uncertain future will bring to this field.

THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF MINERALS: CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE TRADE. Edited by David G. Haglund. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989, 304 pp. $30.00.

A major producer and exporter of some minerals but dependent on imports for crucial supplies of others, Canada finds itself on several sides of many resource issues. These careful studies by Canadian academics break

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some new ground as they look into a number of key issues especially concerning Canadian governmental policies and, to some extent, relations with the United States.

INDUSTRY AND POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: TOWARD THE THIRD REPUBLIC. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. Ithaca (NY): Cornell University Press, 1989, 363 pp. $49.50 (paper, $16.95).

Most of this valuable and original book is made up of studies by German academics on changes in major West German industries during the postwar period. The best chapters are the most detailed and concrete, since the processes of adaptation are subtle and complex, involving new technology, industrial organization, foreign competition, labor-management relations, government help and hindrance, and the pressures of environmental and social movements. To draw conclusions from this dense and sometimes convoluted book is not easy, but this task is bravely undertaken by the editor, a professor at Cornell, in two interesting chapters that relate change to continuity and existing institutions and try to look ahead.

THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. By Adam Zwass. Armonk (NY): Sharpe, 1989, 269 pp. $45.00.

This first-rate book, by a Polish economist who was in the Comecon secretariat for five years in the 1960s and has since watched Eastern Europe closely from Vienna, provides an analytical narrative of the organization's work from the beginning to the early Gorbachev years. Although it deals with many subjects, including Soviet domination, the relation of Comecon to the Warsaw Pact and the different conditions in the member countries, the book never loses sight of the fundamental difficulties that have limited cooperation and stood in the way of real integration. As the story ends, in 1987, the one-time insider wonders if perestroika will lead to more divergence among the national economic systems or to a healthy emphasis on economic aims and equality.

REMAKING THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIALISM: CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Victor Nee and David Stark. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, 405 pp. $48.50 (paper, $13.95).

Economic reforms in China and Eastern Europe have undermined much past thinking about state socialism. These papers represent some serious, though often piecemeal, efforts to find new models and approaches.

THE SOVIET BLOC AND THE THIRD WORLD: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EAST-SOUTH RELATIONS. Edited by Brigitte H. Schulz and William W. Hansen. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1989, 246 pp. $34.50 (paper).

Changes in the economic performance and perspectives of the socialist countries of Europe and the developing world have stimulated a group of academics from North America and Eastern and Western Europe to make new analyses of a range of economic issues. In the process they produce a number of interesting ideas but no general agreement.

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE DECADE AHEAD. Edited by William Brock and Robert Hormats. New York: Norton/The American Assembly, 1990, 264 pp.

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The admirably long and broad view of key issues of the world economy, plus the experience and sophistication of the authors, make most of these papers eminently worth reading.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THE REAGAN PARADOX: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980s. By Coral Bell. New Brunswick (NJ): Rutgers University Press, 1990, 182 pp. $30.00 (paper, $11.95).

For three decades Coral Bell, perspicacious Australian analyst, has been writing pithy studies of American foreign policy. Here she elaborates on the many gaps between the ideological, bellicose declaratory policies of the Reagan years and the pragmatic, cautious operational policy. In almost every sector the results of the Reagan foreign policy by 1988 were at odds with the words of the early years of the administration. Future historians will have to tackle the question of how much this was a matter of deliberate personal decisions on the part of Reagan.

RICHARD MILHOUS NIXON: THE RISE OF AN AMERICAN POLITICIAN. By Roger Morris. New York: Henry Holt, 1989, 1005 pp. $29.95.

Roger Morris has written a first-rate biography of Richard Nixon up to the election of 1952 when he became vice president. The book is especially strong on the politics of California during Nixon's apprenticeship, and in analyzing Nixon as the product of time and place.

LOST VICTORY: A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF AMERICA'S SIXTEEN-YEAR INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM. By William Colby, with James McCargar. Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989, 391 pp. $22.95.

Much of the author's distinguished career in the CIA involved Vietnam—both as an officer in the field and high official in Washington. In this passionate memoir he argues that a stable noncommunist South Vietnam could have been established had not the United States toppled President Ngo Dinh Diem, if more sustained effort had been devoted to providing security for the villagers, and if the United States had been able to follow through on the defeat of the Vietcong's Tet Offensive in 1968. Maybe—maybe not.

HOW PRESIDENTS TEST REALITY: DECISIONS ON VIETNAM, 1954 AND 1965. By John P. Burke and Fred I. Greenstein. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989, 339 pp. $29.95.

Two political scientists, drawing on once-secret documentation, reconstruct, compare and analyze how President Eisenhower decided in 1954 not to commit American forces to Vietnam, and how President Johnson decided the contrary in 1965. While cautioning against too theoretical an approach to presidential decision-making, they see positive lessons in Eisenhower's structured advisory system and negative ones in Johnson's improvisation. The fact that the authors see the 1954 decision as sound and the 1965 one as disastrous may shape their conclusions. A stimulating book.

VIETNAM NOW: A CASE FOR NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH HANOI. By John LeBoutillier. New York: Praeger, 1989, 144 pp. $18.95.

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The author, once a very conservative member of Congress, argues his case for normalization cogently with an eye to bringing the vexatious POW/MIA issue to a satisfactory conclusion. He also believes diplomatic relations with Vietnam will assist "longer term American interests . . . in winning the peaceful battle against Moscow."

POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE MIDDLE OPTIONS. By John David Orme. New York: St. Martin's, 1989, 219 pp. $45.00 (paper, $16.95).

After demolishing the cliché that the United States has consistently supported repressive right-wing regimes in the Third World, the author surveys the mixed results of other options followed in dealing with unstable regimes: reformist intervention, encouragement of liberalization, a negotiated political solution and conciliation.

ROOSEVELT AND MARSHALL: PARTNERS IN POLITICS AND WAR. By Thomas Parrish. New York: Morrow, 1989, 608 pp. $25.00.

Although specialists in the history of World War II will find no strikingly new insights, this double-focus study of the president and his chief of staff is a fine anecdotal introduction to the political-military course of the war—a tribute to both, but especially to Marshall.

THE BORROWED YEARS, 1938–1941: AMERICA ON THE WAY TO WAR. By Richard M. Ketchum. New York: Random House, 1989, 896 pp. $29.95.

This is an engrossing, beautifully written popular history intertwined with autobiography (the author was a Yale undergraduate at the time). Readers who lived through those years will know that Ketchum has it right.

AFTERMATH OF WAR: AMERICANS AND THE REMAKING OF JAPAN, 1945–1952. By Howard B. Schonberger. Kent (OH): Kent State University Press, 1989, 347 pp. $26.00 (paper, $16.50).

American policy toward occupied Japan was not, as myth would have it, simply an extension of the mind and personality of General Douglas MacArthur. It was, as this excellent study demonstrates, shaped by an array of people representing conflicting viewpoints and different segments of American society and government. The book's chapters, all deeply researched in American sources, deal with MacArthur, Joseph C. Grew, T. A. Bisson, James S. Killen, Harry F. Kern, William H. Draper, Jr., Joseph M. Dodge and John Foster Dulles.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS IN THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES, 1942–1945. By Barry M. Katz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989, 251 pp. $27.50.

This lively book is a highly selective study of some of the work of the Research and Analysis Division of the Office of Strategic Studies in which many able academics made real contributions to the war effort. Instead of covering the entire very wide range of R&A activities it concentrates on those of a few: émigré Germans (including Marxists and enemy aliens); German historians in the classical mold and the young Americans they worked with who became leaders of the postwar profession; economists trying to devise rational methods of choosing bombing targets; Soviet experts conducting the first true area studies in the United States. One may

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quarrel with some of Katz's views, but he has provided a useful and appealing bit of history. William E. Diebold, Jr.

AMERICAN LABOR AND POSTWAR ITALY, 1943–1953: A STUDY OF COLD WAR POLITICS. By Ronald L. Filippelli. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989, 288 pp. $32.50.

A well-researched account of how the U.S. government, with the enthusiastic support of the American Federation of Labor, worked to undermine the influence of communists in the Italian labor movement and, as an unintended consequence, weakened labor in general as a political force. The subfield of the labor dimension of U.S. foreign policy needs more studies like this one.

THE LONE STAR: THE LIFE OF JOHN CONNALLY. By James Reston, Jr. New York: Harper & Row, 1989, 691 pp. $25.00.

Texas breeds politicians and economic buccaneers of mythic power and capacity for failure. This robust biography traces the rise and fall of John Connally: his intimate association with Lyndon Johnson, his migration to the Nixon camp, his passion for the big gain, then his bankruptcy Texas-style. If LBJ's nemesis was Vietnam, Connally's was overextension on risky ventures. The lives of both are symbolic for much American history in the second half of the twentieth century.

ARMAND HAMMER: THE UNTOLD STORY. By Steve Weinberg. Boston: Little, Brown, 1989, 512 pp. $22.95.

Armand Hammer, born in the United States in 1898 of Russian-born parents, has been for seventy years a unique player in Soviet-American relations. The details of his entrepreneurial adventures and his special access to Soviet leaders, from Lenin to Gorbachev, have been obscured in myth and calculated self-publicity. This biography has not answered all the questions, but it is an admirable effort that tells more about the subject than any other source.

RIGHT PLACES, RIGHT TIMES. By Hedley Donovan. New York: Henry Holt, 1989, 463 pp. $27.95.

An entertaining autobiography by a most successful journalist: Rhodes scholar from Minnesota; Washington reporter; naval intelligence officer; rapid rise in the empire of Henry Luce, culminating as editor in chief of Time, Inc. Good common sense about "managing the unmanageable," i.e., writers.

The Western Hemisphere

Abraham F. Lowenthal

CROSSROADS: CONGRESS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AND CENTRAL AMERICA. By Cynthia J. Arnson. New York: Pantheon, 1989, 275 pp. $13.95 (paper).

A comprehensive, informative and clearly written account of the Washington politics of policymaking toward Central America in the 1980s, with a particular focus on the seemingly endless struggle between President Reagan and Congress. Herself a participant in the debate as a foreign policy aide to Congressman George Miller (D-CA), the author details how

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the stakes rose until the repeated votes over military aid and other aid to the Nicaraguan contras became the touchstone both of foreign policy prerogatives and of competing worldviews. "In both its ideological orientation to Nicaraguan policy and its practical attitude toward congressional involvement in policy formation, the Reagan administration operated without regard for a domestic consensus over the ends and means of policy and without exercising the restraint that should have been warranted by the absence of consensus." An illuminating study.

LOS ECONOMISTAS Y EL PRESIDENTE PINOCHET. By Arturo Fontaine Aldunate. Santiago: Editora Zig-Zag S. A., 1988, 203 pp.

A former director of Chile's leading newspaper and a strong supporter of the Pinochet government documents the process by which the country's authoritarian and nationalistic military leaders came to embrace relatively radical free-market economic concepts. Based on in-depth interviews with 33 knowledgeable insiders, the book details how a plan devised in 1972 by ten largely Chicago-trained economists dismayed at the economic deterioration under Allende came to revolutionize the country's economic policy. It recounts how the plan (dubbed "the brick") was presented to each member of the junta by noon the day after the 1973 coup, and was slowly and sometimes painfully discussed and transformed over the next decade. It is particularly strong on the behind-the-scenes debates among the military and their civilian technicians over economic policy, and on how ideas get translated into policy within a dictatorship.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA, 1959–1987. By Nicola Miller. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 252 pp. $39.50 (paper, $12.95).

The author attempts to redress what she perceives as an imbalance in the literature on Soviet-Latin American relations by considering them with reference to both parties' relations with other powers, particularly the United States. Both the Soviet Union and specific Latin American countries have at times developed relationships with each other in order to influence their relations with Washington. Beyond this dimension, Moscow's interest in Latin America is primarily commercial but quite limited. The extremely close Soviet-Cuban relation is seen as idiosyncratic, the product of a unique set of circumstances that had more to do with the maneuvering of Eisenhower and Castro than with initiatives from Moscow. An informative and stimulating work.

U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS IN THE 1990s. Edited by Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Hernández. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1989, 324 pp. $38.00 (paper, $15.95).

This book, based on a workshop at Cuba's Center for American Studies in April 1988, seeks to identify the agenda for U.S.-Cuban relations in the 1990s by pinpointing underlying differences as well as bridgeable disputes. Although the North American authors are considerably more diverse and by and large more critical of U.S. policies than the Cuban authors are of Cuba's stance, there is considerable useful material here to illuminate one of the thorniest and, up to now, least dynamic of U.S. bilateral relationships at a time when so many other international positions are in great flux.

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BRITAIN AND LATIN AMERICA: A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP. Edited by Victor Bulmer-Thomas. New York: Cambridge University Press (with the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1989, 240 pp. $44.50.

Based on a Chatham House study group, this volume surveys the ups and downs of Great Britain's economic, political and cultural relations with Latin America. Most of Britain's specific interests in Latin America have been commercial, and these are much less important than they used to be. But Latin America is gaining some political salience in London, largely as a result of European Community considerations.

UNDERSTANDING CENTRAL AMERICA. By John A. Booth and Thomas W. Walker. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1989, 208 pp. $32.50 (paper, $13.95).

A primer on Central America and the causes and consequences of its current civil wars by two leading scholar-advocates who argue that "as long as the U.S. government remains a de facto ally of the privileged minorities of the region . . . it will simply be underwriting continuing instability." Although the authors portray Central America's complexities from their particular vantage point, they present much useful data and analysis needed for an introduction to this troubled region.

THE LATIN AMERICAN NARCOTICS TRADE AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY. Edited by Donald J. Mabry. Westport (CT): Greenwood Press, 1989, 216 pp. $37.95.

With the decline of the Cold War, the new perceived threat to U.S. national security in the western hemisphere is the drug trade and its complex interconnections with guerrilla movements, economic problems and the military. Although uneven in quality and marred by frequent typographical errors, this anthology usefully surveys many of the issues that will be at the heart of U.S. relations with Latin America, particularly with the Andean nations, in the years to come.

FRIENDS SO DIFFERENT: ESSAYS ON CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1980s. Edited by Lansing Lamont and J. Duncan Edmonds. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press (for the Americas Society), 1989, 318 pp.

Twenty-five essays, originally presented as talks at the Canadian affairs program of the Americas Society. The authors are Canadian and American, academic and governmental. They tell us what were the important issues of a decade: trade, environment, cultural tension, different perspectives on international politics. Gaddis Smith

RADICAL MANDARIN: THE MEMOIRS OF ESCOTT REID. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989, 405 pp. $35.00.

Escott Reid ranks close to Lester Pearson as a major figure in Canadian external affairs in the middle years of this century. This fine memoir takes us from his youth in Canada, through Oxford as a Rhodes scholar, his tenure as secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in the 1930s to high positions in External Affairs thereafter. American readers will be stimulated by the author's critical but fair comments on U.S. policy at several important junctures. Gaddis Smith

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IN SEARCH OF CANADA. Edited by Stephen R. Graubard. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction, 1989, 396 pp. $19.95 (paper).

Do not be put off by the title. This is not another tedious "who are we?" book, but rather a collection of informative essays, intended to enlighten non-Canadians on many aspects of Canada's culture and governance.

Gaddis Smith

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

HAROLD MACMILLAN. VOL. I: 1894–1956. By Alistair Horne. New York: Viking, 1989, 537 pp. $24.95.
HAROLD MACMILLAN. VOL. II: 1957–1986. By Alistair Horne. New York: Viking, 1989, 631 pp. $27.50.

The authorized biography of one of Britain's great leaders whose life encompassed much of this century's history. Badly wounded at the Somme, Macmillan went from publishing to politics and in World War II became "the viceroy of the Mediterranean." His public life ended in the glory of his being prime minister—immediately after the Suez fiasco. He was hailed at that time as "SuperMac," but there were darker moments as well, such as his involvement in turning over to the Soviets the Russian collaborators with the Germans. Alistair Horne, a veteran historian, drawing from new sources including Macmillan's own unpublished diaries from 1953 to 1963, places Macmillan in the context of British history and world politics, hence, a major work for the period of the war and the six years at No. 10 Downing Street. Renowned for his "unflappability," he was a lonely man, a voracious reader, afflicted by private griefs, foremost the enduring attachment of his wife to one of his friends and colleagues. His heroes were Disraeli and Churchill, who "both had the combination of the thinker and the doer—the artist and the man of action." An impressive and important portrait of a public man whose ultimate remoteness the biographer leaves inviolate.

SUEZ 1956: THE CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. Edited by Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen. New York: Oxford, 1989, 428 pp. $45.00.

A splendid collaborative effort by the leading experts, some of whom were active in the crisis, to establish the causes and consequences of Suez, in the light of newly available evidence and from the distance of thirty years. The crisis involved virtually every element of world politics, signifying, inter alia, the decline of European colonialism and the rise of Arab nationalism, the intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the decisive role of American economic power. But *Suez 1956* also illustrates the misperceptions, the twisted memories with their seemingly simple lessons, the fears, suspicions and ambitions that have a decisive bearing on politics—and not only in so murky a situation as Suez. A major work.

BETWEEN TWO FIRES: EUROPE'S PATH IN THE 1930s. By David C. Large. New York: Norton, 1990, 425 pp. $22.50.

Eight carefully reconstructed episodes from the Europe of the 1930s, almost all illustrative of the grim prelude to later horror. This successful piece of popular, highly readable history includes chapters on Hitler's and

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Stalin's purges, on Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia, and on the bombing of Guernica.

MEMOIRS: FIFTY YEARS OF POLITICAL REFLECTION. By Raymond Aron. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989, 509 pp. $45.00.

The memoirs of a celebrated French scholar, journalist and observer who, wittingly or not, was also a moralist and a political conscience. A French patriot and a Jew, Aron received his political education as a student in Germany during Hitler's rise to power. The book—with the inevitable presence of his fellow *normalién* and, later, lamented foe Jean-Paul Sartre—evokes the cultural-political milieu of France from the 1930s to the 1980s. Aron believed that his influence would be ephemeral, that he understood power but probably could never exercise it, that he had his own weaknesses, and yet that somehow he had come to occupy a unique niche in the post-1945 world.

THE GERMANS: RICH, BOTHERED AND DIVIDED. By David Marsh. London: Century, 1989, 364 pp. £16.96.

The Bonn reporter of the *Financial Times* has written a reliable survey of West Germany, *anno* 1988, based on well-chosen interviews and anecdotes, on shrewd perception and analysis. He depicts, inter alia, the West German press, industry, arms-makers, the Greens—and, of course, relations between the two Germanys. Out of date, as is yesterday's newspaper, but rich in information about the Germanys that is still relevant.

NIGHT AND FOG. By Arne Brun Lie with Robby Robinson. New York: Norton, 1990, 254 pp. $18.95.

As a Norwegian youth, Lie was an apprentice resister, arrested and tortured by Norwegian Nazis, then handed over to the Germans. He tells the by now familiar and yet ever incredible story of suffering and barely surviving in German camps, intertwined with the story of his later American life and a liberating sail back to Norway. How many such memories—probably most of them without the happy end—haunt Europeans today?

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

REFORM IN RUSSIA AND THE U.S.S.R. Edited by Robert O. Crummey. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1989, 318 pp. $27.50.
GORBACHEV'S AGENDA. Edited by Susan L. Clark. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1989, 422 pp. $35.95 (paper).

Historical perspective, provided by several essays in the volume edited by Robert Crummey on attempts at reform in Russia from Ivan the Terrible to Khrushchev, helps in understanding the factors of traditional political culture that can make or break perestroika. It also illustrates the complexity of the problems and how talented scholars—among them William Taubman, Alexander Yanov, Timothy Colton and Alexander Dallin—can disagree in interpreting them. Among the vital points they address are the relation between foreign policy and domestic reform and the ways in which the West can or should influence the process of change in the U.S.S.R. *Gorbachev's Agenda*, with a mixed group of American and

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European contributors, is also broad and generally realistic and cautious in its analysis, if less bold and searching than the volume edited by Crummey. The chapters on foreign policy provide an excellent review of the state of affairs as of early 1989. Both books stand in welcome contrast to the many superficial works on Gorbachev and reform now pouring out of the presses.

TOWARD A MORE CIVIL SOCIETY?: THE USSR UNDER MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH GORBACHEV. Edited by William Green Miller. New York: Harper & Row, 1989, 400 pp. $26.95.
THE NEW DÉTENTE: RETHINKING EAST-WEST RELATIONS. Edited by Mary Kaldor, Gerard Holden and Richard Falk. New York: Verso/Tokyo: The United Nations University, 1989, 420 pp. $65.00 (paper, $19.95).

Both these volumes are positive and optimistic about "new thinking" and new policies in the U.S.S.R., and both urge the West not to miss the golden opportunities for détente and peace. The volume edited by Miller contains up-to-date analyses of the dynamics of change and reform in Soviet society, competently done by scholars who are now or have been associated with the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations, and it concludes with brief reflections and recommendations by a number of prominent Americans including George Ball, William Colby, John Kenneth Galbraith, Olin Robison and others. *The New Détente* covers a wide range of East-West questions, past and present, with no lack of prescriptions for the future. The authors are from both East and West, many of them well out in front of official or conventional thinking in their own societies.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Archie Brown. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, 245 pp. $35.00 (paper, $12.95).

This book looks at the phenomena of the Gorbachev era in light of the history of the changing (and unchanging) factors in the nature of Soviet leadership ever since 1917. Personalities have counted, especially in the time of high Stalinism, but institutions count even more. The five authors are well versed in the nuts and bolts of the system and in the exploration of how political power in the Soviet Union is gained, used and sometimes lost.

GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC DILEMMA: AN INSIDER'S VIEW. By Olimpiad Ioffe. St. Paul (MN): Merrill/Magnus, 1989, 317 pp. $19.95.

Gorbachev is a product of the Soviet system, which has been based on the unlimited power of the political elite resting on a monopoly of economic power. His reforms, a phase in the long-established cyclical pattern of decentralization and recentralization, are intended to save and improve the system, not destroy it. Such is the thesis expounded by Dr. Ioffe, a law scholar who left the U.S.S.R. in 1981. He supports his thesis with a review of what he sees as the results of perestroika to date, not in declared aims but in the practical effects of the new laws and regulations.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS. By Raymond F. Smith. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989, 148 pp. $27.50 (paper, $10.95). An Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book.

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Are the doctrines and tactics of Soviet diplomacy also changing as the Soviet establishment is shaken up by the Gorbachev revolution? Raymond Smith draws on the experience and writings of others, on his own dealings with Soviet representatives in the course of his duties as a foreign service officer in Moscow and Washington, and on an exploration into Russian/Soviet political culture and ideology. Generalizations about national character and mind-set are surely subject to exceptions, but Smith is on solid ground in pointing to the factors of authority, risk-avoidance and control as keys to understanding Soviet negotiating behavior. He does have something new to say, and American diplomats should be listening.

SOVIET HISTORY IN THE GORBACHEV REVOLUTION. By R. W. Davies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989, 232 pp. $35.00 (paper, $12.95).

Profiting from the relaxation of censorship, Soviet writers have begun to dig into previously forbidden subjects. Professor Davies gives a brief but comprehensive account of what has been written, mainly since 1987, on such hot topics as Lenin's policies and legacy, the collectivization of land and the Great Famine, Stalin's purges and the Stalinist system, and the conduct of World War II. The bulk of these publications, incidentally, come from the pens of journalists and novelists; the establishment's professional historians have been slow to join in. Davies then goes into regime policy. How far should the revelations, revisions and rehabilitations go? After Bukharin and Zinoviev, what about Trotsky? If Stalin's policies were misguided, what about Lenin's? The importance of the current burst of attention to history, and thus the importance of this book, lies in its direct relevance to the present and future.

THINKING NEW ABOUT SOVIET "NEW THINKING." By V. Kubálková and A. A. Cruickshank. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1989, 143 pp. $11.50 (paper).

The authors believe that most Western (particularly American) Sovietologists have missed the boat in their facile interpretations of Gorbachev's "new thinking" on international relations, because they do not relate it to the Marxist ideology that gives it meaning. They devote the book to showing what the connection is and how the Soviet leader and his advisers, far from accommodating to Western norms, have in mind a new "counter-hegemonic" international order based on Marxism—but not on Leninism-Stalinism. The argument is stimulating. It also stretches the imagination.

GORBACHEV AND GLASNOST: VIEWPOINTS FROM THE SOVIET PRESS. Edited by Isaac J. Tarasulo. Wilmington (DE): Scholarly Resources, 1989, 363 pp. $35.00 (paper, $12.95).

Articles translated from the daily, weekly and monthly Soviet press, illustrating the explosion of public debate on the issues of reform, democratization, self-determination of nationalities, military and foreign policy. With glasnost the Soviet press is now an invaluable source of information on politics and society. The book is inevitably only a sampling, but the selection is judicious, including the views of conservatives as well as reformers.

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THE SOVIET EMPIRE: ITS NATIONS SPEAK OUT. Edited by Oleg Lebov and John Crowfoot. London and New York: Harwood, 1989, 189 pp.

Excerpts from speeches made at the historic first Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow in May-June 1989, presided over by Gorbachev. The speeches are mainly by representatives from the Baltic republics, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia, whose candor, criticism and insistence on their peoples' rights were unprecedented. Ernest Gellner contributes a thoughtful introduction.

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: "A TRAGIC EXPERIMENT." By Boris Z. Rumer. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, 204 pp. $39.95.

The Muslim republics of Soviet Central Asia have long had specific regional economic problems—shortage of water, ill-planned industrial complexes, overspecialization in cotton, underemployment—which Gorbachev inherited from his immediate predecessors. Rumer describes them briefly with the pertinent statistics and backup. Perestroika, unfortunately, does not hold much promise for the region, and with glasnost the local political and professional leaders are able, at least indirectly, to say so. Gloomy economic prospects are likely, sooner or later, to generate political instability and protest.

SOVIET STRATEGY AND ISLAM. By Alexandre Bennigsen and others. New York: St. Martin's, 1989, 182 pp. $45.00.

In the first part of the book the late Professor Bennigsen and his colleagues describe how the Soviets, particularly in the Brezhnev period, used their "establishment" Muslims (through visits, conferences, etc.) to further their objectives in the Muslim world. In the second part Paul Henze furnishes brief and pithy assessments, not neglecting unconventional operations, of Soviet success and failure in several Islamic regions: the Nile valley, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian peninsula. The accent is on success.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: NEW DYNAMICS, NEW THEMES. Edited by Carl G. Jacobsen. New York: St. Martin's, 1989, 214 pp. $45.00.

Gorbachev's new thinking and new departures in foreign policy, assessed by a number of seasoned experts, most of them Canadian, representing a diversity of interests and expertise. Besides the expected chapters on East-West relations and arms control there are others off the beaten track (e.g., on Arctic security). The editor contributes an excellent piece on relations with China. One recurrent theme: Gorbachev is for real; this is no exercise in propaganda and deception.

THE SOCIALIST PYRAMID: ELITES AND POWER IN YUGOSLAVIA. By Lenard J. Cohen. Oakville (Ontario): Mosaic Press, 1989, 500 pp. (Lanham, MD: Kampmann National Book Network, distributors, $29.95).

Lenard Cohen applies the techniques of sociopolitical research and analysis to Yugoslavia's system of government over the entire period since World War II. A massive study, the product of many years' labor, it makes a signal contribution to our knowledge of the makeup of Yugoslavia's "new class" as personnel and personnel policy has changed over the years. Some readers may find the book rather dry, politics seen through an array of statistical tables with little on the colorful personalities, cutthroat rivalries,

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high ideals and sordid realities that are the stuff of life at the top. But that of course is a different book. The author has done what he set out to do and has done it superbly.

OPERATION AUTONOMOUS: WITH S.O.E. IN WARTIME ROMANIA. By Ivor Porter. London: Chatto & Windus, 1989, 268 pp. £18.

A welcome addition to the literature on the diplomacy and intelligence operations surrounding the efforts to bring about Romania's surrender and switch of sides in World War II. Porter's account covers both his own experiences (he was dropped into Romania in December 1943, captured and held prisoner, and remained in the country with the British political mission after the Romanian surrender in August 1944) and the larger issues of British, Soviet and Romanian policy.

DIARY. VOL. II: 1957-1961. By Witold Gombrowicz. Evanston (IL): Northwestern University Press, 1989, 239 pp. $29.95 (paper, $12.95).

Gombrowicz was the brilliant and mordant Polish writer who lived most of his adult life in exile in Argentina, stranded there at the beginning of World War II and unacceptable to the postwar communist regime. This volume of the diary is more accessible and somehow sunnier than the slightly shrouded first (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1988/89). His ideas as advanced here remain the same, epigrammatic and resolutely contrarian; e.g., Polish writers suffer from excessive Polishness; a painting can never be as interesting as what it depicts; "to be a man means never to be oneself." The last entry is a terrifying tour de force. There will be a third and final volume of this remarkable diary. Lucy Despard

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

INTIFADA: THE PALESTINE UPRISING—ISRAEL'S THIRD FRONT. By Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990, 325 pp.

Two Israeli journalists, who have already produced a first-rate book on the war in Lebanon, turn their sights on the Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories, which they see as a mass revolt of a population with nothing to lose. Combining accounts of specific episodes with discussion of the basic issues, they are merciless in exposing the failures of leadership on both sides and the danger that, if matters continue as at present, the middle ground will be lost and only extremists left to contend. At the end they present their own quite detailed proposals for negotiation and settlement, including the point that there is no way to bypass the PLO.

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. By Augustus Richard Norton and Martin H. Greenberg. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989, 233 pp. $34.95.

TERRORISM: THE PLO CONNECTION. By Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai. New York: Crane Russak, 1989, 258 pp.

These studies cover some of the same ground although they approach the subject from quite different angles. Alexander and Sinai are bent on

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documenting the record of terrorism for which the PLO, or its factions, can be held responsible. It is not a pretty story, but they say nothing about Israeli counterterrorism. The Norton-Greenberg volume is in a lower key, stressing the PLO's political role as representative of Palestinian nationalism and its international diplomacy. The chapters on relations with the U.S.S.R. and with China are especially good.

FACTS AND FABLES: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. By Clifford A. Wright. New York: Routledge, 1989, 239 pp. $39.95.

The "fables" in this instance are those propagated by Israel and the Zionists, which are refuted by the "facts." Some of the author's points are well taken, but for the most part this is a book of Arab propaganda to offset Israeli propaganda. There is no middle ground, nor is there much in the way of clear and recognizable truth that can settle these arguments.

GREATER SYRIA: THE HISTORY OF AN AMBITION. By Daniel Pipes. New York: Oxford, 1990, 272 pp. $29.95.

The author overstates the case in calling Pan-Syrianism "possibly the most disregarded topic of Middle East history in the 20th century," and in finding it to be a dominant factor in the politics of the region. However, he has written a superior book, tracing the impact of the idea on the region's tortured history since World War I, from the ambitions and machinations of Faisal and Abdullah to those of Hafez al-Assad. Above all, the theme is relevant to Syria's adventures in Lebanon; less so for the fate of "southern Syria" (Jordan and Palestine). The idea and the ambition lose force because, as Pipes himself notes, "there is no Greater Syrian nation." There is still an often troublesome "lesser Syrian" state.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Gideon Fishelson. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1989, 372 pp. $39.50.

There is an air of unreality about this book. It lays out many possibilities of economic cooperation and development involving Israel and Arab states (including a Marshall Plan equivalent) that, given present political conditions, cannot be brought into being. The idea of peace through mutually beneficial economic projects has a long and sad history in the area. The volume does contain useful data and analyses on a wide range of economic problems, however, mainly but not only by Israeli authors.

THE PRAGMATIC ENTENTE: ISRAELI-IRANIAN RELATIONS, 1948–1988. By Sohrab Sobhani. New York: Praeger, 1989, 179 pp.

Iran and Israel are an odd couple, but both found good reasons to cooperate in the time of the late shah and also, in a more limited way, in that of the Islamic Republic. This is a journeyman monograph, better on the earlier than the later period. The author had no access to primary documents on the two sides, but he has made good use of interviews and has found many items of interest in the documents stolen by student militants from the U.S. embassy in Tehran and later published.

CONSISTENCY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE GULF WAR AND THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR. Edited by Abbas Alnasrawi and Cheryl Rudenberg. Belmont (MA): Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1989, 155 pp. $10.95 (paper).

The book's purpose, say the editors, is not to retell or embroider the

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Iran-contra story but to place it in the context of long-established and consistent U.S. policy. Their interpretation of that policy is revisionist in the sense that they see it as driven by corporate interests (i.e., in the Middle East, by the oil companies) and intent on smashing Third World nationalist movements, notably in the Arab region. Not all the contributors pay strict attention to that theme, and there are some interesting pieces, especially on the Israel-Iran connection and on Israel's role in the Iran-contra affair.

THE GULF AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: THE 1980s AND BEYOND. Edited by M. E. Ahrari. New York: St. Martin's, 1989, 200 pp. $49.95.

As its contributors are well versed in the political affairs and security problems of the Persian Gulf region, the volume has considerable merit. The papers were written before the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, however, which makes it difficult for the authors to venture safely "beyond the 1980s." Each author is very much on his own, and the reader has a choice of conclusions, and occasionally of statements of "fact." Two authors dealing with U.S. policy present an interesting contrast: one, James Noyes, is balanced and cautious; the other, Gregory Rose, looses a fistful of poisoned arrows.

IN THE NAME OF GOD: THE KHOMEINI DECADE. By Robin Wright. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989, 284 pp. $19.95.

An accomplished journalist's swiftly moving account of the Khomeini revolution and the ensuing decade of theocratic power in Iran. The best and most revealing part of the book deals with the struggles within the regime and the close connections, both in ideology and in practice, between domestic and foreign policy. The author, wary of prediction, outlines the daunting tasks facing Khomeini's successors who, whatever their abilities, will not be able to rule in the name of God.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

"TELL THE WORLD": WHAT HAPPENED IN CHINA AND WHY. By Liu Binyan with Ruan Ming and Xu Gang. New York: Pantheon, 1990, 195 pp. $18.95.

China's best-known journalist, Liu Binyan, in collaboration with two other former members of the Chinese Communist Party, provide a graphic account of the Old Guard running the party since the massacres in Tienanmen Square. The authors predict that increasing social crises and popular opposition will enable the more moderate forces within the party to replace the hardliners in the government.

PACIFIC DESTINY: INSIDE ASIA TODAY. By Robert Elegant. New York: Crown, 1990, 512 pp. $24.95.

Robert Elegant, a talented journalist and fiction writer, does for East Asia what Hedrick Smith, Robert Kaiser and David Shipler did for the Soviet Union. He has authored a balanced, thoughtful and beautifully written account of the spectacular rise of East Asia to economic predominance during the past several decades. Elegant's advice to the United

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States, if it is to meet the Asian challenge, is to achieve coordination among industry, academia, government and finance, and to make a major psychological adjustment that gets away from "quarter-by-quarter vision."

JAPAN'S GROWING POWER OVER EAST ASIA AND THE WORLD ECONOMY. By William R. Nester. New York: St. Martin's, 1990, 282 pp. $49.95.
DESTINIES SHARED: U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS. Edited by Paul Gordon Lauren and Raymond F. Wylie. Boulder (CO): Westview Press, 1989, 198 pp. $34.95.

These two volumes provide considerable background on the U.S.-Japanese relationship, where it stands today, and the alternative courses it might take in the critical years ahead. The tone of *Destinies Shared*, which is a collection of essays by specialists, is more optimistic than that of Nester. Both volumes suffer from the lack of a macroeconomic perspective and from the absence of a sufficiently detailed, up-to-date analysis of Japanese-U.S. economic relations.

PAKISTAN: TRANSITION FROM MILITARY TO CIVILIAN RULE. By Golam W. Choudhury. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989, 256 pp. $39.95.

Over the years a number of academics and politicians have tried to make the case for "qualified" democracy: guided democracy, one-party democracy, socialist democracy, etc. The Bengali academic and former Pakistani government official Golam Choudhury now tells us there is something called "Islamic democracy," brought to Pakistan by the late President Zia ul-Haq. The author manages to avoid all the most difficult questions in his effort to justify this oxymoron. When it comes to analyzing the rights of non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan, for example, he assures us that the rights accorded to any minority in any state depend on the ideals of those in power, not on the laws and institutions that protect those rights. He also sees no problem in the fact that Zia introduced a federal Shariah court that changed, amended or nullified about 500 existing laws of the country on the grounds that these laws were repugnant to the Koranic injunctions. A solid book remains to be written on Pakistan; this one falls far short of the task.

INDIA BRIEFING, 1989. Edited by Marshall M. Bouton and Philip Oldenburg. Boulder (CO): Westview Press/New York: The Asia Society, 1989, 198 pp. $33.95 (paper, $14.95).

The Asia Society's annual briefing book on current developments in India is again carried out in a skillful manner. There are solid chapters on Indian economics and politics, the ferment among women, the media and environmental problems. Lloyd I. Rudolph has a particularly penetrating essay on Indian domestic and foreign policy in which he highlights the growth of Indian military power (Indian armed forces now rank fourth after the Soviet Union, China and the United States). According to Rudolph, Australian and Indonesian defense analysts in particular now wonder about India's long-term intentions, and the author sees an unresolved tension between India's effort to be both a world military power and the nonaligned promoter of a nonnuclear, peaceful world.

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Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

ISARA: A VOYAGE AROUND "ESSAY." By Wole Soyinka. New York: Random House, 1989, 262 pp. $18.95.

Following on his Nobel Prize-winning autobiographical *Ake*, Nigeria's master writer limns a magisterial portrait of his father, in a fictionalized account of his central role in a chieftaincy struggle in his Yoruba town. Like *Ake*, *Isara* gently illuminates the often ambiguous relationship between Africans and the West; the same confident rendering of punctilious Western embroidery upon the rich fabric of Africa that permeated the earlier book continues to evoke pleasure and nostalgia for another era.

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA: THE REAGAN YEARS. By Pauline H. Baker. New York: Ford Foundation/Foreign Policy Association, 1989, 158 pp.

Leading off this comprehensive update of an influential 1981 Ford Foundation study is an essay on the Reagan years and the policy of Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker that sums up the final epoch of the Cold War in southern Africa. Its usefulness is enhanced by the inclusion of several chronologies (of U.S.-South African relations and events in South Africa), a bibliography and appendices chronicling major watersheds.

THE ECONOMICS OF APARTHEID. By Stephen R. Lewis, Jr. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990, 195 pp. $17.95 (paper).

"The South African economy is too far advanced to be able to sustain apartheid." Why this striking conclusion makes sense and how the heavily state-run economy reached that point are explained in some detail in this interesting and timely volume. The limited but real effects of external pressure are carefully analyzed, and there is an imaginative examination of what directions might be taken by a post-apartheid economy. The author, an economist with a good bit of African experience, is president of Carleton College. William Diebold, Jr.

DEMOCRACY IN BLACK AFRICA: SURVIVAL AND REVIVAL. By John A. Wiseman. New York: Paragon House, 1990, 224 pp. $22.95.

A British scholar looking at the surviving examples of democracy in Africa seeks to "change the focus from failure to success." His method involves detailed narration of the history of democratic politics in post-colonial Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius, and also of the revived democracy of Senegal, as well as that of other countries where democracy has flickered on and off since the post-independence coups of the 1960s. He does not probe the democratic aspirations among Africa's people, though this is surely important in understanding the surprising tenacity of democracy in often inhospitable circumstances.

SADCC: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. By Margaret C. Lee. Nashville (TN): Winston-Derek, 1989, 307 pp. $16.95 (paper).

This study takes a comprehensive look at the economies of the SADCC countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland,

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Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), and at the structure of the regional organization, pointing out the continuing problems of South African destabilization and of the sporadic commitment of international donors. It offers little information, however, on certain key issues—what regional links now exist and what policies should be pursued to augment them.

LIVES OF COURAGE: WOMEN FOR A NEW SOUTH AFRICA. By Diana E.H. Russell. New York: Basic Books, 1989, 375 pp. $22.95.

South African women speak about racial and sexual politics. Taken together, these women's stories and reflections strongly render the pains experienced by the most vulnerable in the brutal world structured by apartheid—as well as of "misfit" women in a highly sexist society. This is an excellent book for radically changing times, as it addresses some of the fundamental dilemmas of human relations that will dog South Africa's people for the foreseeable future.

COCOA AND CHAOS IN GHANA. By Gwendolyn Mikell. New York: Paragon House, 1989, 284 pp. $29.95.

The author, an African specialist and anthropologist, lays out a richly detailed social history of Ghana from the fifteenth century to the present. More interesting than her thematic focus on the destructive effects of the monocrop cocoa economy is her careful exposition of the interplay between economic and social forces over centuries, and particularly the effects of adverse economic change on women's status in what had been a matrilineal society.

MAASAI DAYS. By Cheryl Bentsen. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989, 286 pp. $19.95.

The author, formerly with the *Los Angeles Times*, recounts her odyssey among several families of Masai encountered near Nairobi, where she lived. Building on sensitively pursued relationships with a few individuals, she delineates the complicated intersection of this traditional pastoral tribe with the late twentieth century. Most of Bentsen's Masai friends are untypically ambitious for nontraditional achievements, and their faltering efforts to vault the hurdles posed by modern life in Kenya tell us much about the meeting of two worlds.

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Edited by Janis A. Kreslins

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Asia and the Pacific Ocean

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1. The review of *Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in June*, by Harrison E. Salisbury, on page 223, should have included the signature of William G. Hyland.

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